

F B I

Date: May 27, 1958

Transmit the following in

PLAIN TEXT

(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTELTELETYPE

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Nease
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Clayton
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

*R. F. Powers
Gaffney*

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
 FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (62-11998)
 RE: FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC,
MIKE WALLACE TV INTERVIEW PROGRAM
INFORMATION CONCERNING

The spring meeting of the "Crusade for America" was held at the Garden City Hotel, Garden City, Long Island, New York, on May 26, 1958. The main speakers were WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY, Jr., editor of the "National Review" and L. BRENT BOZELL, co-author with BUCKLEY of "Mc Carthy and his Enemies."

BUCKLEY, in answer to a written question from the audience concerning his opinion of the CYRUS EATON attack on the FBI, stated that EATON was either "a lunatic or was Communist inspired." BUCKLEY stated that EATON had no objective evaluation for his analysis of the FBI. He further characterized EATON's analysis as an "affront to reason," and he diagnosed EATON as suffering from "a dislocation either emotional or intellectual." BUCKLEY related that the curious spectacle is that people waste time on such statements and that people, like EATON, get front page publicity in the "New York Times" for such utterances.

POWERS

REC-41

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EX-102

12 MAY 28 1958

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Approved: E. Powers
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M

Per _____

*CRAVEN REC.**LAWSON*

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Nease

DATE: May 23, 1958

FROM : M. A. Jones

SUBJECT: FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC
BACKING OF MIKE WALLACE
TV INTERVIEW PROGRAM

Tolson _____
 Boardman _____
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 Gandy _____
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 7633

You will recall that we instructed the New York Office to attempt to obtain any press release which might have been issued by the Fund for the Republic in connection with their contribution of \$50,000 to back a 13-week series of Mike Wallace television interviews entitled "Survival and Freedom."

After making very discreet contacts through established sources, the New York Office advised at 5:00 p.m. today that they had definitely ascertained that the Fund for the Republic made no formal press statement. New York further advised that the first notice of this program appeared in "Variety" dated April 30, 1958, and they made this clipping available to the Bureau by airtel dated May 5, 1958.

A copy of the items submitted by New York from "Variety" is attached. - see 100-391697-521

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information.

Enclosure

1 - Mr. Nease
 1 - Mr. Gaffney - Room 7633

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Office Mem

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• UNITED ST

GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
 Attn.: Crime Records Section
 FROM : SAC, NYC (62-11998)

DATE: 5/23/58

SUBJECT: FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC;
 MIKE WALLACE TV INTERVIEW PROGRAM

Mr. Tolson	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Boardman	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mr. B. Tamm	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Rosen	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Tamm	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Trotter	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Clayton	<input type="checkbox"/>
Tele. Room	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Holloman	<input type="checkbox"/>
Miss Gandy	<input type="checkbox"/>

This is to advise that information has been discreetly obtained reflecting that the following individuals will appear on the MIKE WALLACE program for the next four weeks:

5/25/58 ERICH FROMM;

6/1/58 ADLAI STEVENSON;

6/8/58 SYLVESTER "PAT" WEAVER, former President, born Los Angeles 12/21/23
National Broadcasting Co.; wife; Elizabeth Ing'lis6/15/58 CHARLES H. PERCY, President, Bell & Howell Co.
Born Hansacola, Fla. 7/27/17, res. - Illinois.

In the event additional names are received for subsequent programs, the Bureau will be immediately advised.

EJP:MT

(2) Bureau
1-NY 62-11998

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EX-123 NO JUN 4 1958

70 JUN 5 1958

LIAISON

CRIME REC

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Nease
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Clayton
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (62-11998)

O FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC
IKE WALLACE T.V. INTERVIEW PROGRAM
INFORMATION CONCERNING

Attached hereto are newspaper clippings from
the following NY newspapers concerning captioned subject
matter:

"New York Herald Tribune"	5/22/58
"New York Post"	5/22/58
"New York World Telegram and Sun"	5/22/58
"New York Journal American"	5/22/58
"New York Daily News"	5/22/58

POWERS

3-Bureau
4-New York (62-11998)

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 10/11/01 BY SP/SL/BS

5 7 MAY 29 1958

orig: Belmont

INITIALS ON _____

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158 MAY 82 1958

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson

FROM : G. A. Nease

S1 SUBJECT: FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC C

DATE: June 2, 1958

~~Tolson
Boardman
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Tele. Room
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For record purposes, Judge James R. Duncan of the Subversive Activities Control Board gave Mr. McGuire the attached two printed copies of the verbatim text of the Mike Wallace interviews with Cyrus S. Eaton and William O. Douglas, and it is apparent, from the printed material, that wide dissemination is being given to the Mike Wallace series by the Fund for the Republic.

1 -Mr. Belmont
1 -Mr. Jones

Enclosures

JJM:sak SK
(4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 4/13/81 BY SP-16SK/mw

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EX-123

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LIAISON

57 JUN 10 1958

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The Fund for the Republic

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New York, N. Y.

A Mike Wallace

interview with

William O. Douglas

*Produced by the American Broadcasting Company
in association with*

The Fund for the Republic



This is one of a series of thirteen Mike Wallace Interviews, produced by the American Broadcasting Company in association with the Fund for the Republic for the purpose of stimulating public discussion of the basic issues of survival and freedom in America today. This transcript has been edited. Single copies are available without charge from the Fund for the Republic; additional copies 10 cents each.

William O. Douglas has been an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States since 1939. Born in Minnesota in 1898, he taught in the law schools of Columbia and Yale and served as Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission. In addition to his distinguished career as a member of our highest court, he has become known for his books on American freedom, such as "An Almanac of Liberty," "We the Judges," and "The Right of the People," and for his explorations of distant lands, which have resulted in books like "Of Men and Mountains," "Beyond the High Himalayas," and "North From Malaya."

The Fund's Study of the Free Society

The major program of the Fund for the Republic is a study of the basic issues underlying a free society. This study is directed at clarifying fundamental questions concerning freedom and justice that emerge when the forms and principles developed by eighteenth century America meet the ideas and practices of today's highly developed industrial society. One of the aims of the study is to widen the circles of public discussion of these questions. It is for this reason that the Fund is assisting in the presentation of the Mike Wallace Interviews.

The task of clarification is being undertaken by ten distinguished Americans acting as a Central Committee of Consultants to the Fund. These men are:

- A. A. BERLE, JR.
Attorney, author, former Assistant Secretary of State
- SCOTT BUCHANAN
Philosopher, author, former Dean of St. John's College
- EUGENE BURDICK
Political scientist, University of California; novelist
- ERIC F. GOLDMAN
Professor of history, Princeton; Bancroft Prize winner
- CLARK KERR
President-elect, University of California; labor economist
- HENRY R. LUCE
Editor-in-Chief, Time, Life, Fortune
- JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J.
Theologian, Woodstock College; editor of Theological Studies
- REINHOLD NIEBUHR
Vice-president and graduate professor, Union Theological Seminary
- ISIDOR I. RABI
Nobel Prize scientist; Higgins Professor of Physics, Columbia University
- ROBERT REDFIELD
Professor of anthropology, University of Chicago; former president, American Anthropological Association
- ROBERT M. HUTCHINS
President of the Fund, serves as Chairman of the Committee

civilization. These great values are not our standard of living, fine as that is, but our ideas of freedom, our ideas on the dignity of man, the equality of man, the idea that government cannot do certain things to the individual, that his beliefs, his conscience, and his ideas are his own, and it is nobody's business what he thinks.

WALLACE: Are you saying, sir, that a good many of the people, perhaps even a majority of the people listening to you tonight, are insufficiently concerned with their own freedoms?

DOUGLAS: I think that we're all in default in not being alive to the encroachments that have been going on, in not being alive to the dangers of continuing encroachment, and in not being willing to stand up in the school-hall or in the auditorium or in the courtroom and saying: "This should not be done. We disagree with this man but let him speak his mind and we'll answer him with our own good arguments."

WALLACE: Justice Douglas, I certainly thank you for spending this half-hour with us talking about freedom of expression. And, if I may quote from page 54 of your book, *The Right of the People*, I believe these are your words, in the case of *Terminiello v. Chicago*. . . .

DOUGLAS: Yes, I think I wrote that.

WALLACE: ". . . a function of free speech under our system of government," said Justice Douglas, "is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea." . . . The life-blood of a free society is freedom of expression. Cut off this life-blood and a free society withers and dies. If we are to live as free men we must think and speak like free men. We must affirm, and not abridge, our freedoms.

WALLACE: This is William O. Douglas, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. Not long ago, Justice Douglas wrote: In recent years, as we have denounced the loss of liberty abroad, we have witnessed its decline here." We'll find out why in a moment.

ANNOUNCER: The Mike Wallace Interview, presented by the American Broadcasting Company in association with the Fund for the Republic, brings you a special television series discussing the problems of Survival and Freedom in America.

WALLACE: Good evening, I'm Mike Wallace. America prides itself on its freedoms; chief among them: freedom of expression, freedom to exchange ideas. These freedoms have the blessings of our civic leaders, our newspapers, our politicians. But in practice, are we always granted those freedoms, and do we always use the freedoms we have? Our guest . . . Justice William O. Douglas of the United States Supreme Court. . . . Justice Douglas, in your new book, *The Right of the People*, you write this: "In recent years, as we have denounced the loss of liberties abroad, we have witnessed its decline here in America." Where have our liberties declined recently here in the United States?

DOUGLAS: Well, after World War II we had a real problem on our hands with subversives operating for the Communist orbit of influence in the

world and we had the necessary task of ferreting them out and getting them out of important jobs in government. But instead of going about it as the British did, in a very discreet, rather silent, behind-the-scenes manner, we started having public trials of people, and the whole question not only of what they had done but of their beliefs and attitudes began to be looked into. And so people became more and more frightened and, to get a job or to keep a job, wanted to be safe. So I think there has been a general contraction of the feeling of being able to speak freely and a general lowering of the standards of free expression that we enjoyed in early days.

WALLACE: Is it understandable that in our craving for security, if you will, in a cold war, the American people might be willing in a sense to give up a few of their freedoms because of the fear that they're going to lose their security?

DOUGLAS: I don't think there is any such thing as a conscious choice or any imminence of that kind of crisis developing, but I think that the trend to conformity has been great in America for a number of reasons since World War II. The hunt for the subversive, I think, has been one of them. I was sitting on a plane just the other day riding into Washington and a lady, a stranger, said to me that she had found a subversive in her child's public schoolroom. I asked her what her definition of a subversive was and she said "a person who was a Socialist." She was convinced that the man who taught art in this public school was a Socialist and therefore a subversive. It is that kind of non-discriminating analysis that has become more and more common in American public life.

WALLACE: Should freedom of speech, according to your understanding, include the freedom to challenge the very basis of an existing government?

DOUGLAS: In the Jeffersonian sense of freedom of speech there should be no horizons on debate, on talk. People should be tested not by their loyalty,

intellectual field — communication among scholars. For advancement, rapid advancement, continuous advancement in the field of science there should be unlimited discourse, unlimited communication between experts, without putting barriers up to prevent our men from contacting others.

WALLACE: In other words, if I may become this specific, sir, you feel that our scientists should have the right to talk freely about science with Russian or Red Chinese scientists?

DOUGLAS: With everyone. Espionage, of course, is one thing. All of these things involve a certain amount of risk. England turned up with a Fuchs who was a traitor and so on. But those are risks that must be taken. Being alive is itself quite a risk. But keeping the avenues open between scholars is very important. When I was in Russia, I was amazed at the extent to which the Russian libraries are filled with American scientific magazines. Everything is there that we publish and so little of the Russian is here.

WALLACE: I would like, if I may, to cite another poll — this one from a recent book called *The American Teenager*. Taken a couple of years ago, the poll showed that 41 per cent of our teenagers disagreed with the principles of freedom of the press; 34 per cent were against the principle of freedom of speech; and a few other guarantees in the bill of rights were also disapproved of by a large percentage of the teenagers. Now, then, the question that I would like to put to you is: Do you believe that we are apparently failing to raise a new generation with a respect for basic freedoms?

DOUGLAS: Well, I think that we're not giving enough emphasis to it in our schools. Too many students come out of grade school and high school without knowing what the Bill of Rights is. They don't get it emphasized in their classrooms or in their textbooks. I think that what we need is a great educational program, an awakening of the people to the great values that are in our

of being a censor, of imposing upon a community some official's idea as to what is right or decent or of what the people should read. You and I as parents have great responsibilities to be censors of what comes into the house for the children. We have a great responsibility to see that they get exposed to the great books, the great literature of the world, and spend their time on that — on the Bible and other great books — rather than on just the trash that is turned out. Church groups can properly become interested in things of that kind. It is when government steps in and uses the police and the powers of imprisonment to become the censor that I object. That's where I draw the line. All the Constitution speaks about all the way through is what government may not do. The authors were thinking in terms of protecting citizens against the government.

WALLACE: But you do feel that pressure groups of sorts — religious, social, or commercial — have the right to bring pressure to bear on books or magazines or motion pictures, let's say, which they consider offensive or lurid or immoral.

DOUGLAS: They can do what they like as long as they don't enlist the arm of the law, to put the law — that is, government, the sheriff, or police — behind one social creed, behind one religious doctrine, behind one moral code, in preference to others. That's what I meant by literature and morality being competitive.

WALLACE: You have written, Justice Douglas, that restrictions on freedom of speech and expression have been partially responsible for the fact that we have lost ground in science. What did you mean by that?

DOUGLAS: That has been only one of the several reasons why we have lost ground in science, but restrictions upon communication with the rest of the world — between people from various walks of life with various points of view and ideological differences — have slowed up communication. Communication is extremely important in any

not by beliefs, not by utterances, but by their actions. Jefferson would draw the line between speech on the one side and actions on the other. He would, I think, put no limits on speech. There would be no horizons. The way to combat error, according to his classic statement, was with reason; to fight one idea with another idea, to fight one doctrine with another doctrine, to fight one belief with another belief, but never to make any idea taboo and put it beyond discussion or suppress it, because once you start suppressing ideas you get a very unhealthy influence developing in a society.

WALLACE: Most people who expressed fears that America was losing its liberties seemed most fearful four or five years ago, when, as they claimed, our hysteria over communism put our respect for civil liberties into the shadows. But we seem to have recovered somewhat from that period. Do you think that our regard for liberty has been declining even since then?

DOUGLAS: I don't know that it has been declining, but I do have the feeling that we have become a little more insensitive to inroads and that the inclination to look for a teacher who is so-called "safe," a minister who is "safe," a Congressman who is "safe" — this levelling-down process — has continued.

WALLACE: When you say "safe," what does that mean?

DOUGLAS: A man who doesn't have unorthodox ideas, who conforms to the pattern of general thought and thinking, who is not a contentious character, whose ideas are readily acceptable, who is not apt to draw the wrath of people in the field of ideas.

WALLACE: What you are saying, in a sense, is that this becomes stultifying to the American culture?

DOUGLAS: The great and invigorating influences in American life have been the unorthodox: the people who challenge an existing institution or way of life, or say and do things that make people

think about what *they* are doing, the values implicit in what they are doing. Constant re-examination is a healthy thing.

WALLACE: One of your major concerns in the area of freedom of expression is freedom of speech, which is guaranteed under the First Amendment to the Constitution. Now, in your book *The Right of the People*, you say that even this freedom is being modified, restricted somewhat. Just how — in what sense, sir?

DOUGLAS: The theory has developed in some circles that freedom of speech which, in terms, is *absolute* in the First Amendment, is subject to regulation, to reasonable regulation, by the legislative bodies. The First Amendment says that Congress shall make no law abridging freedom of speech, freedom of the press, or freedom of religion. It would be unthinkable in the Jeffersonian sense that freedom of the press could be regulated by reasonable or unreasonable regulations. The law says, the Constitution says, that an editor is free to express himself, that apart from such laws as the laws of libel — which are implicit exceptions — he does not need to submit his editorial page before publication to any board of censors; that he can write what he wants, even though it's against the opinion of the government or of the majority of the people; that he can present to his readers any point of view, whether it is a minority or majority point of view, whether it's orthodox or unorthodox.

WALLACE: Samuel Johnson said — and I wonder if you would give us your opinion of it: "Every society has a right to preserve public peace and order and therefore has a right to prohibit the propagation of opinions which have a dangerous tendency."

DOUGLAS: That was an idea that Sam Johnson had, and it is still widely held in some parts of the world. But we got away from it when we adopted Jefferson's and Madison's ideas on promulgating a written Constitution. Now the written

society flourish is not only the great production lines of automobiles and other commodities but the right to worship, to believe what you think, to speak as you want to, to see on television things you want to see and not be censored.

WALLACE: All right, we live in a democracy and, ostensibly, in a democracy the majority rules. Let's look at freedom of speech from that point of view. A couple of years ago a survey showed that the majority of the people in the United States would not want a Communist to speak in their community; the majority believed that Communists should be deprived of their citizenship. This is a democracy. Why shouldn't the rule of the majority in a democracy therefore be realized?

DOUGLAS: Well, when our Court sits down to make a decision on an important case, we would never think of first taking a Gallup poll to find out how people felt about the question, because that is an irrelevancy. What people think about it is irrelevant because we live under a government of laws and under a written Constitution. Our Constitution was premised upon the sovereignty of the people. The men who drew it were wise men and knew that even a majority can be a tyrannist group, that even a majority can be as guilty of great oppressions as a king or as the Central Soviet Committee. So they set up safeguards for minorities. The greatest glory in our Constitution, I think, apart from the sovereignty of the people, is the check upon what the government, speaking for the people, can do to the individual, to the minority — whether it be a racial minority, a religious minority, or a minority in literature or radio or television or economic theory.

WALLACE: Let's move to another area, sir. Talking of freedom of expression in your book, you say: "Literature and morality should enjoy competitive co-existence." What did you mean?

DOUGLAS: I think what I had in mind was the evils that we run into when government assumes the role

original thinking; to not deviate very far from the official policy on, say, Red China, India, Israel, the Arab world, or what-have-you; to be safe and not get into controversial issues so that he won't be called before his government to be asked questions or to raise problems with his private employer.

WALLACE: What you're saying is that we have freedoms as Americans that we don't use sufficiently?

DOUGLAS: We have a great reservoir of freedoms, the greatest reservoir of any people in the world. The great reservoir of freedom that we have is, after all, the one outstanding thing that distinguishes us from the Communist world. The Communist world, as I have seen it, would be a terrible place to live because there is no place for the spirit of man, for his soul — no place for his conscience, no place for individual utterances of dissident views. The Russians read what is on the bookstands, and the bookstands are made up of material that has gone through the Russian censor; it's all safe and secure stuff from the Communist point of view.

WALLACE: But they seem to thrive and flourish, Justice Douglas. We ask the question, "Is freedom necessary?" Evidently, freedom is not necessary to a thriving and flourishing Russian society.

DOUGLAS: I wouldn't call Russia a thriving, flourishing place. To be sure, they can put up a Sputnik, but when you get into the field of the humanities, when you get into the field of religion, when you get into the field of poetry and literature, it's a very stultifying place. There are no ideas. There's a great revolution going on silently inside Russia among the lawyers and law professors and judges to get more freedom for the courts. But they can't get anywhere with their proposals for reform because the Communist Party doesn't want reform; they want complete control, complete security, a complete monopoly of all the powers and they're unwilling to give anything up. It's not a flourishing society. The one thing that makes our

Constitution that we have says that Congress shall not do certain things; the State shall not do certain things; certain things shall not be done to the citizens. Jefferson and Madison had in mind the protection of minority views — racial minorities, religious minorities, political minorities — against all forms and sorts of persecution. They put up, in other words, little "No Trespassing" signs and said: "Government shall not walk here." That is how our government is inherently different from many other governments including England, because England has no written Constitution.

WALLACE: If I understand *your* understanding clearly, you believe that the Constitution says no abridgement of speech is permissible. Let me see if I understand further exactly what you mean by freedom of speech, and I am sure that you have heard this question before. Should freedom of speech be granted to a man who, simply perhaps for the fun of it, leaps up in a theater, shouts "Fire" and thereby causes a panic?

DOUGLAS: That's been one of the classic illustrations in some of the legal literature. Of course that would not be protected. Of course a man who does a thing like that would commit a crime and it would be properly considered a crime. Such a pronouncement is more than speech; it is really producing a riot. It is not the dissemination of ideas, it is not discourse, it is not discussion of public events or of controversial issues. It certainly would not be protected by the First Amendment. But when it comes down to sociological matters, political matters, economic matters, farm prices, criminal law, deportation policies, foreign policy — the wide range of public affairs — then there should be no limitation or regulation.

WALLACE: Even in the case of a Communist or a Fascist or a racist who gets up at a meeting and says things that are repugnant to the great majority of society and even if he takes off after a minority group in a vile and unspeakable way? You still believe that he is entitled to freedom of

speech because he is talking within the area of sociology or economics or politics?

DOUGLAS: That was Jefferson's view and it was covered by his first inaugural address. The way to combat noxious ideas is with other ideas. The way to combat falsehoods is with truth. Brandeis made a classic statement in one of his historic opinions in the Court. Once you start saying this man shall not talk about this or this other man shall not talk about that, then you inaugurate a regime of real censorship and the question is where are you going to stop — and nobody is wise enough to stop at the right place.

WALLACE: I don't mean to carry this to a ridiculous extreme but, for instance, would you want to permit a Fascist then — I gather you would — to get up on a soapbox in front of the White House and call for the overthrow of our government and for its being taken over by a dictator? Do you think that's sensible?

DOUGLAS: Well, the front of the White House is a poor place to make a speech. We have a traffic problem, and traffic problems cannot be allowed to be disregarded by people who want to make a speech at a busy intersection. You know, the British in Hyde Park have set aside a place where anybody can get up and talk about anything, and there they are — all the crackpots that you can imagine making these stirring, moving, impassioned speeches in favor of some lost cause or other. It is a good healthy thing for a society to have a place like this. While the front of the White House would be a poor place to have it, the idea that you are talking about is, I think, a sound one.

WALLACE: The fact is, is it not, that some judges and other government officials, who are loyal Americans, do not fully share your views on freedom of speech? They want more restraint, more modification than you do.

DOUGLAS: That's right. We're in an area that is subject to a great debate and mine is one point of view.

WALLACE: What is the difference in the basic philosophy between these gentlemen and yourself?

DOUGLAS: That the citizens, in their beliefs, in their ideas, in their consciences, are superior to government. That the great abuses through history have been when government intrudes into the privacy of a man's thinking, when government lays its hand on his shoulder and says you shall not worship this way, you shall not think this thought, you shall not read this book. Those were the great oppressive chapters in history and the great achievement of our Bill of Rights was to put up "No Trespassing" signs and indicate where government cannot intrude.

WALLACE: But, from the other point of view, these are men who feel that for the common defense, for the common security, perhaps it is a good idea to put on a bit of a brake from time to time.

DOUGLAS: Yes, but I should not represent their point of view because I do not agree with it.

WALLACE: The military and political analyst, Walter Millis, has tackled this issue in a Fund for the Republic pamphlet called "Individual Freedom and the Common Defense." He says that some of our freedoms are being restricted because of the cold war. But he says that another factor is what he calls "the pressures of personal ambition and partisan fury, the reactions of those who see in communism less a threat to the free society than to their own positions of power or profit." Would you care to comment about that? Do you see any of that in America?

DOUGLAS: I haven't seen very much of that in America. I think that the influences towards suppression of minority views — towards orthodoxy in thinking about public issues — have been more subconscious or unconscious, stemming to a very great extent from the tendency among Americans to conform to the picture of the man in the Arrow collar ad — to be safe and sound and not to deviate or depart from an orthodox point of view; to have not much

The Fund for the Republic INC.

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*A Mike Wallace
interview with*

Cyrus S. Eaton

*Produced by the American Broadcasting Company
in association with*

The Fund for the Republic

100-391697-538



This is one of a series of thirteen Mike Wallace Interviews, produced by the American Broadcasting Company in association with the Fund for the Republic for the purpose of stimulating public discussion of the basic issues of survival and freedom in America today. This transcript has been edited. Single copies are available without charge from the Fund for the Republic; additional copies 10 cents each.

Cyrus S. Eaton is one of the leading industrialists in the country, organizer of the Republic Steel Company, member of the banking house of Otis and Co., chairman of the board of the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway, Steep Rock Iron Mines, Ltd., and the West Kentucky Coal Co., owner and operator of the Acadia Farms in Ohio and the Deep Cove Farms in Nova Scotia. Born in Nova Scotia in 1883, Mr. Eaton came to the United States in 1900 and was naturalized in 1913. His international conferences in Pugwash, Nova Scotia, in recent years have become famous.

The Fund's Study of the Free Society

The major program of the Fund for the Republic is a study of the basic issues underlying a free society. This study is directed at clarifying fundamental questions concerning freedom and justice that emerge when the forms and principles developed by eighteenth century America meet the ideas and practices of today's highly developed industrial society. One of the aims of the study is to widen the circles of public discussion of these questions. It is for this reason that the Fund is assisting in the presentation of the Mike Wallace Interviews.

The task of clarification is being undertaken by ten distinguished Americans acting as a Central Committee of Consultants to the Fund. These men are:

- A. A. BERLE, JR.
Attorney, author, former Assistant Secretary of State
- SCOTT BUCHANAN
Philosopher, author, former Dean of St. John's College
- EUGENE BURDICK
Political scientist, University of California; novelist
- ERIC F. GOLDMAN
Professor of history, Princeton; Bancroft Prize winner
- CLARK KERR
President-elect, University of California; labor economist
- HENRY R. LUCE
Editor-in-Chief, Time, Life, Fortune
- JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J.
Theologian, Woodstock College; editor of Theological Studies
- REINHOLD NIEBUHR
Vice-president and graduate professor, Union Theological Seminary
- ISIDOR I. RABI
Nobel Prize scientist; Higgins Professor of Physics, Columbia University
- ROBERT REDFIELD
Professor of anthropology, University of Chicago; former president, American Anthropological Association
- ROBERT M. HUTCHINS
President of the Fund, serves as Chairman of the Committee

EATON: No one in the world would be more unhappy under communism than I, because I am dedicated to the other principle. But I am sure that such a choice will never be presented. I would be most unhappy if I had to consider it. I like life and want to live. I am sure we won't have to fight to avoid communism.

WALLACE: Is freedom necessary? Certainly it hasn't been necessary in the Soviet Union.

EATON: No, the Russians have never had freedom and it would take them some time to know what to do with it. But we in the Western world have had it. I sometimes think we are speaking euphemistically when we refer to ourselves as the "free world" with all the secret intelligence and police agencies and the vast and ever-spreading controls of government over us. But we love freedom and we'll go back to it very quickly. The situation will arise very soon when we'll say: "Away with all these government restrictions and security investigations . . . let's be good old-fashioned Americans."

WALLACE: Do you think, or hope, that that time is coming?

EATON: I know it will come. The American people will demand that we turn away from the waging of war to the preservation of peace. And when we do, the activities of these secret police and investigating agencies will be sharply curtailed.

WALLACE: Mr. Eaton, I certainly thank you for coming here from Cleveland and spending this half-hour with us. As an industrial giant and financier, Cyrus Eaton has helped to make America great. This does not necessarily make him an expert on history, communism, or democracy. But when a man like Cyrus Eaton is alarmed it should prompt the rest of us at least to be *concerned* about freedom's future. We have just heard one side of this issue. In the course of this series we plan to explore all sides. We plan to have at least one spokesman who believes that the so-called liberal mind is in itself a threat to our survival and freedom.

WALLACE: **T**his is Cyrus Eaton, an industrialist who heads a two-billion-dollar empire in coal, iron ore, and railroads — a man who says that the way to preserve the American way of life, under which he's prospered, is to woo the friendship of the Soviet Union. As a first step, Mr. Eaton has sponsored several conferences between scientists from the Free World and the Communist nations. In a moment, we'll find out why he sponsors those conferences, and why he charges that the cold war is slowly but surely destroying our freedoms here at home.

ANNOUNCER: The Mike Wallace Interview, presented by the American Broadcasting Company in association with the Fund for the Republic, brings you a special television series discussing the problems of Survival and Freedom in America.

WALLACE: Good evening. I'm Mike Wallace. In our fight to survive and stay free, we as a nation have had to modify some of the very freedoms we want to protect. Tonight's guest, Cleveland industrialist Cyrus Eaton, is one critic who says that we've gone too far — that in our efforts to cure a cold, we're killing the patient. Let's find out why. . . . Mr. Eaton, you've made considerable news with your meetings up at Pugwash. You've financed conferences among scientists of the free world and from Communist countries like Russia and Red China. What do you think that you accomplish when scientists who are devoted to communism meet and talk with British and American scientists?

EATON: We demonstrated that men of different languages and different philosophies can get together and discuss crucial questions, come to a common understanding, and part great friends. One of the most important things we agreed on was that an all-out war between Russia and the United States would be a catastrophe of the first magnitude. For instance, there was no difference of opinion that in the first hour of such a war 75,000,000 Americans would be killed and 25,000,000 would be seriously wounded. These scientists left Canada to go back home and tell their governments of the great hazards we face unless we bring common sense to bear on our international problems.

WALLACE: Why do you hold these meetings up in Pugwash, which is in Nova Scotia, instead of in the United States?

EATON: It would probably be impossible to hold them in the United States because of the restrictions. The Chinese would not be permitted to come in; if the Russians got in it would be with very great difficulty.

WALLACE: What kind of restrictions? You mean that our government would not permit . . . ?

EATON: They would put many obstacles in the way and subject the people coming here to very great humiliations, which I don't think any self-respecting scientist would submit to.

WALLACE: I gather you are not in sympathy with these regulations?

EATON: I think they are unwise and unnecessary.

WALLACE: Were the American scientists who went up there to talk with the Russians and Red Chinese willing to exchange ideas freely with their Communist colleagues, and was there equal freedom on the other side?

EATON: I think everyone was astounded at the freedom with which the Communists discussed any sci-

WALLACE: We are constantly told in the free world by people we respect that it is necessary to have a massive force that will deter the Russians from wanting to attack us. Is this unnecessary?

EATON: If I can be sure of anything, it is that in Russia today the people and their scientists don't want war. I have seen the Russian. He loves his children, his grandchildren, his country. He wants to get along. We are constantly baiting the Russian bear and I think we ought to give it up. Only two weeks ago Mr. Dulles in a big press conference said: "What we all must think about is how we can most effectively fight what we most hate." "Fight what we most hate." Those are terrifying words to use in speaking of a proud and powerful nation — of people who have overwhelming military strength. Those are unwise and foolish words and oughtn't to be said by any responsible statesman here.

WALLACE: How do you relate all he says and our stance against Russia with individual freedoms for individual citizens in the United States?

EATON: To carry on an all-out war against Russia we would have to give up every freedom, subject ourselves to a dictator to get things done, and give up all the things we love. We would have to take on a crushing burden of taxation that would finish us as a capitalistic nation.

WALLACE: Let me ask you this question which we have asked of other persons recently. The British philosopher Bertrand Russell has said that if it came to a choice of a third world war and almost inevitable incineration on the one hand and living under communism on the other, he'd take communism. What about you?

EATON: I don't think that choice will ever have to be made. If we have an all-out war, that's the end of all of us and all that civilization has created. All of our great enterprises would go.

WALLACE: Would you, to avoid a third world war, suggest you could be content to live under communism?

up impoverished and giving up our freedoms, all for hallucinations. Russia has taken on all the territory she can handle.

WALLACE: Mr. Eaton, may I just interrupt for a second? Was it not the United States which started unilateral disarmament immediately after the second World War and wasn't it the United States which proposed world disarmament with a meaningful inspection system and the United States which helped to establish democracy in West Germany? On the other hand, did not the Soviet Union and communism outrage the free world by subjecting Albania and Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia and Rumania and Hungary more or less to the rule of bayonets?

EATON: I think probably we exaggerate what Russia has done there. I think if you take a vote in those countries you might be surprised. But, however that might be, we have no power to change it. We demonstrated that in Hungary. We don't dare interfere. We have got to let them work those things out. One reason I'm in favor of interchanges of citizens between East and West is that the more they see of us the more they are going to admire our way of life. Russia is putting such emphasis on education that its scholars will modify its internal system and change its attitude externally.

WALLACE: You predict a modification of the internal system in Russia. In what way?

EATON: As Russians become acquainted with what's going on in the world, as they make these great strides in economic development, they are not going to be interested merely in military power. They're going to want to enjoy our way of life — a better way, better food, better houses, better clothes, more automobiles — all the wonderful things that make life so attractive here. They have people of vast intelligence and have provided an educational system that is now the marvel of the world. If we have any faith in humanity, we'll let natural forces modify the Russian in his internal and external attitudes.

entific problem. They astounded everyone with their profound knowledge of scientific progress. I would say that perhaps of all the representatives who gathered there the men who were a little more cautious for political reasons were our brilliant American representatives.

WALLACE: You say the Americans were more cautious for political reasons. What do you mean?

EATON: If they were professors from Harvard or M.I.T. or the University of Chicago or Illinois — if they said anything that offended the political forces of this country — they would be aware that they might be called on the carpet and subjected to serious examination. And I think most of our American participants, when they got back home, were probably visited by the FBI and asked what went on and what they said.

WALLACE: And as far as you know, they told what went on?

EATON: Oh, very completely, because there were no secrets. The discussions were completely above board. Everyone said just exactly what he thought without any fear of getting into trouble.

WALLACE: You mentioned the FBI, Mr. Eaton. Let's turn to some security measures — most of them products of the cold war — that are taken by our government with citizens here at home. For instance, you. Our research shows that as an officer of certain corporations engaged in defense work you yourself have been fingerprinted and investigated by the FBI on three occasions. I wonder if you'd tell us why, and what your reaction to this fingerprinting is?

EATON: The officers and directors of the companies with which I am associated — and that's true of most big American corporations — do some work for the government. Some of it is called "classified." Why it is called that I do not know, because none of it is really very secret. At any rate, some of it is regarded this way. And for that reason, on each of these occasions a separate group examines the history of each officer

and director. The investigators consult all the people who have known him — in my case for a great many years, as old as I am — to see if at any time in his past there was anything he ought to be ashamed of. They fingerprint him and go through all those performances. This, to my way of thinking, is quite a humiliation for a loyal and devoted American.

WALLACE: What is wrong with finding out if a loyal and devoted American, if indeed he is, is all those things? You say there is some doubt about the necessity for doing this because you're not sure the work should be classified. Do you believe that these screenings, etc. are superfluous?

EATON: I think so. They keep alive the spirit of suspicion which is one of the evils that plague us. But there are no secrets in the industrial or the scientific world. Any idea that anything we can do in America is a profound secret if it is done industrially, with workmen and all other sorts of people engaged in it, is just a hallucination and an emphasis on the importance of the police side of our government.

WALLACE: You say the police side of our government. Do you have any further views on the work of the FBI as it relates to individual freedom?

EATON: I think it's had a tremendous build-up. It has enjoyed wonderful propaganda and sold itself in a marvelous way. But I always worry when I see a nation feel that it is coming to greatness through the activities of its policemen. And the FBI is just one of the scores of agencies in the United States engaged in investigating, in snooping, in informing, in creeping up on people. This has gone to an extent that is very alarming.

WALLACE: Let's stay with the FBI for just a minute. From the time that J. Edgar Hoover was appointed its director in 1924, more than 200,000-odd convictions have been recorded in cases investigated by the FBI. That includes the cases of Alger Hiss, atom spies Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, Harry Gold and David Greenglass, as

them. Conditions have changed vastly. In that time Russia has performed scientific miracles that have astounded the world and she has demonstrated that her power of retaliation is immense. But we still go on talking as if we were the strongest nation in the world, just as if we could make any nation adopt our view of life and our way of living.

WALLACE: But is not the issue this? You object to certain police powers that have been arrogated by the State, that have been taken over by the State. You suggest that we are losing certain of our freedoms. Someone who disagreed would say we are going to have to give up or at least modify certain of our freedoms to defend ourselves against a Communist threat. You are suggesting that there is no Communist threat — not that there is none, but that there is less than a good many of us fear. That is your interpretation. But President Eisenhower has said: "The Soviet State daily increases its power, and its rulers make clear their purpose to use that power to dominate the world." Soviet Dictator Khrushchev has told Americans on television: "Your grandchildren will live under Socialism." And he snarls at Western diplomats: "Whether you like it or not, history is on our side. We will bury you." What I don't understand is, how can any responsible government be anything else except suspicious and tough with Russia, and careful about security measures at home?

EATON: I don't mind being tough with them to a certain extent, but to threaten them with massive retaliation when we ourselves would go down in smoke and dust does not seem to me to exhibit much common sense. There are no Communists in America to speak of except in the minds of those on the payroll of the FBI. Those of us who see Americans every day as I do — in every walk of life — educators, capitalists, working men, farmers, labor leaders — none of them are Communists and they are never going to be. We don't need any power of "massive retaliation" to keep them that way. But we are creating back-breaking debts and we will wind

they don't make the charges you have done that the cold war is America's fault. What people, what forces in America, are behind making the cold war America's fault?

EATON: Mainly politicians, people in government office. They have believed that communism is a frightful thing that ought to be destroyed and that any suggestion that it be allowed to live is betraying our country. All of that is folly. We can't destroy communism. It's there to stay. Russia, China — there's nothing we can do to make them give up communism or to overthrow them. They have more military power than we have. I don't for a moment say that they are not without their very serious objectionable qualities. I think the original Communist thought that maybe he could persuade the world to accept his doctrines. But I am sure that any intelligent Russian has given up any notion that the United States could ever become Communist. We are the only nation that doesn't have a single Socialist in its Senate or its House, the only nation that doesn't have a large representation in its Parliament of people who believe in government ownership of everything. America is a capitalist country. It's one that's devoted to free enterprise and democracy and there's just no power in the world that could overthrow those institutions. They could kill us all, but they could never make Communists out of us. And to imagine that they could convert us to communism is just silly.

WALLACE: Nonetheless, if it is silly, a good many of our politicians, not just the Republican politicians you have been quoting up till now but Democratic statesmen as well, have been responsible for this cold war. You yourself said: "Twelve years ago, in fact, the United States declared war on Russia." And that was a Democratic . . .

EATON: That's right. You see, Mr. Dulles started with the Democratic party in the State Department and he continued right along with the present regime. But he has become more positive in the doctrines that obtained then and expanded

well as Russian spy Rudolf Abel, who was captured last year. Are you in any sense suggesting that this work is unnecessary and that the FBI should go out of business? In these areas?

EATON: I don't think necessarily that it should go out of business but it should confine itself to legitimate police work. I think its importance is enormously exaggerated and that it makes no such contribution to the upbuilding of this country or to our respect abroad as its literature and those who support its publicity suggest.

WALLACE: The fact remains that the FBI has served to the satisfaction of five Presidents. It recently had the overwhelming support of Congress when it asked for protection of its secret files. And as J. Edgar Hoover himself has said, the FBI is "zealously watched by the executive, the judicial, and the legislative branches" of the government. What more can you want?

EATON: If we want a police state that is all right, but add to the FBI the scores of other agencies that are engaged in the same thing; for instance, the Central Intelligence Agency. One of its jobs is to check the FBI to see whether it is doing its duty. You get one organization checking another and you get to a state of affairs that I think this nation is not going to be proud of. I am just as sure as I am alive that one of these days there will be an enormous reaction against this in the United States because every department of government now has its own investigators and, in many cases, its own police force, to creep up on the citizens. I am a farmer. Even the poor farmer now has a representative of the Agriculture Department coming out to see if he's sowing more crops than he ought to. And so it goes, through almost a hundred other governmental agencies with investigatory and police powers.

WALLACE: Well, let me ask you this, sir. Obviously these branches, these police branches, if you will, are being established at the suggestion of persons who feel they are necessary. Why do you think

we are, as you suggest, turning into a kind of modified police state ourselves?

EATON: Well, you know, you create an agency to remove some abuse. But when you remove that abuse you may create twenty others to take its place. This way you throttle and restrict your people. Take it in connection with scientists. I think our scientific development in this country has been enormously retarded. The scientist is conscious that the FBI is breathing down the back of his neck all the time, scaring him. He is not even allowed to talk to his wife about secret things. We've gotten so enchanted with the value of these security measures that we have carried them to an enormous extent and we have even praised the FBI for violating the rights of free men. But if you were to take the police forces of the cities and of the counties and of the state and the governmental agencies and add them up, Hitler in his prime, through the Gestapo, never had any such extensive spy organizations as we have in this country today.

WALLACE: You really think we have a more serious, more far-reaching spy organization, and you say this seriously, than the Gestapo of Adolf Hitler?

EATON: I believe it profoundly and if we had time I would take nearly every governmental agency and show you its secret intelligence force. Take the Treasury Department with its fifty to sixty thousand employees and tax agents, working in that field. Take the Department of State with all of its supervision over visas and passports and the coming and going of people.

WALLACE: We must be a very insecure people if we feel the need for this kind of police supervision.

EATON: Yes, I think we have less confidence in our people maybe than any nation that I know of on earth. We're certainly worse in that respect than the Russians.

WALLACE: How did we get this way? Here was an America that was free and independent and suddenly we

have turned into, if we are to believe what you say, a frightened and insecure people.

EATON: Two world wars and the prospect of a third have created these conditions. We are always afraid we would be accused of doing something for our enemy. Recently our enemy was Germany and Japan and everyone was suspected of being pro-German or pro-Japanese. Now we are suspected of being maybe not friendly enough with Germany and Japan. Also, we are under suspicion if we are friendly to Russia and Red China. It's a spirit of suspicion that is unworthy of this nation; it must be abandoned.


WALLACE: Let's come, though, directly to the issue that is involved. If we do feel insecure, we are that way because, vis-à-vis Russia, we believe that perhaps they want to take us over, they want to attack us, and we have to defend our way of life against an unfree way of life. Last winter, in a news conference, Mr. Eaton — and this is a quote — you said: "There is more spirit of war in the United States than in any other country in the world." You've made similar charges before and since. On what do you base them?

EATON: Take the pronouncements of the State Department or our representatives in the UN. Almost every week you'll hear this said: "We're in a position for massive retaliation, at the times and places of our own choosing, with the most deadly weapons the world can create." Almost every day there goes out from some department of government in the United States — either Defense or State — a boasting of our great power and what we're going to do to the other fellow if he doesn't behave himself. And when we say behave, we mean we want him to give up his philosophy and his way of life and adopt ours. Now ours, no doubt, is better. But I don't believe we have any right to threaten him with death if he doesn't accept our way of life and theory of human destiny.

WALLACE: I'm sure there are many people — many Americans — who differ with our foreign policy, but

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TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
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~~MIKE WALLACE TV INTERVIEW PROGRAM~~
~~INFORMATION CONCERNING~~

On 5/28/58 former federal judge HAROLD KENNEDY who is known to the Bureau advised the NYO that he is still attempting to secure press release on captioned subject matter and will furnish them if he is able to secure same.

He also stated that so far the following individuals are scheduled to be interviewed on this program:

ADLAI STEVENSON; political parties and the role of the voters.
 SYLVESTER "PAT" WEAVER; mass communication.
 CHARLES PERCY; big business and free society.
 ROBERT HUTCHINS; basic issues of freedom and justice and an overall discussion of past issues presented.

ADLAI STEVENSON is the former Governor of Illinois and former Democratic candidate for President of the U.S. According to current Who's Who in America, SYLVESTER (PAT) WEAVER, Jr., is a television executive. He resigned in September 1956 as chairman of the board, National Broadcasting Company.

CHARLES HARTING PERCY is a Chicago business executive. In 1950-54 he was Director, Fund for Adult Education (Ford

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Foundation). In 1956 was Special Ambassador and personal representative of the President of the U.S. at the inauguration ceremonies in Peru and Bolivia. In 1949 he was elected one of the ten outstanding men in the U.S.

ROBERT MAYNARD HUTCHINS is a fund executive. He has been President of the ~~Ford Foundation~~ since 1954.

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Mr. Clayton
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
 FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (97-11998)
 SUBJECT: FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC.
MIKE WALLACE TV INTERVIEW PROGRAM
INFORMATION CONCERNING

Attached is press release from FRANK K. KELLY, Fund for the Republic (Wells 8-0305, Plainview, NY) with respect to interview of Dr. ERICH FROMM on 5/25/58, over the A.B.C. television network.

This release is in fact a transcript of the interview of FROMM which took place over television 5/25/58.

This material was furnished to ALICE WIDNER a contact of the NYO by [redacted] the "New York Herald Tribune."

[redacted] does not know that Miss WIDNER furnished this material to the NYO.

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Special Agent in Charge

67 JUN 10 1958

For further information call:

Frank K. Holly
Fund for the Republic
(Calls 8-0305)
Plainview, N. Y.)

FOR RELEASE: a. M. Newspapers
Monday, May 26, 1958.

Attached is the text of the Mike Wallace Interview with Dr. Erich Fromm, one of the country's leading psycho-analysts, telecast Sunday, May 25, 1958, from 10:00-10:30 P.M., EST, over the ABC television network.

The interview is the fifth in a 13-week series entitled Survival and Freedom produced by ABC in association with the Fund for the Republic. The purpose of the series is to stimulate public interest in the basic issues of freedom and justice in American society.

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THE MIKE WALLACE INTERVIEW ... May 25, 1953 . . . Dr. Erich Fromm

WALLACE: This is Dr. Erich Fromm, one of the most influential psychoanalysts in the world.. a man whose work has been hailed as a significant step forward from the theories of Sigmund Freud. Recently Dr. Fromm said: "There has never been a better society than in the United States in 1953." But.. he added .. "If the United States goes on in the direction it is now taking, it is in serious danger of destroying itself." We'll find out why in a moment.

ANNOUNCER: The Mike Wallace Interview presented by the American Broadcasting Company in association with the Fund for the Republic brings you a special television series discussing the problems of survival and freedom in America.

WALLACE: Good evening, I'm Mike Wallace. In recent weeks we've been discussing the problems of a free society and what it must do to survive. Tonight we'll try to measure the impact of our free society on us as individuals.. whether we're as happy as we like to think we are.. or as free to think and to feel. Our guest is Dr. Erich Fromm, a psychoanalyst and social critic who is internationally renowned for his studies of men and their search for freedom.

DR. FROMM: first let me ask you this. From different quarters of the world, the United States has been criticized as a materialistic society.. even a shallow society. Yet only recently you said: "There has never been a better society than in the United States in 1953." What did you mean by that?

FROMM: Let me first tell you a word about this criticism of the United States by Europeans and people of other countries. I think they have no particularly good reason to criticize the United States, because those phenomena which they criticize are phenomena which I think are aspects of our modern industrialized culture and the United States, having no feudal remnants is just a little bit more advanced while some of the virtues which European nations have preserved are just the last remnants of feudalism. After all, feudalism had its virtues, too. But to come specifically to your question, I would say indeed if I say there has never been a better society this is meant in a relative sense. The history of man so far is nothing to brag about but we have a society with greater wealth for all than any society before.. a society of greater mobility.. lack of oppression.. of tremendous increase in the spreading of thought, music, art. Beyond that I would say we have people in our society with a remarkable amount of good will, human kindness, fairness, and energy. Now this is something which certainly would justify the statement I made which you quoted.

WALLACE: All right, then, justify, if you will, your later statement which apparently contradicts the first. You also said, just this week, "If the United States goes on in the direction it is taking, it is in serious danger of destroying itself." Now? In what ways?

4-1677-540

ENCLOSURE

FREUD: In the first place, it sounds paradoxical but it is true that in many societies who have developed in one direction and they are no proud of the problems they have solved that they don't see the effects and dangers which they develop after having solved problems of the previous century. You might say it is a kind of Maginot Line psychology fighting the next war in terms of the previous war. I would say that the dangers we are confronted with are no longer the dangers of the 19th Century. We have solved most of those. But we have new ones. For instance, I would say most generally, in the process of producing more and consuming more we have or are in the process of transforming means into ends. Once, more production was a means for mere consumption and mere consumption was a means for a more dignified, richer human life of the individual. Today, I am afraid, production and consumption have become ends in themselves. We produce and consume more and more and, if we ask "Why", "What for", we don't quite know the answer.

WALLACE: And so, in a sense, we are losing ourselves as human beings?

FREUD: Exactly. We are losing the end for which all this effort should be the means and was once meant to be the means. I can give you an example. We try to save time and are very eager and proud when we have saved time. But what do we do with it? We are afraid and embarrassed with all this free time hanging on our hands and we try to kill it. But saving time has become an end in itself.

WALLACE: Let's go, specifically, with this as a background, to man in his various pursuits.

FREUD: May I interrupt you. And could I say something more generally before we come to specific things, because I feel there is another aspect of the general question. This aspect I would like to formulate by quoting Emerson, who said 100 years ago: "Things are in the saddle and ride mankind." What Emerson meant to say was that while we are so eager to produce more and more things we are in the process of transforming ourselves into things. While we make things, we become the prisoners of things; while we create circumstances, we become the prisoners of circumstances and while we pretend that we control our society, we eventually become the prisoners of the very circumstances which we create and which have become our gods. I mean this quite literally because of the fact that what I am talking about here is actually the same thing the prophets of the Old Testament called idolatry, worship of the products of your own hands. You don't anymore experience yourself as a creator of things but things become your idols and I think what we experience today is an idolatry, without being aware of it.

WALLACE: Let me ask you about man in his various pursuits. First of all, how do you regard man in relationship to his work?

FREUD: I think if you ask most people whether they like their work they will say 'yes' consciously and if you probe into their dreams and how they feel in the evening or when they come home from work, I think you will find many millions of Americans who really hate their work, who hate the boss, the competitors, the customers, everybody.

WALLACE: Why?

FREUD: I think because they sense that they spend the best of their energy. . . 8 hours a day . . . for things. And in a way which is not meaningful for them.

WALLACE: You say 'meaningful' . . .

FREUD: By 'meaningful', I mean that there is ^{no} really relatedness to what they are doing because they ^{are} doing it only ⁱⁿ order to make money and that is not enough for a satisfaction ⁱⁿ using one's best life energy.

WALLACE: All right, in our social relationships. . . in our feelings towards our neighbors, towards our friends and towards our business associates, . . . what is happening to us?

FREUD: Again I think that we meet a peculiar phenomenon... consciously everybody speaks about 'togetherness' today. We all feel consciously very friendly. . . we smile.. we have many friends and yet I think most of us are actually very lonely. We feel underneath kind of anxious . . . we feel isolated.. and our friendliness is a kind of superficial friendliness of people who are in the same boat and actually feel lonely and frightened. I think you might say that while we talk a great deal about friendship and friendliness we are at the same time kind of afraid to be closer to each other and we cover up this feeling by a kind of superficial camaraderie, but not by a deep and intense feeling.

WALLACE: In your book "The Sane Society", you write at some length about the 'marketing man orientation', and how it makes a man less than he can or should be.

FREUD: I think this has to do with the point I mentioned before, that we have transformed ourselves into things. We meet each other as things would meet each other on the market. Eager to exchange themselves, with a profit. Could I give you a concrete example? It is kind of not entirely realistic, as you will see. Assuming a handbag in a department store could think and feel and there is one beautiful handbag but because of the recession, let's say, it hasn't been sold. If that handbag would feel like modern man it would have a terrific inferiority feeling because it would feel because it hasn't been sold it has no value, and to translate that into more direct terms, I would say the sense of value of most of us depends on our salability on the personality market and we are called successful if we have sold ourselves.

WALLACE: And success should be what instead of that kind of salability?

FREUD: Success should be the satisfaction of work well done.. work useful.. work meaningful.

WALLACE: Let's go to politics.. what is happening to man in relationship to his politics.. and at the same time, as a corollary, without becoming specific, I would like to ask you about our political leaders..

FROMM: I am a Democrat.. so that is a different topic. I should like to say that we find here a peculiar phenomenon.. namely, that we talk a lot about politics, we read about politics, ~~xxxix~~ but if you see, for instance, the result of a number of studies which have been made we are really concerned only with private affairs. Most Americans, 90%, are concerned with health, money, family problems.. and they are not concerned with the matters of society .. with politics. Now you might ask what do I mean by 'concerned'. I may mean the kind of thing over which you lose some hours of sleep.

WALLACE: You're not suggesting that there is anything wrong with being concerned over health, family affairs, money affairs.. Sounds perfectly natural..

FROMM: Well, it sounds perfectly natural to us.. it might not sound so natural to someone else. It is always 'my' and 'me' and 'my family' and 'my money' and 'my car' rather than to express as a reality my relatedness to others, my solidarity to others.. and my real sense of responsibility for what happens to me and the rest of the world and the rest of the people in this country.

WALLACE: When we talk about men are we talking purely.. if I may interject.. about United States man and woman, or western man, or world man?

FROMM: I would say there is man as such.. I would say, although this is not a very popular concept.. there is such a thing as human nature in general. There is such a thing as a basic condition of human existence, but this human nature never appears in itself because it always appears as molded by a particular culture or society. The strange thing is that most societies assume naively that ~~they~~ the way they are is human nature.

WALLACE: You say that you are a Democrat, and I don't want to hear about that particularly. I am talking about our political leaders of whatever political hue.

FROMM: I would say without being facetious that I think what we miss are men who have at the same time convictions, emotion in which these convictions are rooted and a deep penetration of the problems of society.. ours or others.. and of the forces which operate within them.

WALLACE: And you feel we miss them on both sides of the political fence?

FROMM: Oh yes, in this respect I am quite neutral. I think we miss them on both sides.

WALLACE: How do you account for it, or are you accounting for it in our discussion?

FROMM: For the same reason which we talked about a minute ago. That we are so concerned with instrumentalities that we are not sufficiently concerned with discovering or uncovering the essence, the causes, the forces which are underneath the surface.

WALLACE: Let's talk now about man in relationship with his intellectual development. Aldous Huxley, who was our guest last week on this program, has written a series of articles called "Enemies of Freedom" which will shortly be appearing in a Long Island newspaper, NEWSDAY.. he says that our entertainments, particularly television, are robbing Americans of our capacity to think, to discriminate. Do you agree?

FROMM: I agree wholeheartedly.

WALLACE: Do you wish to elaborate?

FROMM: I think Mr. Huxley has done a very good job of elaborating on this and I just agree.

WALLACE: Now in relationship to love and marriage. Where are we getting off the track?

FROMM: Of course we talk a lot about marriage and about love.., and we have courses in marriage and I think we might have some courses on love, as there are courses for everything. And indeed the wish to love is probably the deepest wish and longing in every man and that is part of human nature and of man but I think we have the wrong concept of love. It is expressed with the word "falling" in love.., as a sentiment which comes over us and we don't understand that love is an active relatedness. That it is not easy to achieve. That it is the most difficult thing to achieve and that one must take it much more seriously than we do in order to become a master or even a decent apprentice at it. What we consider love is often the kind of thing which you read often about in newspapers and in columns.., about a kind of smooth cooperating team.., a kind of egotism a deux.., a kind of relatively friendly relationship of two people who consider their marriage a refuge from loneliness and yet who never make the jump into any intense relatedness with each other.

WALLACE: In religion?

FROMM: In religion I think it is a very sad picture as I see it. Of course many people are very happy about the renaissance of religion which allegedly is going on in the United States now. I am afraid that people talk about God and more today than 100 years ago.., they go more to the churches than they used to 100 years ago.., but actually they take a word for a reality. Instead of having a religious experience, they just go to church, use the word, and if I may be biblical, I am afraid they use the word 'God' in vain.

WALLACE: You say 'instead of having a religious experience'.. what is a religious experience?

FROMM: This is indeed a very difficult question to answer and many people would answer it different ways but I would say, to have a sense of "ultimate concern", to quote Dr. Tillich, for the spiritual values in man.., for our love for man.., for our reason.., for truth.., and to experience this development of ourselves as the most, and only, important aim of life.

WALLACE: You say in "The Dane Society": "In the 19th Century the problem was that God was dead. In the 20th Century the problem is that man is dead."

FROMM: Yes, indeed, I think that's true and I would say we make machines which act like men and we try to make men who act like machines.. little automatons.. but we are not yet aware of it.

WALLACE: May I give you a kind of Rorschach test, Dr. Fromm.. by putting to you words which we may understand in our way . . . I would like you to define those words, if you will, from the way that perhaps we view them and the way you believe they should be viewed... good and bad words.. First, happiness.

FROMM: Well, happiness, I would say what people really mean by happiness is unlimited consumption. We are a society of consumers, we are the whole western world.. more and more. I think if you would ask people what their concept of Heaven is they would say, if they were honest, this is a big department store with new things every week., all the money to buy them and maybe a little bit more than the neighbor, and they would go around buying, buying, buying... actually we are the eternal suckling, the eternal baby who wants the bottle.

WALLACE: And happiness should be...??

FROMM: Happiness should be not an aim in itself but something which accompanies intense relationships to many things, to man.. to nature.. a relationship which does not exclude deep sadness because one cannot remain sensitive and responsive to the world without being deeply sad often.

WALLACE: "Equality?"

FROMM: Equality? I have the impression that what most people today really mean by equality is sameness, that everybody is equal inasmuch as he is the same and if he is not the same as anybody else he hasn't quite the right to be equal.

WALLACE: And equality really should be . . .

FROMM: As I see it, in the philosophical and religious tradition of the western world, equality should be, if I can put it theologically, that we are all created in the image of God and philosophically, that no man must be the means for the ends of another.. that every man is only an end in himself and that is the only equality there is..

WALLACE: Let me ask you about a couple of political words. Democracy and Socialism.

FROMM: Democracy... well, I would define democracy, as it is developed today in practice, as consent by the governed, achieved by manipulation and not by force, while what I think democracy must want to be and I hope will be, is the active participation and responsibility of each citizen in the whole social life and not his being a little cog who is satisfied that he is manipulated in the right way.

WALLACE: And socialism?

FROMM: Well, socialism is one of those odd words. Now why are people afraid of it? I think what most people mean by it is being subject to a governing bureaucracy and materialism in the sense that one only cares for material goods and has no interest in spiritual values. It is,

incidentally, a strange thing.. in this respect.. if that is Socialism we are approaching Socialism very rapidly because we are more and more bureaucratically run in our society, and while we believe in spiritual values and principles and talk about them on Sundays, actually our main interests are production and consumption.. having more things. Besides that, the word socialism was connected with Hitler's Nazism and with Stalin's Communism, which in reality has nothing to do with Socialism. Russia is the most reactionary, conservative, autocratic society there is in Europe and the words Marxism and Socialism are chosen by them as a very convenient symbol but I am sure if Marx had lived in the 30's he would have been shot as an agent of capitalism by Stalin.

WALLACE: Wait just a second, Dr. Fromm. From reading your "The Sane Society" I would gather that you are a kind of socialist.

FROMM: You, indeed, I always have been.

WALLACE: And particularly.. the thing that I find difficult to understand.. you talk about the individual, about realizing himself, about human dignity and yet does n't Socialism demand that the individual put himself at the disposal of the state and thereby lose the very individuality you talk about?

FROMM: Well, I am indeed a Socialist, a Democratic Socialist, for the very reason that my main concern is the individual. And I think that Marx shares something with the Old Testament, if you will pardon the comparison.. in that everybody talks about it but nobody has read it, or read more than a little bit. But if I may answer this question in this way: what Socialism meant to Marx was to be radical and he defined it as going to the root and the root in man.. to have a society in which man is the supreme purpose and that means his development or himself, his unfolding of his powers of love and reason.

WALLACE: Dr. Fromm, it would seem that what Karl Marx said his Socialism constitutes is beside the point.. what does count is what has happened with his Socialism and this.. if I may go on.. calls for the government's seizing of land.. for an oppressive centralized state that controls practically everything.. over the education, the private life of its citizens. All of this is pretty carefully outlined in the Communist Manifesto and it seems to me that the Soviet Union has done a pretty good job of putting into action what Mr. Marx talks about in the Manifesto and has completely done away with the human dignity, human relatedness you talk about..

FROMM: In the first place, it happens again and again in history that an idea has been misused. I think if you think of the Catholic Inquisition and what they did then you would also say this is certainly not the teaching of Christ. I don't mean to compare the teaching of Christ to the teaching of Marx. People have a way of quoting a few lines of the writings of Marx.. namely, to quote certain things and not the whole. And you, Mr. Wallace, join in that which I think is a great disservice namely confirming the propaganda of the Russian claim that they represent Marxist teaching, when they represent exactly the opposite.

WALLACE: Well, now, wait a moment. May I read from the Communist Manifesto: "The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communist revolution." It seems to me that this un-dignified, de-dignifies human freedom.

FRIEDMAN: It is awfully difficult to take one quote and discuss it.. I could quote you some sentences from Robespierre on which modern democracy is based, and you would find arguments.

WALLACE: Perhaps I should reread my Marx and perhaps I should reread my Erich Fromm. We have just thirty seconds left. Dr. Fromm. Are you pessimistic about what's reported to us?

FRIEDMAN: I am worried only in one sense, namely, the danger of war and our possible inability to avoid it, but I am very optimistic.. rather I have faith .. in our world, in the development of our democracy, but I think one thing is necessary.. to face reality rather than believe in fiction and to be aware that we will have vitality only if we are able to fulfill that which is essential to our whole tradition and that is to put man back in the saddle.

WALLACE: Thanks so much, Dr. Fromm, for taking this time to come and talk with us. Whether or not one agrees with his solution, Dr. Erich Fromm points to a pressing problem. As he sees it, America tends to worship machines instead of men. We seem to prefer success to sanity. A society that is politically free, says Dr. Fromm, should guard against this kind of spiritual enslavement.

Next week we go after the story of the American citizen and his political party. Our guest will be one of the major figures of this period. You see him behind me.. he's Adlai Stevenson. If you want to know what control the voter has over the policies of his government, if you want to find out the effects of radio, television and the press in political candidates and campaigns.. and if you want to know which has the greatest influence on public policy: the political party, the private citizen, or special interest groups like the farm bloc, the labor unions, the National Association of Manufacturers or the American Legion, we'll go after those stories from Adlai Stevenson next week.

Well then, Mike Wallace, Goodnight.

F B I

Date: 6/2/58

Transmit the following in

PLAIN TEXT

(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIR-TEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson
 Mr. Boardman
 Mr. Belmont
 Mr. Mohr
 Mr. Nease
 Mr. Parsons
 Mr. Rosen
 Mr. Tamm
 Mr. Trotter
 Mr. Clayton
 Tele. Room
 Mr. Holloman
 Miss Gandy

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-391697)
 FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (62-11998)
 SUBJECT: FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC
 MIKE WALLACE
 TV INTERVIEW PROGRAM
 INFORMATION CONCERNING

Enclosed herewith is the tape (#26) monitoring the MIKE WALLACE TV Interview on ABC-TV, 10:00 - 10:30 p.m., 6/1/58 with ADLAI E. STEVENSON and a NY Times newspaper clipping of JACK GOULD's TV column, 6/2/58, page 46, commenting on said interview.

MIKE WALLACE characterized STEVENSON at the beginning of his interview as a major political figure of the day. (the above interview was concerned with politics and politicians.) Questions were asked about the systems by which candidates are selected; whether the average man has any control over the selection of the candidates; can the average man exercise better influence on the type of candidate being chosen; and are politicians tools of select groups that back them and not the representatives of the people that elect them.

ADLAI STEVENSON agreed that in some cases there is corruption of politicians but felt that much can be done by the voter. STEVENSON stated he believes that the voters should take a more active part in their political parties and political clubs in their communities.

MIKE WALLACE announced during the above program that SYLVESTER "PAT" WEAVER will appear as his guest next week (6/8/58) and that Ambassador HENRY CABOT LODGE would so appear on 6/15/58.

EX-100
ENCLOSURE

REC-66 EX-102

100-391697-57
POWERS

3. Bureau (100-391697) (Encls. 2) (RM)
 1. New York (62-11998)

16 JUN 5 1958

70 JUN 23 1958

Sent

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Approved:

J. P. Powers

Special Agent in Charge

6-6 JUN 1958

V: Politics and Religion

BY JACK GOULD

Interview With Stevenson

The educational series of
the Fund for the Republic

for which "Mike Wallace" is
the helpful moderator on Sunday evenings over Channel 7,
last night presented Adlai E.
Stevenson.

As one of those political
figures who have the relatively rare ability to put together their own prose, Mr. Stevenson, when called upon
to extemporize for the authorized interviewer, often does not reach his highest proficiency in expression.

Given the time and latitude
to devise his own paragraphs,
on the contrary, he can
achieve a lyrical sincerity
that once upon a time prompted selected eggheads to sit in
delighted awe. Last night he
was interviewed.

Via the Channel 7 facilities
Mr. Stevenson echoed many
of the stimulating philosophies
that lent a touch of vigor and flavor to recent
Presidential campaigns. To
Mr. Wallace's carefully constructed inquiries he responded
with purpose and dedication on such matters as politics
in contemporary life, conformity, the slogans of
Madison Avenue and the utility and cost of Presidential primaries.

It was a provocative and interesting half-hour, a refreshing contrast to the general run of political interludes on TV. But not a thirty-minute period one would think that would prompt the committee to beg for equal time.
Who, between 1952 and 1956, took away the excitement of Stevenson remains a matter worthy of the intensified study of Gallup, Roper, et al. If the Fund for the Republic were concerned over television journalism it would be interesting to pursue the subject further with, for example, Carmine De Caprio.

CLIPPING FROM THE

N.Y. N.Y. TIMES

EDITION Late City

DATED 2 JUN 1958

PAGE 46

FORWARDED BY NY DIVISION

100-391697-541

OO-6

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

June 2, 1958

The attached copy of the Mike Wallace interview with Cyrus S. Eaton was sent to the Director from The Fund for the Republic, Inc., NY, NY.

Attachment
hbb

✓ Tolson _____
✓ Mr. Boardman _____
✓ Belmont _____
✓ Mr. Mohr _____
✓ Mr. Nease _____
✓ Mr. Parsons _____
✓ Mr. Rosen _____
✓ Mr. Tamm _____
✓ Mr. Trotter _____
✓ Mr. _____
✓ Mr. Clayton _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Holloman _____
Miss Holmes _____
Miss Gandy _____

ENCLOSURE

100-1291697-Sub A
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76 JUN 4 1958
24 JUN 3 1958

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ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/12/94 BY SP/SCB

87
53 JUN 10 1958

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 100-1291697-Sub A

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: May 20, 1958

FROM : G. A. NEASE

SUBJECT: AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANY (ABC)
FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC

For record purposes, the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HCUA) has experienced considerable difficulties with ABC and its legal staff in connection with obtaining equal time to answer vile charges of Cyrus Eaton, which originally were broadcast over ABC on the Mike Wallace interview program.

Initially, Dick Arens, Chief Counsel, HCUA, on May 14, 1958, called station WMAL-TV, Washington, D. C., and advised Mr. McDowell, Station Manager, that in view of the possible danger to the nation's security, the HCUA felt that WMAL-TV should not show the retelecast of the Mike Wallace-Cyrus Eaton interview scheduled for Saturday night, May 17, 1958. Arens was referred to the President of ABC where he repeated his request and added that if ABC and WMAL-TV would not cancel the program, they at least should grant equal time to the HCUA in order to answer the Eaton charges. A day's time elapsed. A Mr. Weinbach, Legal Counsel for ABC, next called Arens and told him that equal time would be granted but it would have to be on Monday night, May 19, 1958, rather than immediately following the Cyrus Eaton show. There were no other restrictions imposed at this time.

Arens called Weinbach, and in his absence or refusal to talk, discussed matters with Weinbach's assistant on Friday, May 16, 1958. Arens told the assistant that arrangements had been perfected for Congressmen Walter and Scherer to appear on the program with him, Arens. Arens was then told by ABC that no representative of Congress, who was running for election, (as all of them are) would be allowed to appear on the program inasmuch as equal time would then have to be granted to that Congressman's opponent.

1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Jones

CDD:ejp
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EX-10 200-127094-1

59 JUN 6 1958

59 JUN 10 1958

100-391697-1
NOT RECORDED
70 JUN 4 1958
20 JUN 4 1958

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/1994 BY SP/CLP

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson:

Arens next attempted to arrange for the National Commander of the American Legion and a prominent industrialist or scientist to appear with him over ABC. Upon advising ABC of this fact on Friday, May 16, 1958, he was pointedly told by ABC that the participants must be bona fide members of the HCUA and members of Congress who were not running for election. This, of course, eliminated everyone. It is understood that Arens did considerable debating of the issue with Weinbach, the legal counsel of ABC. He eventually succeeded in getting ABC to allow him to appear as Chairman Walter's representative.

Upon arriving in New York City and checking in at the Hotel New Yorker, Arens was contacted by several members of the legal staff of ABC. They told him under no circumstances would he be allowed to make any references whatsoever to the Fund for the Republic directly in his speech. They also pointed out they desired to check his speech at that particular time and strike out any references to Cyrus Eaton which might precipitate a libel suit. My memorandum of May 19, 1958, pointed out the specific eliminations which were made in Arens' speech.

Arens has confidentially advised Mr. DeLoach that he was treated so shabbily regarding this matter that he felt like throwing up his hands and coming home. He stated, however, he felt like there was a job to be done and that he had to do it.

ACTION:

The Director has already commended Arens by letter dated May 20, 1958, concerning his speech. This memorandum is for record purposes only. There is no doubt, in view of the above action, but what the Fund for the Republic was behind this entire matter in all the restrictions placed on Arens. It is, of course, known that the Fund for the Republic has a contract with ABC for a 13-week series featuring Mike Wallace; the individuals thus far who have appeared on the Mike Wallace show, i.e., Cyrus Eaton, Justice Douglas and Aldous Huxley have, of course, been individuals who it was known in advance would parrot the line usually put out by the Fund for the Republic.

*They may not be gullible
as to what Eaton said.*

H. - 2 -

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

RA
S.T.

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: June 3, 1958

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC;
MIKE WALLACE TV INTERVIEW PROGRAM

The New York office advised by memorandum dated 5-23-58 that the following individuals will appear on the Mike Wallace program: Sylvester (Pat) Weaver on 6-8-58 and Charles H. Percy on 6-15-58.

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Trotter _____
 Nease _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

Bureau files reflect that neither of these individuals has been investigated by the FBI and no derogatory information was located regarding them.

Sylvester Weaver was born 12-21-08 at Los Angeles, California. He received a Bachelor of Arts degree in 1930 at Dartmouth, Hanover, New Hampshire. He became vice president in charge of television for the National Broadcasting Company in 1949; vice-chairman, Board of Directors, 1953; president 1953; and was chairman of the board from 1955 until he resigned in September, 1956. The Bureau has had favorable relationships with Weaver during his affiliation with the National Broadcasting Company. By letter dated 7-11-55, the Director expressed his appreciation for the assistance rendered by Weaver and members of his staff in the establishment of the New York office radio station. (Who's Who 1958-59; 94-4-2439-388; 80-648-34-183)

Charles Harting Percy was born September 27, 1919, Pensacola, Florida. He received a Bachelor of Arts degree at the University of Chicago in 1941. He was employed by the Bell & Howell Company in 1938 and has been president since 1949. He has been a director of the Fund for Adult Education, Ford Foundation, since April 5, 1951. Percy was chairman of "The Hutchins Twentieth Anniversary Committee" in 1950, one purpose of which was to raise funds for the purchase of a gift in honor of the twentieth anniversary of Robert M. Hutchins, chancellor, University of Chicago. Percy was special ambassador and personal representative of President Eisenhower to the Presidential inauguration ceremonies in Peru and Bolivia in 1956. (Who's Who 1958-59; 100-385355-42 ep 348; 65-58957-13)

ACTION:

Layto Copy ✓

None, for information.

JJG:pws (5)

62 JUN 1 1958
Mr. Belmont1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Gaffney

B.

REC-79 100-391697-1 auto copy
EX-11777

10 JUN 6 1958

file 100-391697-1

100-391697-1 auto copy
100-391697-54555

Liaison

Office of the Attorney General • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman *J. P. on
6-9-58*

FROM : A. H. Belmont *M. Belmont*

SUBJECT: FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC

DATE: June 6, 1958

Referral/Consult

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Trotter _____

A3/fb

--

- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Nease
- 1 - Mr. Gaffney
- 1 - Liaison Section

REC-42

100-391697

10 JUN 10 1958


62 JUN 10 1958

EX-102

LIAISON

Memo Belmont to Boardman
Re: FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC

Referral/Consult



ACTION:

For your information.

[Handwritten signatures and initials]

[Handwritten signature]

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 5/26/58

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (62-11998)

SUBJECT: FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC
MIKE WALLACE TV INTERVIEW PROGRAM

There are enclosed for the information of the Bureau, two photostats of a photostat of an article that appeared in the Rumanian Communist newspaper "The Spark" on 5/8/58 in Bucharest, Rumania.

Also enclosed are two photostats of an English translation of the above-mentioned article furnished by Mrs. VETURIA MANUILA, wife of SABIN MANUILA, President of the Iliu Maniu American-Rumanian Relief Foundation, 55 West 42nd Street, NYC, on 5/26/58.

- 2 - Bureau (RM) Encs. 4
1 - NY 62-11998

MES:AMV
3

4 ENCLOSURE

53 JUN 17 1958

REC

62-39117-544
6-10
MAY 28 1958

CRIME REC

ESP SEC

TRUE COPY

Article appeared in the Romanian communist newspaper "The Spark" on May 8th, 1953 in Bues-
rest, Romania.

A BILLIONAIRE BRANDS AMERICAN POLICE SYSTEM.

The wellknown rich American Cyrus Eaton, possessor of an immens wealth, made a few days ago the statement, that the American system of spying on its citizens became more powerful than that of the Gestapo in Hitler's days.

Cyrus Eaton of Cleveland, heads series of companies of coal, metallur-
gie and railroad business with a total capital of 2 billion dollars. A
wellknown figure in the social-political life, Eaton, 74 years old, is a
declared partizan of capitalism, especially of American capitalism, but
at the same time he condemns the aggressive politics of the leaders of
the United States, being one of the few big capitalists who are for a peaceful
competition with communism, and for better knowing each-other in spirit of
friendship, of the United States and the Soviet Union.

From his own funds, the billionaire organized meetings of Soviet
and American scientist with scientist of their countries to stand against the
policy of atomic armament; He is one of the "personalities" who signed
the wellknown appeal for "a reasonable nuclear policy".

In his TV interview given Sunday on the American Broadcasting
Company, Syrus Eaton said: " I am always worried when I see, that a
country believes in rising to the top due to its police action. Or, FBI
(The Federal Bureau of Investigation, the principal American police force
specialized in anti-communist fight) is one of the many institutions in the
United States, who's task is the investigation, follow up and spying on the
citizens. Here, this activity reached the proportion when it inspires serious
alarm".

Eaton said, that surely he would not expect that the United States
Police Force should cease functioning but it should delimit its activity
to its legal task of fight against criminality. He combats the propaganda
of praise against those who prefer police force and spying on citizens, on
scientists, etc. He stated, the the scientific progress was slowed down
considerably because " de men of science are permanently aware of the
FBI behind their backs and this is frightening". As an example Mr. Eaton
mentioned that last year at his farm in Pugwash " the world would have
been quite surprised to see" the communist soviet scientist -probably he
is referring to a soviet man of science- discussed any scientific program
brought up. He impressed everybody by his vast scientific knowledges. I
state with certainty, that from among all scientists assembled there, our
brilliant American renzenterative proved to be the most reserved for
political

"understood that they might be investigated and held responsible" for everything they said there.

The international conference of Pugwash - said Mr. Eaton - demonstrated that the Americans have less confidence in each other than the citizens of any other state.

Analyzing further the proportions of this police system, the rich American said that beside the FBI, there are at least one hundred other American institutions doing the same job." Each department of the U. S. government has at the present time its own investigation officers, its police force following up the citizens."

"If you would assemble all the police force of the cities, counties, states and federal police - declared Mr. Eaton - you would realise that Hitler/on the peak of his power, has never had such organizations like we have at present in our country.

Obviously the situation described by Mr. Eaton is not new. But the fact, that a big capitalist like him protests against the police system shows at least two interesting phenomena: First: the increasing unemployment as well as the difficult situation of the government circles, which continue the nuclear tests, lead to a stiffening of the police terror in the American citadel of the "free world". The second: This policy finds an increasing opposition on the part of the lucid Americans, who prefer the democratic freedom and a peaceful competition, in lieu of a war which would have the most disastrous consequences also for the American people.

PROLETARI DIN TOATE ȚARILE, UNITI-VĂ!

Sînteaia

Organ al Comitetului Central al P.M.R.

ANUL XXVII Nr. 4209

Joi 8 mai 1958

4 PAGINI — 20 BANI

Un miliardar înfierează polițismul american

Cunoscutul bogătar american Cyrus Eaton, posesor al unei imense averi, a declarat acum cîteva zile că sistemul american de spionare a cetătenilor a lăsat proponii mai mari decât cel al Gestapo-ului hitlerist din vremuri lui Hitler.

Cyrus Eaton, din Cleveland, conduce un grup de companii carbonifere, metalurgice și feroviară, al căror capital este evaluat la 2 miliarde de dolari. Personalitate cunoscută a vieții sociale-politice, Eaton, în vîrstă de 74 ani, este un partizan declarat al capitalismului. Îndeosebi al capitalismului american, dar în același timp condamnă politica agresivă a cercurilor conducătoare din Statele Unite, fiind unul dintre puținii mari capitaliști care se pronunță azi pentru o întrecere pașnică cu comunismul și pentru o bună cunoaștere reciprocă, în spirit prietenesc, între S.U.A. și Uniunea Sovietică. Din fondurile sale, miliardarul a organizat întîlniri ale savantilor americani, sovietici și din alte țări, împotriva politicii de înarmări atomice; el este una dintre personalitățile care au semnat cunoscutul apel „pentru o politică nucleară rezonabilă”.

Intr-un interviu său dat duminică unui mare serviciu american de televiziune (American Broadcasting Company), Cyrus Eaton a spus: „Mă cuprind totdeauna neliniștea cînd văd că vreo jard își închîpuie că ar putea să spre măreție datorită activității sale polițienești. Or, F.B.I. (Biroul federal de investigații, principala forță polițienească americană, specializată în lupta anticomunistă — n.r.) nu este decât una din cele cîteva zeci de instituții din S.U.A. care se indeletnicează cu anchetarea, filarea și spionarea cetătenilor. La noi, această activitate a ajuns la proporții care inspiră o serioasă alarmă”.

Eaton a spus că, desigur, nu înțelege că politile din S.U.A. să-și inceteze activitatea, dar să-și mărginească la atribuțiile lor legale, de luptă contra rădușcătorilor, și a combătut propaganda care prosilvește polițismul, spionarea cetătenilor, a savantilor etc. El a declarat că progresul științific „a fost frinat într-o măsură uriasă”, din cauză că „omul de știință își dă permanent seama că în spatele lui stă F.B.I., care-l însărcină”. Ca urmă din

exemplu, Eaton a amintit că la conferință său din anul trecut la fermă sa-ște Pugwash (un grup) și fost numită dacă ar fi putut vedea „liberitatea cu care comunistul (probabil că se referă la un om de știință sovietic — n.r.) a discutat orice programă științifică. El a uitat pe toți prin cunoașterea temeinică a realizărilor științifice. Spun cu toată siguranță că, dintr-un savant să fie întrunită acolo, străușul nostru reprezentant american a dat doară de cea mai mare rezervă, din considerente politice”, deoarece americanul de la conferință „au înțeles că ar putea fi interogați și trasi la răspundere” pentru tot ce-au vorbit acolo.

Conferința internațională de la Pugwash — a spus Eaton — a demonstrat că americanii au mai puțină încredere unul în altul decât cetătenii oricărui altă țară. Analizând mai departe problemele polițismului, bogătarul american a spus că în afară de F.B.I. există, probabil, circa 100 de alte instituții americane care se ocupă de asemenea investigații. „Piesă de departament al guvernului are în prezent proprii săi anchetaitori, propria sa forță polițienească și se ocupă de filarea cetătenilor”.

„Dacă ati aduna fortele polițienești ale orașelor, districtelor, statelor și cele federale — a declarat Eaton — văd că seama că Hitler, în culmea puterii sale, dispusind de Gestapo, nu a avut niciodată asemenea organizații de filare cum avem noi în prezent în țara noastră”.

Desigur, situația descrisă de Eaton nu este nouă. Însă faptul că un mare capitalist ca el protestează astăzi împotriva polițismului ne arată cel puțin două fenomene interesante. Prințul valul de somaj, precum și situația grea în care se găsesc cercurile guvernamentale, care continuă experiențele cu explozii nucleare, duc în prezent la o îndepărtare a terorii polițiste din citadela americană a „lumii libere”. Al doilea: această politică adsează o împotrivire tot mai fermă și mai largă în rândurile americanilor lucrați, care preferă libertățile democratice și o întrecere pașnică în locul unui războl ce-ar avea cele mai grele urmări și pentru poporul american.

N. SCUTARU

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Nease

FROM : M. A. Jones

SUBJECT: FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC
MIKE WALLACE TV INTERVIEW PROGRAM

DATE: June 2, 1958

REC-8

Tolson _____
 Boardman _____
 Boardman _____
 Mohr _____
 Nease _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Trotter _____
 Clayton _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

b7c
c7d
Under cover of a letter dated May 26, 1958, captioned as above, the New York Office enclosed two Photostats of an article that appeared in the Rumanian Communist newspaper, "The Spark" on May 8, 1958, in Bucharest, Rumania. New York also enclosed two Photostats of an English translation of the above-mentioned article furnished by Mrs. Veturia Manuila, wife of Sabin Manuila, President of the Iliu Maniu American-Rumanian Relief Foundation, 55 West 42nd Street, New York, New York.

MRS. SABIN MANUILA

A true copy of this translation for the Director's use is attached.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information.

Enclosure

DGH:gegqay
(2)

#291,978
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/13/99 BY SP/SL/P

REC-8

100-391697-545

JUN 10 1958

ENCLOSURE
REC-81 auto Copy
6-11-58

53 JUN 17 1958

Central Research
Autostore Corp.
GRANADA CORP.
100-391697-545
100-391697-545

TRUE COPY

~~True copy of
ARTICLE ENTITLED~~

Article appeared in the Romanian communist newspaper "The Spark" on May 8th, 1958 in Bucharest, Romania.

~~A BILLIONAIRE BRANDS AMERICAN POLICE SYSTEM.~~

The wellknown rich American Cyrus Eaton, possessor of an immense wealth, made a few days ago the statement, that the American system of spying on its citizens became more powerful than that of the Gestapo in Hitler's days.

Cyrus Eaton of Cleveland, heads series of companies of coal, metallurgy and railroad business with a total capital of 2 billion dollars. A wellknown figure in the social-political life, Eaton, 74 years old, is a declared partisan of capitalism, especially of American capitalism, but at the same time he condemns the aggressive politics of the leaders of the United States, being one of the few big capitalists who are for a peaceful competition with communism, and for better knowing each-other in spirit of friendship, of the United States and the Soviet Union.

From his own funds, the billionaire organized meetings of Soviet and American scientist with scientist of their countries to stand against the policy of atomic armament; He is one of the "personalities" who signed the wellknown appeal for "a reasonable nuclear policy".

In his TV interview given Sunday on the American Broadcasting Company, Syrus Eaton said: " I am always worried when I see, that a country believes in rising to the top due to its police action. Or, FBI (The Federal Bureau of Investigation, the principal American police force specialized in anti-communist fight) is one of the many institutions in the United States, who's task is the investigation, follow up and spying on the citizens. Here, this activity reached the proportion when it inspires serious alarm".

Eaton said, that surely he would not expect that the United States Police Force should cease functioning but it should delimit its activity to its legal task of fight against criminality. He combats the propaganda of praise against those who prefer police force and spying on citizens, on scientists, etc. He stated, the scientific progress was slowed down considerably because "de men of science are permanently aware of the FBI behind their backs and this is frightening". As an example Mr. Eaton mentioned that last year at his farm in Pugwash "the world would have been quite surprised to see" the communist soviet scientist -probably he is referring to a soviet man of science- discussed any scientific program brought up. He impressed everybody by his vast scientific knowledges. I state with certainty, that from among all scientists assembled there, our brilliant American reprezentative proved to be the most reserved for political reasons", because the Americans taking part at this conference

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10/13/97 BY SP-5 CLK/JF
#297,978

ENCLOSURE

100-391697-545

"understood that they might be investigated and held responsible" for everything they said there.

The international conference of Pugwash - said Mr. Eaton demonstrated that the Americans have less confidence in each other than the citizens of any other state.

Analyzing further the proportions of this police system, the rich American said that beside the FBI, there are at least one hundred other American institutions doing the same job." Each department of the U. S. government has at the present time its own investigation officers, its police force following up the citizens."

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Obviously the situation described by Mr. Eaton is not new. But the fact, that a big capitalist like him protests against the police system shows at least two interesting phenomena: First : the increasing unemployment as well as the difficult situation of the government circles, which continue the nuclear tests, lead to a stiffning of the police terror in the American citadel of the "free world". The second: This policy finds an increasing opposition on the part of the lucid Americans, who prefer the democratic freedom and a peaceful competition, in lieu of a war which would have the most disastrous consequences also for the American people.

2

F B I

Date: 6/9/58

Transmit the following in _____

PLAIN TEXT

(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIR-TEL (Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-391697)

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (62-11998)

SUBJECT: FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC
MIKE WALLACE TV INTERVIEW PROGRAM
INFORMATION CONCERNING

Enclosed herewith is the tape (#5498) monitoring the MIKE WALLACE TV Interview on ABC-TV, 10:00 - 10:30 PM, 6/8/58 with SYLVESTER L. (PAT) WEAVER, Jr., former President of the National Broadcasting Company.

Also enclosed for the Bureau are the following newspaper clippings commenting on the above-mentioned interview:

"NY Times", late city edition, 6/9/58, page 47, by JACK GOULD, captioned "TV: A Dissenting Voice".

"NY Daily News", Final Edition, 6/9/58, page 47, by BEN GROSS, captioned "PAT WEAVER FLAYS TV FOR ITS POOR PROGRAMS".

During the above mentioned interview, MIKE WALLACE stated that Mr. WEAVER questions whether the television industry fulfills its duty to the public and that WEAVER feels that TV does not do what it can to present programs to the public that would tend to interest and educate the audience. Mr. WEAVER stated during the above interview that TV should tackle great issues and must not allow the service to be degraded by a steady diet of "westerns, detective, and panel" type of shows.

REC-78

3- Bureau (100-391697) (Encl. 3) Rm 100-391697-5498
1- New York (62-11998)

RRF:cem
(5)

15 JUN 10 1958

EX-117
ENCLOSURE
117
117

Approved

Sent _____

Per _____

62 JUN 13 1958

Special Agent in Charge

Crime Records

F B I

Date: 6/9/58

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT
(Type in plain text or code)Via AIR-TEL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

NY 62-11998

For the Bureau's information at 10:07 PM,
the above interview program was interrupted by technical
difficulties at the studio and the audience was asked
to "please stand by" for about 1 minute or so.

It is to be noted that on the above program it
was announced that next week's MIKE WALLACE Interview will
be with HENRY CABOT LODGE, the US Ambassador to the UN.

POWERS

- 2 -

Approved: _____ Sent: _____ M Per: _____
Special Agent in Charge

TV: A Dissenting Voice

Weaver, Former N.B.C. President, Takes Medium to Task on Wallace Program.

By JACK GOULD

SYLVESTER L. (PAT) WEAVER, JR., former president of the National Broadcasting Company, criticized the management of the television networks last night for failing to live up to their responsibilities and degrading the quality of their service to the public. He was interviewed on the Mike Wallace series over Channel 7, presented in association with the Fund for the Republic.

As is his custom, Mr. Weaver spoke forthrightly, albeit with a touch of bitterness, and said many things worth saying. In the last two years, which happens to be roughly the time since he left N.B.C., he charged that the networks have gradually abdicated their obligation to offer adequately diversified programming and have settled for cheap game shows or routine story-telling programs, notably a flood of westerns and mysteries.

Mr. Weaver appropriately noted that only the network managements were in a position to exercise the authority to guarantee expanding schedules of quality cultural material, increased news and information offerings, and a departure from the radio format to which TV now seems to be returning.

It is unfortunate that on the fund series, however, Mr. Wallace is not the digging reporter he once was on "Night Beat." For the personal dilemma of Mr. Weaver should have been brought out. He, too, is a victim of the trend he deplores.

His major representation on the air is through a show called "Make Me Laugh," precisely the type of cheap game program he vigorously denounced. Economics often can dictate unhappy rationalizations for individuals as well as managements.

Mr. Weaver also was perhaps a little unfair to the network managements. His hint that N.B.C. currently would welcome the profits it knew under his regime did not sufficiently emphasize the advent of the recession, which has enormously increased the advertising pressures on the medium.

But there can be no disagreement with Mr. Weaver's insistence that the networks must try to elevate taste and incorporate more public service and cultural programming

in prime evening time. The minority viewer does need to be served beyond "some bones" on Sunday afternoon, as he put it.

Mr. Weaver does have a tendency also to hint that all was well with TV during his N.B.C. incumbency, being human, he had his share of dismal "dogs." But this cannot take away from the man his sense of excitement and vision and his healthy realization that TV is too important to be judged only as a business. His dissenting voice is valuable.

CLIPPING FROM THE
FLY TIMES

N.Y.
EDITION Fly City
DATED 9 JUN 1958
PAGE 47
FORWARDED BY NY DIVISION

100-391697-546

ENCLOSURE



What's On? RADIO

Pat Weaver Flays TV For Its Poor Programs

By BEN GROSS

The network managements of this country are "degrading" our television service, reducing it largely to a mere "story telling medium." That is all the shows are really either game shows or story telling shows. So said Sylvester (Pat) Weaver, former president of NBC, during a startling interview on the Mike Wallace program last night (ABC-TV, 10).

This was the most scathing indictment of current television ever uttered in public by one who himself is an outstanding figure of the medium.

Weaver, who has served both as a top echelon advertising agency and network executive, called on the networks to live up to their responsibilities.

Weaver, now a consultant and producer, pointed out that TV today is "lacking in balance" and "it is going from open forums to closed forums." He deplored the disappearance of live shows, especially drama, and emphatically criticized all three networks for "moving news out of network time."

Made Money

Known as one of the most creative and far-sighted men of the broadcasting industry, Weaver while at NBC became famous as the originator of the "spectacular" and also of such shows as "Wide Wide World," "Today" and "Tonight."

As if anticipating that his critics might regard his advanced ideas as impractical or uncommercial, Weaver pointed out that "we made an awful lot of money at NBC television starting back in 1951... and I started running it in 1949. I am sure they would love to have the profits that I made today."



Sylvester
(Pat) Weaver

John
Wayne

TV, he said, "should reflect as a communication medium the whole richness and pluralism of our society. In other words, we should have the magic of live performances in the New York theatre... the great issues in documentaries and telementaries presented... we should have all of the people passing across our sets."

"It is a port, you know, through which you can look out on the entire world, but if you aim at only at a film projector and show the cans out of Hollywood together with some game shows that can be presented cheaply and get pretty good audiences on a commercial value, you are degrading a service and I am afraid that's what's happening."

"Well, what should TV do?"

"We should have a great im-

CLIPPING FROM THE

DAILY NEWS

N.Y. _____

EDITION Final

DATED 9 JUN 1958

PAGE 47

FORWARDED BY NY DIVISION

100-391697-546

ENCLOSURE

portant report to the nation at least once a month by each of the networks in premium time, that is, network time," Pat suggested. "I think we should have a news service that really spends a lot of money in developing a coverage of this country and everything that happens in it."

"I think that beyond the infor-

mation programs, there should be all sorts of informational tele-montaries; we should be going into the cultural field and showing all the good things that we know people, when they have a chance to learn about these, will become interested in... their tastes upgraded and their standards elevated."

"But isn't this 'uncommercial'?"

No," said Weaver. He cited that NBC was able to get an audience of 30 million viewers for its presentation of the "Sleeping Beauty" ballet.

Weaver argued that with the proper approach it is possible to obtain sponsors for good programs, even some controversial ones.

The former NBC prezzy said that the number of people at the sets is going down and added that the public really wants the "good things."

Eventually, he predicted, if the networks neglect high-quality programming, the pressures on them will increase and "their managements will be changed."

Or other ways of distributing such material will arise. "Pay television is one way." Another way is through the theatres themselves," Weaver said.

"A significant, a trail-blazing interview," this. "It may have repercussions for years to come."

00-6

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

June 3, 1958

The attached copy of the interview of Mike Wallace with William O. Douglas was sent to the Director from the Fund for the Republic, Inc., NY, NY.

No reference is made to the Director or FBI.

Attachment
hbb

100-391077-35311,23

✓ Mr. Tolson _____
✓ Mrs. Boardman _____
✓ Mrs. Belmont _____
✓ Mr. Mohr _____
✓ Mr. Nease _____
✓ Mr. Parsons _____
✓ Mr. Rosen _____
✓ Mr. Tamm _____
✓ Mr. Trotter _____
✓ Mrs. Jones _____
✓ Mr. Clayton _____
Tele. Room _____
✓ Mr. Holloman _____
✓ Miss Holmes _____
✓ Miss Gandy _____
✓ M. A. [initials]

EX-102

ENCLOSURE

REC-51

EX-102

100-391077-547

20 JUN 10 1958

CREW REC

57 JUN 23 1958
7274

REC-7Z

EX-101 100-391697-549

June 11, 1958

Mr. W. R. Thomson
Post Office Box 838
Greenville, South Carolina

Dear Mr. Thomson:

Your letter of June 4, 1958, has been received, and while I would like to be of assistance, I must advise that the function of this Bureau as a fact-gathering agency does not extend to the furnishing of evaluations or clearances on individuals or organizations.

Supplying information of the type you have requested would, in effect, constitute an approval or disapproval of the group you mentioned; therefore, I regret I am unable to comply with your request. I am sure you will understand the necessity for this policy and will not infer that we do or do not have the information you desire.

Many thanks for your generous remarks concerning "Masters of Deceit."


Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

JUN 11 1958
REC'D-READING ROOM

F B I



NOTE: Bufiles reveal no derogatory information concerning Thomson.

DWB:hjf
(4)

JUN 20 1958

Polson _____
Boardman _____
Elmont _____
John _____
Ease _____
Arsons _____
Osen _____
Amm _____
Totter _____
Payton _____
R.R. Room _____
Silloman _____
Indy _____
MAIL ROOM

MAIN MAIL ROOM 41 ✓

SOUTHERN HANDKERCHIEF MANUFACTURING CO.
ALL AMERICAN HANDKERCHIEFS

REG. U. S. PATENT OFF.

GREENVILLE, SOUTH CAROLINA

June 4th 1958

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Nease
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Clayton
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

Hon J Edgar Hoover Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington D C

Dear Mr Hoover:

At the recent meeting in Houston, Texas, of the Southern Baptist Convention, the charge was made that the Christian Life Commission, one of its approved agencies, had compromised itself by accepting a gift of \$15,000. from the Fund of The Republic. The Convention rejected the charge by a large vote, upon the assurance from members who had investigated the organization, that it was in no way associated with Communism.

While in my judgment it was a mistake to accept the gift from outsiders regardless of their integrity, I am writing to be certain that the Fund for the Republic is not one of the many high-sounding organizations which carry on their nefarious activities for Communism or other unrevealed and usually ulterior purposes. I would therefore appreciate your writing me your official estimate of this Fund.

While writing I want to express my appreciation of your recent book "Masters of Deceit" which I am now reading. I trust it will have wide distribution as it reveals what every American should know about Communism. I plan to recommend and use it in every way possible to inform people within my circle of contacts.

Sincerely yours,

W. R. Thomson

W. R. Thomson

REC-71

100-391697-549

12 JUN 16 1958

EX-101

~~EXP. PROC.~~
JUN 6 1958

(initials)
att.
6-11-58
DWB

Craig D. Boardman

SOUTHERN HARDKERCHIEF MANUFACTURING CO.

ALL AMERICAN HARDKERCHIEFS

REG. U. S. PATENT OFF.

GREENVILLE, SOUTH CAROLINA

June 13 1958

ccm
Honorable J Edgar Hoover-Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25 D C

Dear Mr Hoover

Thanks for your letter of the 11th. It was not my intention to ask for information you could not consistently divulge. I understand the reasons you have given for not being able to comply with my request.

From time to time I have seen lists of various front organizations which the FBI had exposed as representing Communism. As far as I recall, the Fund for the Republic has not been so listed. However, I will try to get a line on their reputation through Senator Thurmond, who may know something about this outfit.

Meanwhile, with assurances of my high esteem and appreciation for your splendid work.

Sincerely yours

W.R. Thomson

W.R. THOMSON
GREENVILLE, S.C.

WRThomson
ej

REC-21

100-391697-550
B JUN 17 1958
No a/c b/p by 6/11/58
to bank of atlanta

EX-102

57 JUN 22 1958

CRAVEN REC'D.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 6/23/58

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (62-11998)

SUBJECT: D FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC
MIKE WALLACE TV INTERVIEW PROGRAM

There is attached for the completion of the Bureau's file on this matter a booklet setting out the interview by MIKE WALLACE of REINHOLD NIEBUHR which was the initial interview on this television series.

N.Y. N.J. *EX-140*

This booklet was made available by former Federal Judge HAROLD KENNEDY, whose identity is known to the Bureau.

ENCLOSURE SURVIVAL AND FRIENDS
REC-99 EX-140

2-Bureau (Enc.1) RM
1-New York (62-11998)

EX-140

REC-99 100-571691-551
26
13 JUN 25 1958

TGS:EG
(3)

60 JUN 26 1958

R. H. L. J.
LIAISON

F B I

Date: 5/6/58

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)Via AIRTEL
(Priority or Method of Mailing) ✓

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Nease
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Clayton
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Nease
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Clayton
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

JUN 12 1958

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
 FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (62-11998)
 SUBJECT: FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC
 SCOMIKE WALLACE TV INTERVIEWS

The following newspaper articles are attached which deal with the interview of CYRUS EATON by MIKE WALLACE, on the 10:00 P.M. telecast over the American Broadcasting Company, Channel 7, on 5/4/58:

"Newark Star Ledger" of 5/6/58, (editorial)
 "New York Daily News" of 5/6/58, (editorial)
 "New York Daily News" of 5/6/58, television write-up
 "New York Mirror", 5/6/58, NICK KENNY byline
 "New York Post" of 5/6/58, TV write-up.

POWERS

3 - Bureau (RM) (Encs 1-5)
 1 - New York (62-11998)

*ALL CLOSING DATED
RECORDED
EX-110*

TGS:bfh(#1)
 (5)

REC-29

100-371697-54

15 JUN 12 1958

50 JUN 18 1958

Approved: *E. Powers* Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

CRAIG REC.

Originals removed 20 & Photostats sent to file 7/20 6-11-58

The Fund for the Republic

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
A Mike Wallace
interview with

Reinhold Niebuhr

100-391697-551

Produced by the American Broadcasting Company
in association with

The Fund for the Republic



This is one of a series of thirteen Mike Wallace Interviews, produced by the American Broadcasting Company in association with the Fund for the Republic for the purpose of stimulating public discussion of the basic issues of survival and freedom in America today. This transcript has been edited. Single copies are available without charge from the Fund for the Republic; additional copies 10 cents each.

Reinhold Niebuhr is an eminent theologian, vice-president and graduate professor of the Union Theological Seminary in New York, now on leave to the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. He was born in Missouri in 1892, received his Bachelor of Divinity from the Yale Divinity School in 1914, and was ordained in 1915 in the ministry of the Evangelical Synod of North America. He is the author of many notable books, most recently "Pious and Secular America." He is a member of the Central Committee of Consultants of the Fund for the Republic.

The Fund's Study of the Free Society

The major program of the Fund for the Republic is a study of the basic issues underlying a free society. This study is directed at clarifying fundamental questions concerning freedom and justice that emerge when the forms and principles developed by eighteenth century America meet the ideas and practices of today's highly developed industrial society. One of the aims of the study is to widen the circles of public discussion of these questions. It is for this reason that the Fund is assisting in the presentation of the Mike Wallace Interviews.

The task of clarification is being undertaken by ten distinguished Americans acting as a Central Committee of Consultants to the Fund. These men are:

- A. A. BERLE, JR.
Attorney, author, former Assistant Secretary of State
- SCOTT BUCHANAN
Philosopher, author, former Dean of St. John's College
- EUGENE BURDICK
Political scientist, University of California; novelist
- ERIC F. GOLDMAN
Professor of history, Princeton; Bancroft Prize winner
- CLARK KERR
President-elect, University of California; labor economist
- HENRY R. LUCE
Editor-in-Chief, Time, Life, Fortune
- JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J.
Theologian, Woodstock College; editor of Theological Studies
- REINHOLD NIEBUHR
Vice-president and graduate professor, Union Theological Seminary
- ISIDOR I. RABI
Nobel Prize scientist; Higgins Professor of Physics, Columbia University
- ROBERT REDFIELD
Professor of anthropology, University of Chicago; former president, American Anthropological Association
- ROBERT M. HUTCHINS
President of the Fund, serves as Chairman of the Committee

the dignity of a free man, to bow his knee to a god, as if he were a sinner."

The truth about man is that he has a curious kind of dignity but also a curious kind of misery, and that is what the various forms of agnosticism don't understand. The eighteenth century always talked about the dignity of man, but I rather like Pascal's words, "The philosophers talk to you about the dignity of man, and they tempt you to pride, or they talk to you about the misery of man, and they tempt you to despair," and then, says Pascal — this was written in the Cartesian age — "Where, but in the simplicity of the Gospel, can you hear about both the dignity of man and the misery of man?" That's what I say to the atheists. On the other hand, I also say, it is significant that it is as difficult to get charity out of piety as to get reasonableness out of rationalism.

WALLACE: Do you think that because you're a Christian you're a more valuable man in our society, or more worthy in the eyes of God, than an atheist like Bertrand Russell?

NIEBUHR: I think I've already answered that, Mr. Wallace. Certainly anybody who says "in the eyes of God" is pretentious. How do I know about God's judgment? One of the fundamental points about religious humility is that you say you don't know about the ultimate judgment. It's beyond your judgment. If you equate God's judgment with your judgment, you have a wrong religion.

WALLACE: Dr. Niebuhr, I surely thank you for coming and spending this half-hour with us. God speed to you, sir.

Reinhold Niebuhr is a man of God, but a man of the world as well. Dr. Niebuhr would seem to be saying that if a nation would survive and remain free, its citizens must use religion as a source of self-criticism, not as a source of self-righteousness.

WALLACE: This is Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr — A Protestant minister, one of the most important and challenging religious thinkers in the world. Dr. Niebuhr is a critic of America's religious revival and he says that religion will not necessarily vanquish injustice or communism. We'll find out why in just a moment.

ANNOUNCER: The Mike Wallace Interview, presented by the American Broadcasting Company in association with the Fund for the Republic, brings you a special television series discussing the problems of survival and freedom in America.

WALLACE: Good evening, I'm Mike Wallace. It's been said of tonight's guest, "No man has had as much influence as a preacher in this generation. No preacher has had as much influence outside the church." Reinhold Niebuhr is the vice-president of Union Theological Seminary in New York, currently on leave to the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton. Through his writing he has helped mould the world's thinking in religion, morality, and politics.

Dr. Niebuhr, the first question I'd like to put to you is perhaps a very obvious one, but I would

like a kind of capsule answer if I may. We hear about the necessity for a separation between church and state. If religion is good, why should our society be based upon a separation between the church and the state?

NIEBUHR: Your "if" is a very big one — "if religion is good." It may be good and it may be bad. The separation of church and the state is necessary partly because if religion is good then the state shouldn't interfere with a religious vision or with a religious prophecy. There must be a realm of truth beyond political competence. That's why there must be a separation of churches. But if religion is bad — and a bad religion is one that gives an ultimate sanctity to some particular cause — then religion mustn't interfere with the state. So one of the basic democratic principles as we know it in America is the separation of church and state.

WALLACE: Well, this brings us to the issue of possible religious infringements on freedom here in the United States. I'm going to talk about several. First off; The Roman Catholic Church opposes birth control and divorce and there is no doubt that this opposition has blocked the spread of birth control and easier divorce laws, not merely for Catholics but for non-Catholics as well. Do you consider such measures an infringement on the rights and liberties of non-Catholics?

NIEBUHR: When you say "not merely for Catholics," that is the crux of the matter. The Church has the right to set its own standards within its community. I don't think it has a right to prohibit birth control or to enforce upon a secular society its conception of divorce and the indissolubility of the marriage tie.

WALLACE: When you say enforce upon a society, how does the Catholic Church enforce its suggestions for Catholics?

NIEBUHR: No, no, no, that's the point. Whenever a church does anything for its own group it has that right.

society because we have our own different history but it is not — as you quite rightly point out — so implausible in Asia and Africa. That's our predicament, that this despotism, which we regard with abhorrence, is rather too plausible to decaying feudal, agrarian, pastoral societies. That's why we must expect to have many a defeat before we will have an ultimate victory in this contest with communism.

WALLACE: But you believe in an ultimate victory? Why are you so sure of an ultimate victory?

NIEBUHR: I'm not so sure. I hope for an ultimate victory, but I think that there's a serious ambiguousness about it. On the one hand, you say, because it's right it must be victorious. On the other hand, you say, it's right whether it's victorious or not. This is what I believe about a free society — that it's right, victorious or not.

WALLACE: What is your personal attitude about atheism? We have heard from certain atheists that the whole conception of God is unworthy of free men. They say that it's almost, in a sense, contemptible for a man to fall on his knees before God. What is your attitude toward atheists?

NIEBUHR: Well, you are asking two questions there. My personal attitude toward atheists is the same attitude I have toward Christians, and it is governed by a very orthodox text: "By their fruits shall ye know them." I wouldn't judge a man by the presuppositions of his life but by the fruits of his life. And the fruits — the relevant fruits — are, I'd say, a sense of charity, a sense of proportion, a sense of justice. Whether the man is an atheist or a Christian, I would judge him by his fruits, and I therefore have many agnostic friends. That's an answer to one question. I might say that the debate between atheists and Christians is rather stale to me, because the Christians say, "You must be a Christian, or you must be a religious man, in order to be good," and the atheists will say — as you quoted one of these atheists as saying — "It's beneath

ernment, without freedom, momentarily, in order that I may live to fight for my freedom at a later time."

NIEBUHR: Well, I can see that individuals would say that. I would simply say that in terms of collective destiny it's not a live option. A nation will not say that, a complex of nations will not say it. I think that the people who say that are really too rationalistic. Politics deals with a common-sense approach to the imponderables of history which I think are obscured by a certain kind of rationalism.

WALLACE: Dr. Niebuhr, tell me this: Is freedom necessary? The Russians, we are told, do not have freedom, and yet they have a productive society. Is freedom necessary for our society?

NIEBUHR: Well, I should think it was, but that's a rather searching question that I couldn't answer very simply. I'd say that freedom is necessary for two reasons. It's necessary for the individual, because the individual, no matter how good the society is, has hopes, fears, ambitions, creative urges that transcend the purposes of his society. Therefore, we have a long history of freedom, as people have tried to extricate themselves from tyranny for the sake of art, for the sake of science, for the sake of religion, for the sake of the conscience of the individual. Secondly, freedom is ultimately necessary for a society, because every despotic society lives on the basis of a rather implausible dogma. For instance, the Russian society lives on the Marxist dogma of world redemption through communism.

WALLACE: Implausible to whom?

NIEBUHR: To us.

WALLACE: Yes. All right. But obviously not implausible to hundreds of millions of people.

NIEBUHR: No, one of the great perplexities is that the dogma is implausible to the whole of European

WALLACE: Surely.

NIEBUHR: But when it reaches up beyond its group and tries to enforce its standards upon a society that doesn't accept these standards — perhaps for good reasons, perhaps for bad reasons — this is the problem we face in a pluralistic society, that not necessarily every standard every church tries to enforce upon the society is from the society's standpoint a good standard.

WALLACE: Tell me this, sir, would you vote for a devout Catholic as President of the United States?

NIEBUHR: Well, I have a simple answer to that. I voted for one in 1928.

WALLACE: Then obviously you feel that a man can be a devout Catholic without in any sense owing his first allegiance as an American to the Pope rather than to —

NIEBUHR: That is one of the flagrant misconceptions about Catholicism in America: that if a man is a Catholic he owes allegiance to what they say is a foreign sovereign, or something like that. In our study in the Fund for the Republic on religion in a pluralistic society we're dealing with both policies and attitudes and one of the things we have to consider is the attitudes of Protestants to Catholics and Catholics to Protestants and Catholics and Protestants to Jews. Now the ordinary Protestant, Jew or secularist has a stereotype about Catholicism. It consists of Spanish Catholicism, Latin-American Catholicism and and, let us say, the Catholicism of O'Connor's novel, *The Last Hurrah*. Now there are all these types of Catholicism but the stereotype doesn't do justice to the genuine relation that Catholicism has had to democratic society, not only in our country but in France since the war, in Germany after the First World War, in the Germany of Adenauer. These are the creative relationships of Catholicism to a free society that the average American doesn't fully appreciate.

WALLACE: Are you saying that we do not properly understand our Catholic brothers?

NIEBUHR: We don't properly discriminate. We never discriminate properly when we're dealing with another group. One of the big problems about religion is that religious people don't know that they are probably as flagrant in these misjudgments as irreligious people.

WALLACE: We don't discriminate sufficiently. We discriminate against occasionally too much.

NIEBUHR: Yes, that's right.

WALLACE: Let's turn to some criticisms of the Protestant Church. You've admitted in your writings that the Catholics have been far more successful than the Protestants in abolishing racial segregation in their churches. How come?

NIEBUHR: Well, how come? I tried to analyze this in an article in a rather heretical way. I said that the churches that are most obviously democratic are most obviously given to race prejudice, by which I mean the churches that have absolute congregational control. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there was a kind of Protestantism that said, "If you could only get rid of the Bishop, then you'd be a true Christian." Well, you might get rid of the Bishop and get the local Klu Klux Klan leader instead. That has been the fate of certain types of Protestantism. They get under the control of a White Citizens Council, while the Catholic Church with its authoritarian system, in which the Bishop expresses the conscience of the whole Christian community, says there are some things that you can't do. There must be equality of all men before God in a democratic society. I think that the achievements of Catholicism on race are very very impressive.

WALLACE: I imagine that you deplore, then, the comparative impotence of certain Protestant churches in this respect?

there's a general religious frame which I accept but does it give a particular answer?" And I said, "No, it doesn't give us a particular answer." You can't say that religion or irreligion will give us a particular answer to the nuclear dilemma. I think I have one answer, which is partly religious and partly secular; and that is, we ought at least to recognize that we and the Russians are in a common predicament. That would be religious in the sense of "Judge not lest you be judged." We judge the Russians because they're living under despotism and we don't like it, but we've gotten into a fix now where we're living in a common predicament. We all know it really. This doesn't mean that the Summit Conference ought to be held, or that it would succeed, but we ought to recognize the common predicament of Communists and democrats — or Americans.

WALLACE: Let me ask you this: I think it was Bertrand Russell who fairly recently said — and other people have said it along with him — that if it came to communism or nuclear war, communism or possible incineration, they'd choose to live under communism. How do you feel about that?

NIEBUHR: Well, I know Bertrand Russell is a great philosopher or logical mathematician, but I think my friend Sidney Hook is right about him. He said, "All the achievements in this field are no substitute for common sense." What Bertrand Russell is saying is that capitulation to communism is better than a nuclear war. But that isn't the point. We have to risk a nuclear war in order to escape capitulation to communism. For all I know, we may stumble into this terrible war. But no nation can say, "We will capitulate to tyranny rather than accept a speculative fate" — to accept an absolute fate as alternative to a speculative one. No nation can do that.

WALLACE: But people say: "I would rather 'live and fight another day' than give it all up right now. I would even rather live under a totalitarian gov-

about atheistic materialism and God-fearing America I think is beside the point; it's a rather vapid form of religion.

WALLACE: What is our way out? What is our solution? You have said not only that religion can't solve our problems but that our reason can't, our intelligence can't, science can't. Why can't they, and what can?

NIEBUHR: Well, that brings us to the ultimate question, about the Biblical and the Christian and the Jewish interpretations of the meaning of human existence. When I say that those things can't solve our problems, I don't say that they don't contribute, that you don't have to have science; a rational approach to the problems of life. The more complex the world situation becomes, the more scientific and rational analysis you have to have, and the less you can do with simple good-will and sentiment. Nonetheless, I think the Christian faith is right as against simple forms of secularism in that it believes that there is in man a radical freedom. This freedom is creative but it is also destructive, and there's nothing to prevent it from being both creative and destructive. That's why history is not an answer to our problem, because history complicates and enlarges every problem of human existence. The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries didn't believe this but now we're living in the nuclear age, and the science that was supposed to work automatically for human welfare has become a science that gives us nuclear weapons. This is the ironic character of human history and human existence, which I can only explain; if I may say so, in Biblical terms, although I don't mean by this that I would accept every interpretation of Christianity that's derived from the Bible. Many people wouldn't accept my interpretation, but that's what Christianity means for me. There is an ultimate answer in the true religious faith. It doesn't give you any immediate answers.

One of the young physicists at the Institute for Advanced Study said to me: "I know that

NIEBUHR: I certainly do. I said in my article that we Protestants ought to confess humbly that the theatre and sports have done more for race amity, for race understanding than the Protestant Church in certain sects and in certain parts of the nation.

WALLACE: I ask you a question now about which we could talk for many hours and ask for a simple and straightforward answer. Dr. Niebuhr, how do you account for Christian anti-Semitism in the United States? Do we sufficiently appreciate our Jewish population here?

NIEBUHR: I don't think we do. I account for it, first, on the basis of general human failing. We misjudge anybody who's different from us. The Jews diverge from our type, ethnically and religiously. That's their chief offense, but there are particular causes. I have many Jewish friends, very creative Jewish friends, and I've long felt that the average Christian didn't realize the tremendous capacity for civic righteousness among our Jewish people.

WALLACE: What do you mean by "civic righteousness"?

NIEBUHR: Well, let me mention Stanley Isaacs here in New York — people that have a concern for the public good, Senator Lehman, Frank Altshul. Now I know there are Christians that also have this, but there is not a sufficient appreciation in the Christian community of this particular quality of Jewish life.

WALLACE: Why does the Jewish stereotype unhappily survive?

NIEBUHR: Well, that's a long story. It came out of the Middle Ages and was transferred here, according to our American historians, through populism. The Jews were the money-lenders of the Middle Ages so there's a stereotype of the slightly or more than slightly dishonest businessman. This stereotype covers and obscures all the facts.

WALLACE: It would look, Dr. Niebuhr, as though all of our major religions are becoming more influential. I say it would look that way because we hear so much about religious revivals, increasing church attendance, college students returning to religion, the apparent success of the evangelists. Yet, in large measure, you have criticized this revival. Why?

NIEBUHR: That's a long story, too. I wouldn't criticize the whole revival. I've criticized the revival wherever it gives petty and trivial answers to great and ultimate questions about the meaning of our life. Let me put it like this: The people who weren't traditionally religious, conventionally religious in my youth had a religion of their own. They were liberals who believed in the idea of progress or they were Marxists. Both of these secular religions have broken down. The nuclear age has refuted the idea of progress and Marxism has been refuted by Stalinism. Therefore, people have returned to the historic religion. Now when the historic religions give trivial answers to the tragic questions of our day — when an evangelist says, for instance, we must hope in Christ without spelling out what this means in our particular nuclear age — this is irrelevant. When another evangelist says if America doesn't stop being selfish, it will be doomed, this is also a childish answer because nations are selfish. The question about America isn't whether we will be selfish or unselfish, but will we be sufficiently imaginative, for example, to pass the Reciprocal Trade Acts.

WALLACE: In other words, translate religion into a kind of active morality.

NIEBUHR: Yes, a morality of justice and reciprocity.

WALLACE: Let me ask you this: We're constantly being told by our political and church leaders that in our fight against communism we are on God's side — that we're God-fearing people, the Russians, the Communists are atheists — and therefore we must ultimately win. What about that?

NIEBUHR: I don't know whether any religious leader would say that we must ultimately win because we're on God's side. If they do say that, it's bad religion, because —.

WALLACE: Well, haven't we heard from the Old Testament that "right is might"?

NIEBUHR: But in the Old Testament the God of the Prophets never was completely on Israel's side. There was a primitive national religion but there was always a transcendent God who had judgment first in the House of God. This is the true religion. It has a sense of a transcendent majesty and a transcendent meaning that puts the foe and me under the same judgment. "Judge not that you be not judged." Why do we judge each other —

WALLACE: But we do, we do!

NIEBUHR: That's true religion.

WALLACE: We do here, sir, do we not? For instance, we're told by many of our leaders, including President Eisenhower, that we will help strengthen ourselves as a nation through religion and going to church. And I infer, from what I hear, that our political and our religious leaders say, "If we can find a religious revival, this will give us strength to fight godless communism." We do hear that.

NIEBUHR: You may hear that. I wouldn't agree with it. I will tell you, among other reasons, why: I know that the Communists are atheistic and godless, but I don't think that's what's primarily the matter with them. What's primarily the matter with them is that they worship false gods. That's much more dangerous than when people don't believe anything; they may be confused but they're not dangerous. The fanatic is dangerous. The Communists do have a god, the Dialectic of History, which guarantees everything that they're going to do and guarantees them victory; that's why they're fanatic. All this talk

Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : TOR, FBI

DATE: 6/16

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK

SUBJECT: FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC,
MIKE WALLACE TV INTERVIEW PROGRAM
INFORMATION CONCERNING

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Pyle
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Candy

On 6/16/58, Mrs. ALICE WIDENER, the publisher of "USA," whose identity is known to the Bureau, advised the NYO as follows:

On 6/16/58, [redacted] "New York Herald Tribune," confidentially turned over to Mrs. WIDENER, a Western Union Telegram, which he stated, came to his attention while he was at work at the "New York World Telegram," and which he pocketed without advising the intended receiver of this telegram. This information is to be treated with the utmost confidence.

b6
b7C

This telegram, which was filed at Cleveland, Ohio, 6/14/58, at 11:15 Eastern Standard Time, is quoted as follows:

"Luke Carroll, City Editor, New York Herald Tribune, 230 West 31st Street, NYK. For automatic release in Sunday AM's, 6/15/58. Cleveland.

obj "President TITO, of Yugoslavia, Prime Minister NEHRU, of India, and the US State Department, in letters received by CYRUS EATON, Cleveland industrialist, have praised the works of the 2nd Pugwash Conference of Nuclear Scientists. All three letters said that the report of the Conference, which was sponsored by Mr. EATON, for the purpose of exploring ways of meeting the dangers of nuclear arms race, was receiving careful study. Earlier this week, Pope Pius XII sent his thanks to Mr. EATON and the scientists for sending him a report of the conference, while last week, NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV, Premier of the USSR, hailed the 'great importance of the efforts of scientists of countries of the world to remove the threat of nuclear war hanging over the world.'

- 2 - Bureau
1 - Cleveland
1 - New York (62-11998)

TGS:lmb
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REC-65

100-57127-552

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JUN 18 1958
EX-100
FEB 11 1959
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13 JUN 26 1958

52 JUL 3 1958

NY 62-11998

"President TITO, in his letter, said "I read with great interest, the principal documents pertaining to the 2nd Pugwash Conference of Nuclear Scientists. I am confident such efforts will help the responsible political factors in the world perceive the peace and thereby, the existence of all mankind depends, above all, on eliminating the danger of the use of weapons of mass destruction and on the policy of peaceful solution of outstanding international problems, by agreement."

"Prime Minister NEHRU said "I have immediately read these papers and I find them of great interest. I am sure that these papers will be of great interest to our nuclear scientists here and I shall pass them on to them. May I say that the work of this conference is, in my opinion, of the highest importance, and I earnestly trust that it will help in making people all over the world realize the terrible dangers which the world faces today."

Referral/Consult

"The telegram is signed, [redacted]"

With respect to [redacted] Mrs. WIDENER stated that she had ascertained that [redacted] had once been [redacted] at the "New York Herald Tribune," and had subsequently gone [redacted]

b6
b7C

NY 62-11998

Thereafter, he again obtained employment with the "Herald Tribune", was promoted, but left some years ago. She stated that her information is that after leaving the "Tribune" he went to work in the Publicity Department of one of ROBERT YOUNG's enterprises, in Cleveland, Ohio. ROBERT YOUNG is the former railroad tycoon who recently committed suicide.

Mrs. WIDENER stated she is, however, not certain of the employment of [redacted] by the ROBERT YOUNG enterprises. The Cleveland Office, through established sources, is requested to determine the identity of [redacted] who apparently resides in or about Cleveland, Ohio, and conceivably could be employed in one of CYRUS EATON's enterprises.

The morning and afternoon newspapers were reviewed; however, no reference to this story was noted. Mrs. WIDENER stated that [redacted] had been very friendly with LUKE CARROLL, and it may be that the "New York Herald Tribune" is the only New York paper that received this news release.

This is for the information of the Bureau.

b6
b7C

F B I

Date: 6/16/58

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson
 Mr. Felt
 Mr. Belmont
 Mr. Mohr
 Mr. Nease
 Mr. Parsons
 Mr. Rosen
 Mr. Tamm
 Mr. Trotter
 Mr. W.C. Sullivan
 Tele. Room
 Mr. Holloman
 Miss Gandy

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-391697)
 FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (62-11998)
 SUBJECT: FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC
 MIKE WALLACE TV INTERVIEW PROGRAM
 INFORMATION CONCERNING

For Bureau's information, the MIKE WALLACE TV interview program, ABC-TV, originally scheduled for 10:00 p.m., 6/15/58, was cancelled per announcement over Channel 7 at 10:00 p.m., 6/15/58. The program, Damon Runyon Theater, was shown instead.

Enclosed for the Bureau's information in this regard is a newspaper clipping from the "NY Times", Late City Edition, 6/16/58, page 1, entitled "Lodge TV Interview Cancelled by ABC After He Asks Cuts".

POWERS

3-Bureau (100-391697) (Enc. 1) RM
 1-New York (62-11998}

EX-124

REC-59

20 JUN 18 1958

CC-Belmont

EX-124

ENCLOSURE REC-59

RRF:EG
(5)

70 JUL 7 1958

Approved:

John Powers
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

Lodge TV Interview Canceled By A.B.C. After He Asks Cuts

The American Broadcasting Company last night canceled Mike Wallace's television interview with Henry Cabot Lodge, United States Ambassador to the United Nations. It said that the deletions Mr. Lodge had insisted on constituted "editorial censorship" in violation of company policy.

The program, the eighth in a series of thirteen produced jointly by Newsmakers Productions and the Fund for the Republic, was to have been on the air from 10 to 10:30 P.M. The programs appear with the general title, "Survival and Freedom."

Dr. Robert M. Hutchins, president of the fund, objected strongly to the company's action. He said that the program was educational in nature and that previous programs in the series had been revised with the company's approval.

In the interview as it was originally filmed Mr. Lodge had expressed the general view that the United States should give up the idea of winning popu-

larity abroad and should seek international respect instead.

John J. Daly, the company's vice-president in charge of news, public affairs and special events, said in a statement that ex post facto editing of public information programs was contrary to company policy except in instances of libel slander, bad taste or the national security.

He said that since the Lodge interview had been prepared several days in advance of presentation, the company had agreed that it could be reviewed "in the light of events as of the day of the telecast."

Mr. Daly reported that Mr. Lodge wanted some cuts made in the public interest about some areas of the discussion. He noted that after reviewing the entire text the company had agreed that one deletion might be made for this reason.

"With respect to other reservations by Ambassador Lodge, Mr. Daly said, "A.B.C. could

Continued on Page 47, Column 3

CLIPPING FROM THE

N.Y. Times

EDITION late City

DATED 6/16/58

PAGE 1

FORWARDED BY NY DIVISION

- / -
ENCLOSURE

160-391697-553

nature of the program, we did not feel that we or A. B. C. should attempt to compel him to say things he did not wish to say."

Dr. Hutchins explained that he and Mr. Lodge had agreed that some statements in the interview would be treated as "off-the-record" until Mr. Lodge released them.

"Other Interviews Recalled

Dr. Hutchins recalled that two previous interviews, one with Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr and the other with Dr. Erich Fromm, had been wholly or partially redone at their request and in the presence of representatives of the company's legal and press departments. The company representatives, he added, had raised no objections.

Dr. Hutchins insisted, too, that the procedure followed by the fund in the case of previous interviews had been agreed to by Oliver Treyz, president of the company's television network.

"Consequently," he said, "we are astonished to find that Mr. Daly has the power to announce suddenly a policy which is in violation of our agreement."

He called Mr. Daly's action "arbitrary" and an "experiment in censorship." He said that Mr. Lodge had rejected Mr. Daly's compromise of a single deletion.

not agree that national security and the public interest were involved. The program, therefore, was canceled.

"We deeply regret any embarrassment to Ambassador Lodge resulting from the action of Newsmaker Productions and the Fund for the Republic."

Called "Incomprehensible." Describing Mr. Daly's decision as "incomprehensible," Dr. Hutchins contended that Mr. Lodge was within his rights in refusing to allow an official of a television network to determine what statements of his should be broadcast.

Dr. Hutchins said that Mr. Lodge had accepted the fund's invitation to appear on the program and to "say what he wanted to say in exactly the way he wanted to say it."

"Upon reading over the transcript," Dr. Hutchins continued, "Mr. Lodge felt that there were certain statements he did not wish to make publicly at this time. In view of our understanding with him and the

F B I

Date: 6/30/58 *W.A. 54*Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)Via AIRTEL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-391697)
 FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (62-11998)

FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC
 MIKE WALLACE TV INTERVIEW PROGRAM
 INFORMATION CONCERNING

Enclosed herewith is tape (No. 488-1) monitoring the
 MIKE WALLACE TV Interview on ABC-TV, 10:00-10:30 P.M., 6/29/58
 with HARRY ASHMORE, Editor of the "Arkansas Gazette". *ALR. M.Y.*

ASHMORE in his firm stand for Integration of the Little Rock High School alienated many of the citizens of Little Rock, Arkansas, and MIKE WALLACE wanted to know how long ASHMORE could editorially take this stand without having the owners of the newspaper relieve him of his position.

ASHMORE felt the newspaper owners were behind him and that the advertisers in the "Arkansas Gazette" had not deserted him.

ASHMORE made comments relating to techniques of interviews on television, press conferences with public officials and other related matters in the press.

Returning to the Little Rock question, ASHMORE felt that the recent Court decision to extend the integration period to two and one half years, by Judge LEMLEY, forces the Federal Government to enact a policy to enforce the Supreme Court ruling on integration, or this ruling will be nullified.

(Tape Recording Only) REC-108

REC-64

3 - Bureau (100-391697), (Enclosure 160-391697) (RM)
 1 - New York (62-11998) *RECEIVED JULY 1 1958*

POWERS

23 JUL 1 1958

RRF:imci (#1) REC-108 64
 (5) *RECEIVED JULY 1 1958*

ENCLOSURE REC-108
 MAIL EX-108

Approved: *E.Powers*
 50 JUL 15 1958 Special Agent in Charge

Sent: *ORANGE HORN* M Per: *LIAISON*

Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman *7-3-58*

FROM : A. H. Belmont *AB*

SUBJECT: FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC (FFR)

DATE: July 2, 1958

AHR

Tolson	_____
Boardman	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
Nedre	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Trotter	_____
Clayton	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

Summary
 The enclosed clipping from "The New York Times" of 6-28-58, page 7, reflects the FFR announced on 6-27-58 that Arthur J. Goldberg was elected to its Board of Directors. Goldberg is a member of the Washington, D.C., law firm of Goldberg, Feller, and Bredhoff and is General Counsel to the Ethical Practices Committee of the AFL-CIO. He is also a member of the law firm of Goldberg, Devoe, Shadur and Mikva at Chicago, Illinois. Goldberg was born 8-8-08 at Chicago and attended college at Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, where he received the degree of Doctor of Jurisprudence in 1930. He has been a trustee and director of the Philip Murray Memorial Foundation since 1953. Martindale-Hubbell, 1958, estimated Goldberg's legal ability as "very high" and indicated his field of law was "general practice, Labor law."

Goldberg has not been investigated by the FBI. In November, 1954, he contacted Mr. Nichols regarding an allegation that he had been involved in a subversive organization. On 4-5-55 Goldberg volunteered information regarding his past activities during an interview with Mr. Nichols.

Bufiles reflect that during the period 1939-42 Goldberg had associations with CP members and ten CP front organizations but much of the information did not fully identify Goldberg and was furnished by sources who had furnished both reliable and unreliable information in the past. During the interview with Mr. Nichols, Goldberg admitted the following after the question was raised by Mr. Nichols: Attended one meeting of the American Committee for Protection of the Foreign Born (cited by AG); on the mailing list and attended one meeting of the American Youth Congress (cited by AG); he might have granted the use of his name to the National Emergency Conference (cited in House Guide); was chairman of the Chicago Chapter, National Lawyers' Guild (cited in House Guide) in 1939 but stopped paying dues in 1941-42; contributed to the United Spanish Aid Committee (cited by AG) during Spanish Civil War and spoke at the same location where a Young Communist League (cited by AG) meeting was held but denied knowing it was a meeting of a subversive organization.

EX-124

Enclosure

JWG:pwf (5)

- 1 - Mr. Boardman,
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Gaffney

60 JUL 8 1958 | ENCLOSURE REC-64

REC-64

EX-124

10 JUL 8 1958

LIAISON

clipping

Memorandum Belmont to Mr. Boardman.
Re: FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC

Goldberg advised Mr. Nichols it was his opinion that the FBI had sought to do a good job and had not been a party to the false charges against Goldberg. He said that in the past he had gone to considerable lengths in labor circles to defend the FBI. Goldberg indicated interest in the cause of civil liberty and had been a member of the American Civil Liberties Union and the Chicago Civil Liberties Union.

b3 per OGA

In February, 1955, Goldberg publicly warned against attempts by communist dominated unions to merge with the AFL-CIO.
(100-7764-13)

ACTION:

None, for information. ✓

J. J. O'Brien

R. P. B.

S. M.

H. H. Fair

**Lawyer Joins Board
Of Fund for Republic**



Arthur J. Goldberg

The election of Arthur J. Goldberg as a member of the board of directors of the Fund for the Republic was announced yesterday.

Mr. Goldberg is a member of the Washington law firm of Goldberg, Eellen & Brethoff, and general counsel to the Ethical Practices Committee of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations.

The fund is an independent educational corporation founded in 1952 to promote the principles of the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence.

CLIPPING FROM THE

N.Y. TIMES

EDITION LATE CITY

DATED 6/28/58

PAGE 7

FORWARDED BY NY DIVISION

**RE: FUND FOR
THE REPUBLIC
INFORMATION CON-
CERNING
IS-C**

BUFILE 100-391697

100-391697-555

ENCLOSURE



THE AMERICAN LEGION

FIRING LINE



Prepared and Distributed By The National Americanism Commission, P. O. Box 1055, Indianapolis, Indiana

Subscription rate \$3.00 per year

REC-8

VOL. NO. VII, NO. 13

July 1, 1958

FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC FINANCES FBI SMEAR

Two months ago, the Ford Foundation's Fund for the Republic, in association with the American Broadcasting Company, commenced sponsoring a series of 13 television programs entitled "Survival and Freedom." CYRUS STEPHEN EATON appeared on the Fund's second program on May 4, 1958 and was interviewed by MIKE WALLACE. EATON, a wealthy, aged, foreign-born industrialist, with a peculiar penchant for adopting the Soviet viewpoint, was the cat's-paw used by the Fund to viciously smear the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The immediate reaction of several Congressmen to EATON's remarks was a rally to the defense of the FBI. On May 8, 1958, the Honorable A. PAUL KITCHIN stated that EATON, "Innocently or otherwise...has done much to ingratiate himself to the international Communist conspiracy. Like the Soviets, he (EATON) has not allowed the facts to influence his inane babblings." Congressman KITCHIN quoted an editorial from the Miami News of May 6, 1958, in rebuttal of EATON's attack upon the FBI which concluded as follows: "Mr. EATON is noted as a shrewd and capable businessman of vast interests. He has done his country a disservice by his thoughtless and baseless charges against the FBI." (See "Congressional Record", 5-8-58, page A4280.)

According to the Congressional Record of May 12, 1958, Congressman GORDON H. SCHERER declared that "Canadian-born EATON again made a tremendous contribution to the Soviet cause when he viciously attacked the FBI and the security systems of this Nation...EATON's scurrilous attack on the FBI and our security system climaxes a series of his public utterances which are being beamed by the Soviet propaganda machine to the four corners of the earth. Do not think that the Fund for the Republic did not put him on this program by design. It knew of EATON's previous pro-Russian positions. It is more than coincidence that in December of 1955, the official Russian Governmental organ, Izvestia, hailed EATON for his expressions on peaceful coexistence; that another organ of the Communist international apparatus, New Times, in October 1957, contained an article by EATON in which he rapturously extols the virtues of the Soviet Union..."

Congressman SCHERER referred to a significant statement made by the late GEORGI DIMITROV, a former instructor of the USSR's revolutionary Lenin School of Political Warfare, who taught that "one sympathizer is generally worth more than a dozen militant Communists...one who is outside our (Communist) ranks but defends Soviet international policy is worth more than a thousand party members." In drawing a comparison, Representative SCHERER stated while EATON is "not a Communist, but who defends, as DIMITROV said, the Soviet Union and Soviet international policy, is worth more than a thousand party members." On May 13, 1958, the Honorable PRINCE H. PRESTON added his voice to those

REC-8

100-391691-556

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NOT RECORDED

EX-124

10 JUL 1958

278
60 JUL 8 1958

LIAISON

colleagues who expressed "righteous indignation at the scurrilous attack" launched by EATON against the FBI. Congressman PRESTON remarked: "In recent years, EATON has won an eager following of Iron Curtain officials. He has entertained Soviet representatives at his country estate and has provided quotations for the Communist propaganda mills...He...has accused the United States of baiting the Russians and being primarily responsible for the tension which exists between our two countries." (See "Congressional Record", 5-13-58, page A4377.)

In a resolution adopted by our 139th National Convention, The American Legion called for a Congressional investigation of The Fund for the Republic and the cancellation of its tax-exempt status. On March 26, 1958, Congressman FRANCIS E. WALTER, Chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC), sent a letter to the Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting a staff study and questioning the tax-exempt status of the Fund. The Committee's study pointed out that "while some projects of the Fund appear to be objectively presented, the majority of its operations are based on biased investigation and result in findings which not only fail to present both sides of a given question, but even further, actually conceal facts necessary for an honest understanding of the subject matter."

Congressman WALTER charged in his letter that "the program of the Fund has been principally one of action and not of education. Among its chief targets have been Congressional Investigations of Communism, Government security procedures, loyalty oaths and regulation of immigration. The Fund has spent several million dollars opposing the denial of employment to security risks in Government and defense and other industries. The Fund has financed attacks upon newspapers, magazines and individuals expressing positions with which it disagrees. It has financed preparation and distribution of books, magazines and articles to influence legislation. The Fund has also financed attacks, unsupported by competent evidence, upon the loyalty, integrity, intelligence and mental stability of all confidential informants of the FBI who have testified in public trials or proceedings."

Replying to EATON's assertions, RICHARD ARENS, Staff Director of the HUAC, was granted equal time on an ABC television program on May 19. ARENS announced that EATON has been subpoenaed by the HUAC "for questioning about his attack on Federal Security agencies and his defense of some Soviet policies." While stating that EATON "is not a Communist", ARENS declared EATON "has extolled the virtues of the Soviet Union, attacked what he rather curiously characterizes as the anti-Russian belligerance of the United States and expresses his firm conviction that the masters of the Kremlin desire only peace." (See "The Evening Star", Washington, D. C., 5-20-58, page A-4.)

In 1955, the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee published a report entitled, "Soviet Political Treaties and Violations." The Committee studied "nearly a thousand treaties and agreements...which the Soviets have entered into not only with the United States, but with countries all over the world. The staff found that in the 38 short years since the Soviet Union came into existence, its Government had broken its word to virtually every country to which it ever gave a signed promise."

COMMUNISM IN THE BALTIMORE-WASHINGTON, D. C. AREA

On May 13, 1958, Superior Court Judge JOHN T. TUCKER of Baltimore sustained a ruling of the Board of Appeals of the State of Maryland Department

of Employment Security which refused to allow compensation to MRS. JEANETTE K. FINO of 3105 Mondawmin Avenue of that city. The case stemmed from MRS. FINO's discharge from the Sunray Drug Company following her appearance before the HUAC on May 8, 1957. When questioned before the HUAC, MRS. FINO invoked the Fifth Amendment many times regarding membership and activities in the Communist Party, U.S.A. (See "The Sun", Baltimore, Maryland, 5-14-58, page 38; and HUAC, Investigation of Communist Activities in the Baltimore, Md., Area-Part 1, 1957, pages 997-1004.)

In upholding the State of Maryland's position, Judge TUCKER ruled "that a person who invokes the Fifth Amendment in an investigation of Communist activities may be denied unemployment compensation on the grounds that her conduct was deliberate and willful in so far as her employment is concerned." Testifying before the HUAC on May 7, 1957, CLIFFORD C. MILLER, JR., a former Confidential Security Informant of the FBI, identified MRS. FINO as a member of the Communist Party. During MRS. FINO's appearance before the HUAC, "she persistently invoked the Fifth Amendment when the Committee displayed to her canceled checks drawn by her and payable to the F. & D. Printing Company; which... (printed) the Daily Worker. Some of these checks were dated as recently as March 1957."

IRVING KANDEL, a Maryland Chess Champion of 932 Brooks Lane, Baltimore, was removed from the Maryland Chess Federation on May 7, 1958, for his alleged membership and leadership in the Communist Party. KANDEL, who was identified before the HUAC in 1957 as a former "head of District 4" (Maryland-District of Columbia area) of the Party, was the subject of a bitter controversy among the Federation's 9 affiliated chess clubs. In April 1958, a spokesman for the Arion Chess Club, declared that "his club would resign from the Federation rather than play with Mr. KANDEL." (See "The Washington Post & Times Herald", 5-9-58, page A-9; "The Evening Sun", Baltimore, Maryland, 4-10-58, pages 51 and 60; and HUAC, Investigation of Communist Activities in the Baltimore, Md., Area-Part 1, 1957, page VIII.)

Emphasizing the seriousness of the situation, the Arion Club claimed many of its members had "worked for the Government on top secret projects involved with the defense effort... (and)... to associate in a social organization with a man identified as a Communist would be exercising poor judgement." Members of the Glenn L. Martin Company Chess Club "objected to Mr. KANDEL's membership and indicated they would withdraw from the Federation if it remained in force... Many of the Martin Club members felt they were jeopardizing their security clearances by remaining in the Federation." (See "The Evening Sun", Baltimore, Maryland, 4-10-58, page 51.)

Faced with the possibility of complete dissolution, the Federation established a new organization called the Maryland Chess Association "based on individual rather than club membership." Following transfer of its "powers and funds" to the Association, the Federation "voted itself out of existence" which resulted in the cancellation of KANDEL's membership. KANDEL appeared before the HUAC on May 7, 1957, and invoked the Fifth Amendment 27 times when asked about alleged activities in the Communist Party. He also took refuge behind the Fifth Amendment when questioned regarding "his present or past leadership of District 4" of the Party. (See "The Washington Post & Times Herald", 5-9-58, page A-9; and HUAC, Investigation of Communist Activities in the Baltimore, Md., Area-Part 1, 1957, page VIII.)

VICTOR PERLO, an identified leader of an "important" Soviet espionage apparatus which functioned in the United States Government prior and during World War II, reportedly spoke at a meeting sponsored by the Washington Citizens Area Forum on May 14, 1958 at the Cultural Center, 4402 Georgia Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C. The Communist background of the Washington Forum was disclosed in the April 1, 1958 Firing Line. Both WHITTAKER CHAMBERS and ELIZABETH T. BENTLEY have testified before Congressional Committees that PERLO was affiliated with Soviet intelligence activities while employed in strategic positions in the Federal Government. (See Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, Report, Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments, 7-30-53, pages 2, 3, 6 and 9; and HUAC, The Shameful Years, 1951, pages 58-61.)

RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISION FAVORS A COMMUNIST LAWYER

On May 19, 1958, the Supreme Court of the United States "summarily reversed" a 6-month contempt of Congress conviction of veteran Communist attorney HARRY SACHER, who refused to testify before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee in 1955, whether he was a past or present member of the Communist Party. In ordering the dismissal of SACHER's indictment, the Supreme Court based its decision on the Court's JOHN T. WATKINS ruling of June 17, 1957, which held that a witness could not be convicted of contempt unless a Congressional Committee "made clear to him the pertinence of its questions." (See "The New York Times", 5-20-58, page C-23; and Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, Report, Significance of the Matusow Case, 1955, pages 86 and 87.)

Justice TOM C. CLARK filed a dissenting opinion with Justice CHARLES E. WHITTAKER concurring. In his dissent, Justice CLARK "said at least one question about Mr. SACHER's possible Communist affiliation 'was vital to a matter in which the (Senate) Committee properly was interested - petitioner's (SACHER) role in a Communist conspiracy to procure (HARVEY M.) MATUSOW's recantation'." According to Senator JAMES O. EASTLAND, Chairman of the Committee, the "remand of the SACHER case in the first instance, allegedly under the doctrine of the WATKINS case, was an unjudicial act...The Court was attempting, through its dicta in the WATKINS case, to make the law of general applicability; and the Court has now applied such judge-made law to the SACHER case..."

SACHER, who has been a "member of the Communist Party in its higher echelons", is a "veteran defender of Communist cases." In 1952, he served a 6-month prison term for contemptuous "harrassing and defiant courtroom tactics" while playing "a major part" in the defense of the 11 Communist Party national leaders who were on trial in 1949. The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee stated that "if any single quality can be said to characterize Mr. SACHER's appearances in defense of Communist cases, it may be said that it is his attitude of defiance toward constituted authority, thus repudiating the oath he took as a member of the bar to respect that authority."

A supporter of many subversive organizations since the 1930's, SACHER has been an active member of the National Lawyers Guild. SACHER was elected to the Executive Board of the Guild during its 1957 Convention. (See "New York Guild Lawyer", March 1957, page 8; and Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, Report, Significance of the Matusow Case, 1955, pages 103-107.)

F B I

Date: 6/23/58

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)Via AIRTEL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-391697)

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (62-11998)

SUBJECT: FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC
MIKE WALLACE TV INTERVIEW
PROGRAM

INFORMATION CONCERNING

Crime file

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-7-03 BY SP/CS/KS
25X 487

Enclosed herewith is tape (#272-1) monitoring
the MIKE WALLACE TV interview on ABC-TV, 10:00 -
10:30 p.m., 6/22/58, with Monsignor FRANCIS LALLY, Editor
of the Boston Catholic Newspaper "Pilot".

The interview concerned itself with charges,
sometimes made, that the Catholic Church does not
adhere to the separation of Church and State, and
that the teachings of the Catholic Church do not enhance
intellectual development but stifle it. Monsignor
LALLY presented his arguments showing that this
opinion is erroneous.

*Date 2/23/73 per form
Y-341 dated 2/21/73
cc*

*EX-124 POWERS
ENCLOSURE REC-65*

3- Bureau (100-391697) (Encl. 1)
1- New York (62-11998)

100-391697-557

TGS:ptp
(5)

REC-65 13 JUN 25 1958

EX-124

7/9

52 11 C-112

5 7 JUL 10 1958

Approved: Edward J. Powers Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

LIAISON

IN RECORDED COPY FILED IN 94-3763

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Nease *PNP*

FROM : M. A. Jones *M. A. Jones*

SUBJECT: FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC
MIKE WALLACE TV INTERVIEW PROGRAM.
INFORMATION CONCERNING

DATE: July 3, 1958

WMA

Tolson	✓
Boardman	✓
Belmont	
Mohr	✓
Nease	✓
Parsons	
Rosen	
Tamm	
Trotter	
Clayton	
Tele. Room	
Holloman	
Gandy	

It is noted that the Mike Wallace TV Program scheduled for 10:00 p. m., 7-5-58 on Channel Seven, Washington, D. C., will have as its guest Monsignor Francis Lally, editor of the Boston Catholic newspaper, "Pilot."

A tape recording of this program submitted by New York Airtel dated 6-23-58 revealed that this program addressed itself to the lack of understanding between the Catholic and non-Catholic as evidenced by the prevalent anti-Catholic disposition. The program included discussion on the theological, social and political implications of the Catholic teachings including the separation of Church and state, birth control and divorce. Monsignor Lally rebutted the charge that the teachings of the Catholic Church inhibit intellectual advancement, and he clarified the notion that Catholics are opposed to free discussion and the open forum.

Monsignor Lally explained that the Church spoke for Catholics, but addressed its remarks to the whole world. He said the teachings of the Church stand alone as ~~canon~~ law. He added that the Church was not trying to legislate for its non-Catholic neighbors nor impose its will on people, but rather it attempted to "convince" the world to faith. Monsignor Lally asserted there is no conflict between faith and reason, but said they are complementary in that faith is a gift of God which enables those who have it to believe in things not demonstrable. He added that reason is applied to faith to draw new implications from it. With respect to religious tensions which exist today, Monsignor Lally mentioned that theological problems should be discussed only by those qualified to do so.

*REG-10**100-391697-558*

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information.

*12 JUL 9 1958**EX-117**WHS:cr**(2)*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

5 7 JUL 9 1958 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE

2004 RELEASE UNDER E.O. 14176

F B I

Date: 7/7/58
PLAIN TEXT

Transmit the following in _____

(Type in plain text or code)

AIRTEL

Via _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-391697) *Crypta Records*

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (62-11998)

SUBJECT: FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC
MIKE WALLACE-TV INTERVIEW PROGRAM
INFORMATION CONCERNING*R. S.*
Karp
Jaffrey
W.M.
Enclosed herewith is tape (number 224-1) monitoring the MIKE WALLACE TV Interview on ABC-TV, 10:00 p.m., on 7/6/58, with CHARLES PERCY, President of Belle and Howell.

Said monitoring of the above program was discontinued at 10:14 p.m., due to technical difficulties in the NYO.

The topic of discussion on the above-mentioned program was The Function of Free Enterprise in a Free Society.

2-1
multiple) MIKE WALLACE asked Mr. PERCY what he thought of the increased federal control of business in this country, and PERCY stated he deplores it. *4-2*

EX-124 MIKE WALLACE also wanted to know if there is a way to stop this "modified socialism" and PERCY stated that he felt that there is, but that we must realize what this socialism is, and then take steps to prevent it.

2 ENCLOSURE REC-65

EX-124 REC-65/00-391697-559 MIKE WALLACE also inquired whether the Soviet economical growth recently is not a sign that a planned economy is better than the Democratic free enterprise?

Out 2/23/58 per form
4-7 VLR dated 3/1/62
(3) - Bureau (100-391697) (Encls. 2) (RM)
1 - New York (62-11998)
RRF:pms
(5)FBI
REUHVA. E. R.
51 JUL 10 1958

Approved:

S. Powers
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

51 JUL 10 1958

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)Via _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

NY 62-11998

Mr. PERCY presented his arguments to the contrary.

Also enclosed for the Bureau is a newspaper clipping from the "New York Times", late city edition, dated 7/7/58, page 22 entitled "US Survival Seen in Free Enterprise" commenting on Mr. PERCY's interview by MIKE WALLACE on 7/6/58.

POWERS

-2-

es 8/11/58

Approved: _____ Sent: _____ M Per: _____
Special Agent in Charge

U. S. SURVIVAL SEEN IN FREE ENTERPRISE

Free enterprise is America's best hope in the battle against communism, but complacency can cost us the economic war, Charles Percy, a business executive, said last night on television.

Mr. Percy, president of Bell & Howell, said the Soviet Union could outproduce the United States by 1972, "unless we recognize that we are today in an economic war."

"We have all been too complacent," he continued. "We are all too self-satisfied."

Steady planning by free bus-

iness is America's answer, he indicated in his appearance on the Mike Wallace interview series "Survival and Freedom."

The Fund for the Republic sponsored the televised interview on the American Broadcasting Company network.

Mr. Percy, a member of the Business Advisory Council of the United States Department of Commerce, asserted that the free enterprise system gave the average consumer more for his money and raised the standard of living.

Mr. Percy also suggested that the United States postal system might be improved if it were taken over by private enter-

prise.

CLIPPING FROM THE
N.Y. TIMES
EDITION Tate City
DATED 17 JUL 1958
PAGE 32
FORWARDED BY NY DIVISION

100-391697-559
ENCLOSURE

Office Memorandum • UNITED GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Nease

DATE: July 2, 1958

FROM : M. A. Jones

SUBJECT: FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC
MIKE WALLACE TV INTERVIEW PROGRAM6/29/58

Tolson
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By airtel dated June 30, 1958, the New York Office forwarded a tape recording of the Mike Wallace TV interview on ABC-TV, 10:00 - 10:30 p. m., 6/29/58 with Harry Ashmore, Editor of the "Arkansas Gazette."

Ashmore is a militant advocate of integration in Arkansas and won a Pulitzer prize for editorial treatment of the integration problem involving among other things Central High School in Little Rock. He has, of course, alienated many of the citizens of Little Rock, Arkansas, and relations between him and Governor Faubus are strained since he is against the re-election of Faubus for a third term.

Mike Wallace asked Ashmore how long he could maintain his editorial stand without having the owners of the newspaper relieve him of his position. Ashmore stated that the newspaper owners were behind him and then went into a rather lengthy dissertation concerning the fact that the newspaper has not lost advertising which could be attributed to his editorial stand.

Ashmore and Wallace then discussed matters relating to techniques of interviews on television, press conferences with public officials and other related matters involving the press.

In the last four minutes of the program, Ashmore returned to the Little Rock question and stated he felt that the Supreme Court decision to extend the integration period to 2 and 1/2 years by Judge Lemley forces the Department of Justice to resolve in the next few weeks how it is going to enforce the edict of the Supreme Court and that unless the Department of Justice does so the Supreme Court decision relative to integration would be nullified. He stated he could advance no theory as to how the Department of Justice might enforce the Supreme Court ruling. There was no mention of the FBI during the program.

RECOMMENDATION:

EX-124 REC-43 100-391697-560

That this memorandum be routed to the Investigative and Domestic Intelligence Divisions for information.

1-Mr. Rosen

1-Mr. Belmont

CEM:grs

(6)

59 JUL 14 1958

1 copy
7-7-58

CIV 3 JUL 8 1958

F B I

Date: 7/14/58

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT

(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing).

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-391697)

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (62-11998)

SUBJECT: FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC
MIKE WALLACE TV INTERVIEW PROGRAM
INFORMATION CONCERNING

Enclosed herewith is a tape monitoring the MIKE WALLACE TV interview on ABC-TV, 10:00-10:30 p.m., on 7/13/58, with Professor HENRY KISSENGER of Harvard University.

Professor KISSENGER prepared a report on the use of limited nuclear warfare to prevent the expansion of Russia. WALLACE questioned KISSENGER on the reasons for this type of warfare. KISSENGER explained that the United States as yet has no definite foreign policy and is reluctant to affect massive retaliation in case of aggression on a limited scale.

As a result Russia uses atomic blackmail to achieve her ends, knowing full well that the United States will not go to war to defend any country against Russian inroads. KISSENGER feels that by having a policy of fighting aggression anywhere in the world with the use of a limited nuclear warfare will discourage Russia's blackmail attempts.

Next week WALLACE will interview Dr. ROBERT HUTCHINS.

3 - Bureau (100-391697) (Enc.1) RM
1 - New York (62-11998)

FOSTER

REC-95 21 JUL 16 1958
11 18TMB:jad
(5)ENCLOSURE
REC-95Approved: H. L. Taylor
JUL 23 1958 Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

HAMPSON

CRIMINAL REC

The Fund for the Republic

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
A Mike Wallace
interview with

Henry A. Kissinger

Produced by the American Broadcasting Company
in association with

The Fund for the Republic

CRIME REC. 8/15



This is one of a series of thirteen Mike Wallace Interviews, produced by the American Broadcasting Company in association with the Fund for the Republic for the purpose of stimulating public discussion of the basic issues of survival and freedom in America today. This transcript has been edited. Single copies are available without charge from the Fund for the Republic; additional copies 10 cents each.

Henry A. Kissinger is Associate Director of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University. His book, "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy," published last year, created a considerable stir with its new concept of nuclear warfare waged on a "limited" basis.

The Fund's Study of the Free Society

The major program of the Fund for the Republic is a study of the basic issues underlying a free society. This study is directed at clarifying fundamental questions concerning freedom and justice that emerge when the forms and principles developed by eighteenth century America meet the ideas and practices of today's highly developed industrial society. One of the aims of the study is to widen the circles of public discussion of these questions. It is for this reason that the Fund is assisting in the presentation of the Mike Wallace Interviews.

The task of clarification is being undertaken by ten distinguished Americans acting as a Central Committee of Consultants to the Fund. These men are:

- A. A. BERLE, JR.
Attorney, author, former Assistant Secretary of State
- SCOTT BUCHANAN
Philosopher, author, former Dean of St. John's College
- EUGENE BURDICK
Political scientist, University of California; novelist
- ERIC F. GOLDMAN
Professor of history, Princeton; Bancroft Prize winner
- CLARK KERR
President, University of California; labor economist
- HENRY R. LUCE
Editor-in-Chief, Time, Life, Fortune
- JOHN COURTMAYER MURRAY, S.J.
Theologian, Woodstock College; editor of Theological Studies
- REINHOLD NIEBUHR
Vice-president and graduate professor, Union Theological Seminary
- ISIDOR I. RABI
Nobel Prize scientist; Higgins Professor of Physics, Columbia University
- ROBERT REDFIELD
Professor of anthropology, University of Chicago; former president, American Anthropological Association
- ROBERT M. HUTCHINS
President of the Fund, serves as Chairman of the Committee

WALLACE: Well, certainly not in the case of John Foster Dulles. How would you evaluate the over-all impact of Mr. Dulles on the world position of the United States?

KISSINGER: I think that Mr. Dulles is a very skilful tactician and that he shows extraordinary ingenuity in escaping from specific crisis situations. Unhappily, the real problem in the world at the moment is to prevent the crisis from arising. It is to project an image of American concern and of American purpose. This he is much less successful in doing. He often gives the impression of being so infatuated with the mechanics of foreign policy and with the negotiation aspect of foreign policy that he has not succeeded in projecting the deeper things we stand for and so has often created great distrust abroad.

WALLACE: Who, if any, are the men in public life whom you admire and look to for leadership in the United States?

KISSINGER: Well, I must say, first of all, that I am here as a non-partisan, that I am an independent. I don't stand for either party in this. I have respected Mr. Stevenson in many of his utterances, respected Mr. Acheson in many of his utterances, although I have disagreed with him very much on other things. It is very difficult for a party out of power to prove what it can do.

WALLACE: But there is no Republican who comes readily to your mind, in whom you have the confidence that that man has the understanding that we need to lead us at this time.

KISSINGER: I hate to engage in personalities. I think that Mr. Nixon in his public utterances lately has shown an awareness of the situation. But I'd rather not deal in personalities.

* * *

WALLACE: Dr. Kissinger, last year your attack on our foreign and military policies was apparently found so disturbing that *The New York Times* carried this front-page story. *The Times* said: "For the first time since President Eisenhower took office, officials at the highest government levels are displaying interest in the theory of the 'little' or 'limited' war. The theory of 'massive retaliation' is being re-examined." What has come of the re-examination?

KISSINGER: I think the theory has been re-examined; the practice has not been.

WALLACE: The theory has been found wanting, then?

KISSINGER: The theory has been found wanting but I don't think we have made the effort or spent the money or made the sacrifices necessary to get a capability for limited war.

WALLACE: In order to better understand your proposal for limited war, perhaps it would be well for you to define what you understand to be our current United States military policy. What is our military policy?

KISSINGER: Our current military policy is based on the doctrine of massive retaliation—that we threaten an all-out attack on the Soviet Union in case the Soviet Union engages in aggression anywhere. This means that we base our policy on a threat that will involve the destruction of all mankind. This is too risky and I think too expensive.

WALLACE: You obviously think it's wrong—dangerous to our security. I wonder if you would expand on that. Just because of what you call the risk and just because of the expense, it is not worthwhile?

KISSINGER: What it will mean is that in every crisis an American President will have to make the choice whether a given objective is worth the destruction of American cities. The American President will have to decide whether Beirut or whatever the issue may be is worth thirty million American lives. In practice I am afraid the American President will have to decide that it is not worth it and it will therefore encourage the piecemeal taking over of the world by Soviet aggression.

WALLACE: Because you believe the Soviets understand our unwillingness or inability—certainly our unwillingness—to wage an all-out war?

KISSINGER: The Soviets will understand our increasing unwillingness to engage in this kind of war and therefore their task will be to present us with a challenge which does not ever seem worth taking the final jump, but the accumulation of which is going to lead to the destruction of the free world.

WALLACE: In place of that policy, what do you think our military and political policies should be?

KISSINGER: Well, the first thing I would like to say is that military policy can't be a substitute for other measures. It can only be the screen behind which other measures are possible. Now, with this qualification I think that we must have a military capability which permits us to react to Soviet threats at the same level of intensity at which they present it, so that we don't always have to choose between the destruction of the United States and the defense of the countries that may be threatened but rather that we can defend the areas which are threatened at the place and time the threat occurs.

WALLACE: How is that actually translated into more simple language? Are you simply talking now about a policy which includes limited war?

WALLACE: How do you account for that?

KISSINGER: First of all, we're a nation of specialists. We tend to think that a problem is either economic or political or military. Many of your questions earlier in the program seem to me to indicate this—when you said *this* is a policy of war and *that* is a policy of peace. It is hard for us to understand that we have to do military, economic, political, and psychological things all simultaneously. Then, we have been rather satisfied with the situation in our country as it is and with the world in which we have lived. Our response to the world has usually been to an overpowering threat from abroad. Therefore, even when we have engaged in constructive steps like the Marshall Plan, the Greek-Turkish Aid program, which were very great efforts, nevertheless we have always justified them on the basis of a Communist threat, very rarely on the basis of things we wanted to do because of our intrinsic dynamism. I believe, for instance, that we reacted very wrongly to the riots in Latin-America. Rather than saying, "These are Communist-inspired and we must keep Latin-America from going Communist," we should have said, "This recalls us to our duties. These are things we want to do because of the values we stand for, not because we want to beat the Communists."

WALLACE: But the question is: Why are we as unaware, as unavailing? Is it because we have been projected into world leadership in too much of a hurry? Unprepared for it? Is that one of the reasons?

KISSINGER: Yes, one of the very basic reasons is that we have been projected in too much of a hurry. And it must also be said in fairness that we have done rather well considering all the challenges that have been thrown at us. It is too bad that rather well isn't good enough. Another problem is that the people who emerge in leadership positions in this country usually come from a lifetime of experience which doesn't prepare them for the conduct of foreign policy. They may come from business or from law or even from the universities.

KISSINGER: Because we have been suddenly projected into a situation for which very little in our history has prepared us and because, I am afraid, many of the leadership groups that are engaged in foreign policy have had a set of experiences which makes it rather difficult for them to come to grips with a really revolutionary situation.

WALLACE: Well, now, in that regard, you told our reporter earlier this week, as far as current leaders are concerned: "We have an administration of old men, happy with the life they have led." And you considered this dangerous. You smile now. What did you mean, and why is it dangerous, and why are you smiling?

KISSINGER: I made this statement. I think that the groups I was referring to are very well-meaning, very sincere, very patriotic people. The difficulty they have is that they think that the world in which they grew up is the normal world. Their tendency is, when a crisis arises, to try to smooth it over and then to expect that the normal forces would reassert themselves. Therefore, they conduct policy a little bit like small-town bankers who think one can always draw interest on a good situation. We conduct our policy as if Adenauer would live forever, despite the fact that he's 82 years old. When there's no crisis, it's always very difficult to get agreement on a constructive step. Conversely, it often requires a crisis to make us engage in any action.

WALLACE: Do you see any political leaders in the U. S. who you believe have a clear grasp of America's current place in history?

KISSINGER: I think one of the very worrisome features of the situation is that I don't find any great moral dynamism on either side.

WALLACE: When you say on either side, you mean—

KISSINGER: Either in the Democratic or in the Republican party.

KISSINGER: Yes, that we are ready to engage in limited war—that we have troop transports, air transports that enable us to get into position quickly, and that we have the forces to engage in limited war which we do not now have.

WALLACE: Can you give me an example of how this might actually work out?

KISSINGER: Well, at the moment we have thirteen divisions. It is clear that with thirteen divisions we are incapable of resisting Soviet attacks when the Soviet Union has one hundred seventy-five divisions. If we had more divisions and if we had air transport, then in case of a Soviet attack, say on Iraq, we could airlift a few divisions into the area and, together with local forces, attempt a defense.

WALLACE: You advise limited war—or you suggest the use of limited war—limited nuclear war. President Eisenhower said about two years ago: "War in our time has become an anachronism. Whatever the case in the past, war in the future can serve no useful purpose. A war which became general, as any limited action might, could only result in the virtual destruction of mankind." Now, that's the rub, it would seem—that any limited nuclear war might boil over into a total war and so the question we must put to ourselves is: "Dare we take the chance?"

KISSINGER: Let me answer this question in two parts. You say I advise a policy of limited nuclear war. I do not advise that we initiate war. The question of war will arise only if the Soviet Union attacks. Then if the Soviet Union attacks—and, in fact, we are very much more afraid of total war than they are—they will gradually blackmail the free world into surrender. Everything I say is based on the assumption that we are as willing to run risks as the Soviet Union. If this is not the case, we are lost, and I think we ought to face that fact.

WALLACE: Let's look at some of the measures which you propose for keeping a limited war limited. You

say, for instance, that in the midst of a limited war each side could be required to list its strategic air bases, which would then be immune from attack. All cities within 500 miles from the battle zone would be immune from nuclear attack if they were declared open and certified so to be. It could be proposed that no weapon larger than 500 kilotons will be employed unless the enemy uses it first. And so forth. Now two nations which up until now have been unable to agree on armament control during peacetime, according to Dr. Kissinger, are expected to engage in fairly complex Marquis of Queensbury rules in a nuclear war. It doesn't sound sensible, sir.

KISSINGER: I know it doesn't sound sensible nor does the destructiveness of modern weapons sound very sensible. What is required here is a completely new order of thinking. I hold no particular brief for the specific limitations which I recommend. What I am saying is this: Both sides, if they know one thing, know that an all-out war will mean the destruction of civilization, of their own as well as of the others. They also know they will therefore have an interest in keeping any war that does break out to the smallest possible proportions. If they are looking for an excuse to expand it, they will expand it. I am assuming they are looking for an excuse to limit it. What we have to do is bend our ingenuity towards finding means to limit any war that might break out either through accident or through design. Whether these particular limitations are absolutely the right ones, I wouldn't maintain, but the great difficulty has been that the traditional military thinkers, trained in conventional strategy, have simply dismissed all new forms of thought and have not addressed themselves to what seems to me to be a very real and serious problem.

WALLACE: Then you think American strategy should be re-evaluated to restore war as a usable instrument of policy?

KISSINGER: American strategy has to face the fact that it may be confronted with war and that if Soviet

ments in the Middle East which do not always have the support of their actual inhabitants, and that perhaps Nasser has more support from the other governments and from the people themselves?

KISSINGER: Our policy vis-à-vis Nasser has suffered from indecisiveness. We have neither been conciliatory enough when we were conciliatory nor intransigent enough when we were intransigent. We're not friendly enough to make him a friend and not hostile enough to put him down, with the result that we have suffered from the worst of both.

WALLACE: What you're saying is that we have no policy—

KISSINGER: That we have been governed by events rather than attempting to shape them. I would say, however, that Ibn Saud does not represent the force with which we should be identified in the Middle East.

WALLACE: Let me come back again to the study called *Foreign Policy and the Free Society*. In it, Scott Buchanan says: "Our problem here in the U. S. is to exist as a capitalist society in, possibly, a completely socialist revolutionary world." Now, it would seem, to a certain extent anyway, that that's the way the world is going. Is it possible that we cannot exist in such a world?

WALLACE: Well, you know, you could argue that the identification of socialist and revolutionary is not a very good identification. You could well argue that a capitalist society or, what is more interesting to me, a free society is a more revolutionary phenomenon than nineteenth century socialism, and this illustrates precisely one of our problems. I think we should go on the spiritual offensive in the world. We should identify ourselves with the revolution. We should say that freedom, if it is liberated, can achieve many of these things.

WALLACE: Well, what is keeping us from going on the spiritual offensive, as you see it?

the construction of the free world which is based on other motives than simply defending the world against communism. We must make clear what we are for rather than what we are against. If we were clearer about the kind of world we want to bring about, if we could project this concern to other people, then we wouldn't always seem so intransigently militant, then we would be identified with positive measures rather than simply with military alliances.

WALLACE: Well, let's talk about some specifics. How do you regard our conduct in regard to the Algerian situation of the past few years?

KISSINGER: I think the Algerian situation is an extremely complicated and difficult one. In general, we should stand for the freedom of people. In general, we should oppose colonial regimes. On the other hand, an independent Algeria cannot survive as a purely independent state. The great paradox of this period is that, on the one hand, you have a drive towards more and more sovereign states and, on the other hand, there is no such thing as a purely independent state any more. The thing that has always attracted me, therefore, is that we could advocate a North African federation which could be tied together economically and for other development projects and that Algeria would find its place as part of that rather than as a purely independent state.

WALLACE: Do you look to the inclusion of Nasser and his people in this North African federation?

KISSINGER: Well, initially, I would recommend grouping Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. There might be another group of powers in the Middle East which includes Egypt and some of the other states which have had a somewhat different history from Algeria's.

WALLACE: Would you say that our posture vis-à-vis Egypt has been a realistic one? Do you not agree that the peoples of Africa would seem to respond to Nasser and that we seem to support govern-

aggression confronts us with war and we are unwilling to resist, it will mean the end of our freedom. It boils down then to a value choice. In these terms, yes, I think war must be made a usable instrument of policy.

WALLACE: Let me throw another argument at you, if I may, Dr. Kissinger. I would like to quote from a study that was released just a few hours ago by the Fund for the Republic, written by Walter Millis and Father John Courtney Murray, called *Foreign Policy and the Free Society*. In it Walter Millis writes as follows: "The concept of limited war presents a simple fallacy in logic . . . we can resort to limited war only when the objective is not vital to either side, in which case we would be unlikely to resort to war in any event, as happened in Indo-China, Suez, and Hungary." He obviously is talking about the United States when he says "we." What about that?

KISSINGER: I am a great admirer of Walter Millis. I cannot agree with him there. Every one of these instances were instances where the Western position was eroded. If it is really true that we can never engage in limited war while the Soviet Union *can* engage in limited war, I can only repeat that our expulsion—the collapse of the free world—is inevitable. Moreover, to say that limited war is a logical fallacy does not mean very much if you look at the period from 1945 to 1958, when you had the Berlin blockade, the Korean war, Indo-China, Suez, Hungary—constant threats of nuclear attacks on other countries. The fact cannot be explained away on simply logical grounds.

WALLACE: Tell me this, sir. Suppose the Communists were to march in to West Berlin next week. Would you personally—and do you think the majority of Americans would—want to take a chance on protecting West Berlin with a limited nuclear war?

KISSINGER: I am not saying that every Soviet attack must be answered with nuclear war. In an attack on West

Berlin I would certainly react in some manner, and in some manner that involves the use of force. If we do not, no one will ever believe in our protection again, or in our word again. Whether the American people would support this or not would depend to some extent on their leadership. If you had taken a public opinion poll on June 20, 1950 whether the American people would support the defense of Korea, you might have gotten an entirely different answer from the one you got one week later when the President said it was essential to our interests to defend it.

WALLACE: Then I take it what you envision is: If the government were to follow your point of view, they should announce publicly that from now on the possibility of limited nuclear war should be seriously considered by all Americans and all of our potential enemies?

KISSINGER: I would announce that our primary purpose is to avoid war but if we are forced into war through Soviet aggression, we would attempt to keep it to the smallest proportions necessary, we would not use more force than was absolutely necessary to defend the safety of the free world, but we *would* use the amount of force that *was* necessary to defend the free world.

WALLACE: As long as we're in the realm of speculation here, let's speculate a little further. What do you think the reaction of the Soviet government would be to an announcement of that kind?

KISSINGER: Well, they would be very likely to deny that war can be limited because atomic blackmail is one of the most effective means of expansion. If they can create the impression that any resistance to Soviet aggression inevitably leads to the destruction of the country concerned, then many countries would prefer surrender to defending themselves. If they were faced with the real situation, however, all past experience indicates that this is not a regime that gambles everything on one throw of the dice.

WALLACE: In the field of foreign policy and military affairs, Dr. Kissinger, you're acknowledged to be one of the most penetrating minds in the country. Last year, as I have mentioned, you published a military analysis which rocked Washington. Yet you devoted it almost exclusively to framing a war policy rather than a peace policy. Couldn't this be indicative of what is happening to our thinking here in America? Isn't this indeed what many of our allies criticize us for?


KISSINGER: Well, I would reject this description of my book. I did not frame a war policy. I framed a policy which I think is the only one that is going to preserve the peace. I am afraid that weakness is certainly going to lead us into a position where finally we will be forced to engage in very extreme measures to defend ourselves. I would therefore reject the description of my recommendation as a war policy. Our problems abroad are more complicated than this because, on the one hand, we are accused of an overemphasis on military factors and, on the other hand, the fact of the matter is that we are not strong enough to defend most of our allies. I would at least suggest that one of the difficulties is that our allies are both worried about our general political posture and at the same time feel that we are not capable of protecting them if a showdown comes.

WALLACE: Let's move from war policies to positive peace policies. What policies do you believe, generally, we should adopt to help keep the peace and at the same time contain communism?

KISSINGER: I hate again to differ with you but again I cannot accept the distinction between war and peace policies. Defense policies are essential to maintain the peace. They are not, however, going to solve the political problems of the world. They are only going to give us a shield behind which we engage in constructive measures. What is essential right now is that we identify ourselves with the tremendous revolution that is sweeping across the world, that we have some image for

The Fund for the Republic INC.

160 East 42nd Street, New York 17, New York



HON. J. EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C. 11E

Office M

UNITED

GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: July 18, 1958

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLICY AND THE FREE SOCIETY
 THE FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC, INC.
 CENTRAL RESEARCH MATTER

Tolson _____
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"Foreign Policy and the Free Society," issued recently by The Fund for the Republic, Inc., reviewed by Central Research Section. Views of Walter Millis in this book indicate he is still blind to threat of communism.

Latest Release by the "Fund"

Captioned publication was issued recently by the Fund for The Republic, Inc., as part of a series designed "to determine what a free society is and how it may be maintained in twentieth century America." It consists largely of two analyses, by Walter Millis and Reverend John Courtney Murray, followed by brief comments of a panel of consultants, and was prepared after a series of discussions by Millis, Reverend Murray, and the panel. ("Foreign Policy and the Free Society," Foreword)

Derides Communist Threat

In brief, Millis' article calls for "competitive co-existence" as the basis for future relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. While the discussions from which this volume was prepared ostensibly centered on the effect of our foreign policy on individual freedom, Millis devotes only one sentence to the claim that the armament race can be expected to cause "a steady erosion of the personal and political liberties traditional in our free society." During the course of his article, he derides the existence of an international communist conspiracy and claims that the Communist Party, USA, "no longer represents any significant threat to the American system." He urges the "full recognition of Communist China and her acceptance as a great power in her own right." Perhaps the best indication of Millis' approach to communism is his comment that it has produced a reorganization of society "which, whether it is good or evil, has demonstrated that it is both viable and powerful." *E*
 (Ibid., pp. 3, 5, 6, 7, 14 (emphasis added))

JFC:aml

(10) *Anil* ENCLO. ATTACHED

SURE Section tickler

326

1 - Mr. Belmont	1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Condon	1 - Mr. Nease
1 - F. J. Baumgardner	1 - Mr. Mohr
15 JUL 31 1958 Jones	1 - Mr. Roach

REG II 100-391697-562

EX-135

NO JUL 22 1958

CENTRAL RESEARCH

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont
Re: "Foreign Policy and the Free Society"

Millis Running True to Form

Millis has long been a bitter and unfair critic of the Bureau and the loyalty security program. A former writer for the New York Herald Tribune, he has been a full-time consultant for The Fund for the Republic since 1954. He has not been investigated by the Bureau. His comments are largely a restatement of the views he set forth in an article which appeared in the February 2, 1958, issue of The New York Times which was reviewed in a memorandum prepared by the Central Research Section on February 4, 1958. As his latest comments indicate, Millis' preoccupation with civil liberties has left him blind to the threat of communism and an easy prey for the subtle blandishments of communist propaganda. In this connection, his affiliation with The Fund for the Republic, Inc., is most appropriate. (100-421610)

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For the information of the Director.

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Whe ✓

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Foreign Policy and the Free Society

WALTER MILLIS

JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S. J.

And the Discussants:

A. A. Berle, Jr.

Scott Buchanan

Eugene Burdick

Eric F. Goldman

Robert M. Hutchins


Clark Kerr

Henry R. Luce

Reinhold Niebuhr

Robert Redfield

ility and the Free Society



A CONTRIBUTION TO THE DISCUSSION OF
THE FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC
The Free Society

WALTER MILLIS

JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J.

Foreign Policy and the Free Society

The Discussants:

A. A. BERLE, JR.

SCOTT BUCHANAN

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ROBERT M. HUTCHINS

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HENRY R. LUCE

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Foreword

IN THEIR SEARCH to determine what a free society is and how it may be maintained in twentieth century America, the Consultants on the Basic Issues to the Fund for the Republic determined that it was necessary for them to examine, among other things, the consequences for liberty of the foreign and military policies of the United States. Four meetings of the Consultants during the winter and spring of 1957-58 were devoted to this question. Out of these meetings grew the papers presented in this book by Walter Millis and John Courtney Murray. The book also includes a highly abridged version of the Consultants' "conversations."

All of the Consultants participated in the discussion and all are represented in this abridgment except Dr. I. I. Rabi, who felt that his position as a member of the President's Science Advisory Committee forbade placing his views on the public record.

The papers and the discussion make no attempt at definitive answers to the extremely complicated questions involved in the foreign and military policies of this country in their relation to the character, standards, and goals of the free society. There are, in fact, disagreements on many points, consensus on a few, and no conclusions. However, we believe that the material herein is worth presenting as—to quote Father Murray's words on the final page of this book—"a contribution to public understanding."

ROBERT M. HUTCHINS

By Walter Millis

THE UNITED STATES is now entangled in courses of military and foreign policy which appear to tend only toward eventual catastrophe. With the Soviet Union, it is committed to a nuclear weapons race of almost inconceivable deadliness, of which a probable ultimate outcome is an intercontinental war of mass extermination in which the American as well as the Soviet system would certainly perish, and perhaps civilization with them. In the meanwhile, under the enormous material and moral costs of this arms race we must expect a steady erosion of the personal and political liberties traditional in our free society; while to live under the shadow of doom at home brings no compensatory strength to our foreign policies. An indefinite continuation of this state of affairs threatens only a deterioration of American, as opposed to Soviet, influence over the development of world history.

I believe that less calamitous courses must and can be found. Current debate is already indicating the directions in which solutions may lie. But if they are to be found, I believe that the United States as well as the Soviet Union must make a more positive contribution than either has yet offered toward the discovery.

The cold war was not of American making, yet Americans should realize that they have, by their official policies and the public attitudes which dictate official policy, been

unable to moderate its tension, to diminish the difficulties of even minor clarification, or to decrease the tempo of the nuclear-missile competition.

Americans have generally accepted a concept of the world problem—repeatedly set forth in the speeches of our statesmen and arguments of our publicists—which finds a forceful and official restatement in the “Declaration of Principles” by the NATO Conference in Paris in December 1957:

The free world faces the mounting challenge of international communism backed by Soviet power. Only last month in Moscow the Communist rulers again gave clear warning of their determination to press on to domination over the entire world, if possible by subversion, if necessary by violence . . . For the entire world it is both a tragedy and a great danger that the peoples under international Communist rule—their national independence, human liberties and their standard of living as well as their scientific and technological achievements—have been sacrificed to the purposes of world domination and military power. The suppression of their liberty will not last forever.

In accordance with this concept of the world problem Americans have assumed that the greatest peril confronting their society is that of military attack, which the Soviet Union may launch upon us (or upon our allies) the moment it has acquired the military ability to do so without exposing itself to catastrophic reprisal. To make the reprisal certain we have ringed the Soviet Union with military air bases armed with thermo-nuclear bombs, thereby stimulating the Soviet Union to develop intermediate-range ballistic missiles intended to “take out” the bases before reprisal can descend—to which in turn we are forced to make reply.

This concept has done nothing to discourage its mirror image, sedulously propagated by the Russians, that "Western capitalism" is the force which is sacrificing all peoples to "the purposes of world domination and military power." It adds to the difficulties of rational negotiation with the Russians; it fortifies their intense suspicions of our purposes while so enflaming Western suspicion and distrust that productive discussion of the problems which are in fact common to both the super-power systems becomes virtually impossible.

Yet the statement in the NATO "Declaration" is clearly inadequate as a description of the existing relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and of the power factors that determine them. It is even more faulty as a guide to policy. It is true that in forty years Communist governance has spread from control over no more than a meeting-hall in Petrograd to control over about one-third of the population of the globe. But to regard this astonishing development—to which many historical forces contributed and which followed many different patterns in different areas—simply as the result of a conspiracy by something called "international communism" to achieve "domination over the entire world, if possible by subversion, if not by violence," is to deny many of the most obvious facts of the past forty years. It is also to blind ourselves to the real weaknesses (which we never seem able to exploit) and the real strengths (which we seem always to overlook until it is too late) of the Russian political-imperial structure and the Communist ideological system.

I believe that better analyses of the existing world problem can be made. I believe that there are many forces at work today besides those of military terrorism. To appreciate and apply these forces properly will not solve every issue; and one can see no present possibility of any great "summit" act of peace that will answer all questions and finally avert

the dreadful perils that modern society has created for itself. But many factors now clear in the international complex can be grasped and used to relax the tensions under which we are living, to reduce the tempo of the nuclear arms race to a point at which it may ultimately become manageable, to establish the bases of that "competitive co-existence" to which the two super-powers appear to be sentenced as the only alternative to a "competitive co-extinction."

Three propositions would probably be accepted today by most Americans:

That neither of the super-powers can today destroy the other, or even impose crippling restrictions on the other's freedom of action, without itself being blown to fragments in the process;

That serious conflicts between them must therefore be resolved by some process of accommodation or negotiation;

That fruitful negotiation is all but impossible in an atmosphere of war psychosis, enflamed by exaggerated suspicions and unnecessary fears.

These propositions imply no approval of Soviet aims. They merely reflect the factual situation. It is evident that this situation is leading to increasing, if less complete, agreement among Americans to some further propositions:

One: That the dangers to this country of a sudden Soviet sneak attack have been exaggerated out of all relation to reality. Secretary Dulles has expressed the conviction that the Soviet leaders not only do not want war but do not want the two nations "to drift so far apart that there is increased

danger" of war. Russian memories of their 15 million dead in the Second World War are not yet two decades old; and under present conditions, which Soviet leadership seems to find satisfactory, so far as we can see, there is nothing which the Soviet Union could possibly gain by a nuclear attack on the United States even remotely commensurate with the risk it would run, even if Soviet ability to forestall reprisal were far greater than it is.

Two: That communism, both within the Soviet Union and in the Communist-controlled countries with which it has surrounded itself, is not an ephemeral system. The hope, entertained under the original "containment" policy promulgated by George F. Kennan, that if the external pressure were kept up the Communist system would dissolve itself into something else, has been abandoned by Kennan himself and most others. In confronting the Russian super-power, the United States is dealing with the effects of an enduring social revolution. It is an historic fact, as irreversible as were the French or the American revolutions; and it has produced a political-social-economic organization of society which, whether it is good or evil, has demonstrated that it is both viable and powerful.

Three: That its powers, however great, are at the same time not unlimited. Soviet Russia, like the United States, is restrained—or "deterred"—by its own fears of war. It has been unable to enforce its own solution for the German problem, just as the West has been. It felt obliged to retreat from Iran in the early post-war years, and has finally retreated from Austria. Whatever hopes it may have entertained of world conquest through subversion have suffered a severe discount. It is now obvious that American domestic communism no longer represents any significant threat to

the American system or to Western policy whatever. In France and Italy, where Communist parties have enlisted substantial fractions of the electorate, Russian imperial infiltration may find greater opportunities. Yet whatever their successes, it is obvious that they could not repeat past patterns which, whether in China or in Central Europe, were overwhelmingly determined by the military-political circumstances of the Second World War. While Russian maneuvers and infiltrations in the Arab or Southeast Asian worlds present difficulties and dangers to Western statesmanship, it is unrealistic to regard them as simply extensions of past Communist expansions, which themselves differed greatly one from another, and all of which were shaped by conditions that do not now exist.

Russian military power—while beyond challenge in dealing with internal revolt, as Hungary clearly demonstrated—has not since 1945 been effectively exerted beyond the frontiers then attained. (The conquests of China and North Vietnam were not, in either origin or conduct, primarily Russian enterprises.) The Russian Communist power system has tenaciously and successfully defended every power position achieved in 1945. It has matched the United States in the weapons of threat and terror. It has called up, in China, a potentially great ally, much as the United States has called up the Grand Alliance of NATO. But beyond this it has not been able to go; and it is at least conceivable that it has already arrived at the practicable limits of its reach.

From these propositions it should be possible, it seems, to construct a different and more useful picture of international society than that of an inappeasable “war,” waged between a West cowering upon a military and psychological defensive

dogma not only compels them implacably to threaten the non-Communist world; even worse, it renders it impossible for them to make a peace with the non-Communist world.

Secretary Dulles—who is always beseeching the Russians to make peace—does not put it so bluntly. But at the core of this view is the belief that the Soviet Union not only does not want to but in a real sense cannot make peace with the West on terms compatible with Western survival. It cannot accept free elections in East Germany, because the idea of free elections—obviously poisonous to any totalitarian system—would spread back through the satellites into the heart of the Soviet empire. It cannot accept genuine inspection of armaments because this would destroy too much of the secrecy essential to the successful operation of the police state. It cannot come to the appearance, even, of a peaceful settlement with the West because this would destroy the spectre of capitalistic encroachment and invasion which is essential to the regime to maintain its hold over its own people.

In this view, consequently, the Soviet Union is not only implacably aggressive but cannot, by its very nature, be otherwise. One cannot make peace with an organism which by its nature is incapable of making peace. The only alternative is to contain it indefinitely until, by the gradual operation of historic forces of one kind or another, it is transformed into a kind of organism which is capable of making peace with an essentially unchanged Western society. There is, it may be said, much that is persuasive in this view. It seemed quite adequate when it was first stated in its essentials by Kennan in his famous “containment” article in *Foreign Affairs* in 1947.

But the tensions of today (reflected in Kennan’s own subsequent change of viewpoint) arise precisely because it seems increasingly inadequate to conditions as they have developed. The Russian Communist power system, while it

Here is the greatest dilemma of what might be called the "containment" or "no peace" approach. Some rather desperate attempts have been made to escape it by somehow bringing war back into the international scene as a usable instrument of policy. The argument is that we can still continue to contain the Soviet Union by making war, but we must make only "limited" war in the process. This, however, requires the further argument that if the West carefully confines itself to limited war it can trust the Soviet Union to do likewise. For a nation which spends so much of its breath proclaiming that "you can't trust the Russians" this simply leads to an impasse. Aside from all the technical difficulties involved in keeping a war waged with "tactical" atomic weapons limited in its scope and terror, the concept of limited war presents a simple fallacy in logic. Obviously, limited war is possible only for objectives which are not of vital importance to the survival of either contestant. Therefore, we can resort to it only when the objective is not vital to either side—in which case we would be unlikely to resort to war in any event, as happened in Indo-China, Suez, Hungary—while *limited* war is no more a protection than the super-giant bombs against those Soviet aggressions which we believe really are vital to our own survival.

This dilemma has not been resolved by the no-peace school, and cannot be resolved by any number of repeated appeals to the Russians to disarm, to allow free elections, to submit to a United Nations authority loaded against them, or to make peace on any other of the terms which the West has so often advanced in the name of "peace" and which, by this very analysis, can only amount to defeat. If the Russian government is by its nature incapable of making peace, then to offer it peace is in fact simply to demand that it surrender.

Admittedly, the opposite school is not free from dilemmas of its own. In this view, it is unrealistic to assume that

balance of terror which sustains the existing peace, each power system might be brought to agree not to attempt to upset it by further competitive development of more powerful, more irresistible, and inherently more dangerous systems of mass-destruction weapons.

Such are the possibilities which those who believe that peace, or at least a significant truce, can be achieved would seek to explore. They are in the dilemma, however, that to achieve such stabilizing adjustments in the relationship each power system must accept the other and, to a large extent, take it into partnership. It is obviously out of the question to normalize relations in the Far East without full recognition of Communist China and her acceptance as a great power in her own right. It is apparent that Russia will not relinquish her power position in East Germany without some return which will make the bargain attractive to the Kremlin leaders; and it is difficult to think of any such return which the West could offer short of accepting Communist control of Central Europe and in effect becoming the Kremlin's partner in its maintenance. Churchill in the later war years was willing to contemplate a revival of the old system of "spheres of interest" in the Near East and the Balkans. Such immoral ideas were indignantly rejected by the Americans, but the possibility that something of the kind may become the price of peace cannot be denied and must be faced fairly by those whose objective is, after all, a reconciliation of the two great systems in "competitive co-existence."

They must also face the dilemma that if the co-existence must continue to be competitive, something like equal terms of competition must be worked out. They do not now exist. Industrial competitors normally operate within the same rules

—the mechanisms of price competition or competition in service or productive efficiency are open to both. In a monopolistic situation this relation no longer obtains; the rules are different for the monopolists than they are for the independents who would challenge them. The Communist power system operates on one set of rules, so to speak, the non-Communist power system on a different set, and it is almost as difficult to establish any genuine competition between them as between, say, the great American grocery chains and the remaining independent grocers. The competition between the Communist and non-Communist worlds uses certain terms common to both—just as price considerations are not wholly absent from the relations between the independent grocers and the big chains—but they are not the significant terms. This is hardly at all a military competition; it is only in small part a "competition for the minds of men"; it is only partially a competition in the ability rapidly to raise the standard of living of underdeveloped areas over the world.

It is probable that the democratic-capitalistic West is still superior in all these competitive potentialities, but even among those who most strongly assert its superiority in these respects one finds no confidence at all that it will be able to withstand the Communist challenge. Western spokesmen too often sound like a hypothetical industrialist who might say of a rival: "I can beat him on prices, on production costs, on service, on the excellence of my labor relations, on salesmanship, but he is taking my business all the same and one day will be certain to undo me." One could conclude from such a statement that there must be some hidden factor here; that the competitive situation was not fully expressed in the conventional terms; that this was not, in fact, a "competition" at all, since there can be no real competition except on mutually equal rules.

Those who hope to establish a "competitive co-existence" must still meet the problem of competitive rules. The significant competition between the Communist and non-Communist worlds is not in military power, in ideas, or in economic productivity. It is a competition between two different systems for the organization of men into that degree of submission or cooperation required by the demands of the highly integrated and highly specialized modern society. The Communist system might prove less efficient as an industrial producer and still triumph as a more efficient way of getting the organization done; the Western world might prove superior both as producer and as provider of a freer and more humane way of life, and still fail just because it could not organize the hundreds of millions uncommitted, at heart, to either system. In either case, the result would not be the outcome of a "competition," for no elements of competition would be present. It would be the outcome of the "co-existence," since it would flow from the simple fact of two different methods of organization being present on the same planet, just as the economics of the modern automotive industry flow not from the competition between the Big Three but from the fact of their co-existence.

If the no-peace party in the West has failed to solve the military dilemma, the no-war party has failed to solve the dilemma of "competitive" co-existence. To enter a partnership with the Soviet Union must tend to strengthen the Communist methods of human organization; firmly to oppose those methods and endeavor to defeat them must make partnership extraordinarily difficult. There is no clear light at the end of either avenue of approach. Those who follow one must expect to receive the frequently well-founded taunts

of those who follow the other; each must expect to be told by the other that his hopes are fantastic, the risks he is running are appalling, he is imperiling the state and man's immortal soul. All one can say is that, of the two general courses, that which is willing to explore the possibilities of peace or accommodation is more hopeful than that which begins with a denial that peace is possible. The course which endeavors to examine the realities of motive and possibility in the international complex is more hopeful than that which clings to the most extreme fears of a war psychosis type and, in discounting an unknowable future, overlooks the possibilities of the actual present.

For the time being at least, the "balance of terror" appears to be operating. It has thereby created an opportunity for creative good as tremendous as its potentialities for the ultimate destruction of civilization. The continued maintenance of an effective deterrent power is a requirement for national security. It is only one. Another, no less essential to ultimate survival, is that we re-examine the actualities of the international context, that we be willing to take at least the same risks for peace that we normally take for guaranteeing victory in war, and that we use the chance which the great deterrents have provided to bring international relations into some framework in which the race toward total catastrophe can first be slowed and ultimately be ended.

By John Courtney Murray

IT MAY BE A CONTRIBUTION to the present discussion if I attempt a brief statement of the unique character of the Soviet empire. Co-existence with this empire is the present fact. There are those who seek to transform the fact into a policy by adding various adjectives to the word "co-existence." There is talk, for instance, of "peaceful" co-existence, or "competitive" co-existence. But before co-existence, however adjectivally qualified, can become a policy, it is necessary to know just what kind of empire we are co-existing with.

It is not enough to cite as the single characteristic of the Soviet empire that it is intent on "world domination," and to let it go at that. The intellectual tyranny of phrases, to which we have long been accustomed in domestic politics, has invaded the field of foreign policy in consequence of the impact of democracy on the conduct of war and on the making of peace. The trouble is that the stock phrases tend to become simply incantations. They are invoked as curses on the enemy or as cries of alarm to sustain a mood of fear and opposition. So it is with the phrase "world domination." It has ceased to yield any clear demonstrable meaning. It has even acquired false connotations, as if the primary Soviet aim were domination by military conquest. In consequence some would wish to discard the phrase altogether, as unreal and unhelpful. But this would be a mistake of method that

would lead to substantial error in viewing the structure of the problem that confronts America today. The phrase has meaning, but it needs to be analyzed in the light of the four unique aspects of the Soviet empire.

The Soviet Union is historically unique (1) as a state or power, (2) as an empire (*imperium*) or mode of rule, (3) as an imperialism, and (4) as the legatee of a special segment of world history.

One: Russia is unique as a state or a power. For the first time in history it has brought under a single supreme government the 210,000,000 people scattered over the 8,600,000 square miles of the Euro-Asiatic plain, the great land-mass that stretches from the River Elbe to the Pacific Ocean. This gigantic power is a police state of new proportions and unique efficiency. Within it there is no such thing as the "rule of law"; there is only the thing called "Soviet legality." Power is used according to certain forms; but there is no justice and no sense of human rights. The Soviet Union has not adopted the Western concept of law nor has it evolved a comparable concept of its own. Its theory of government is purely and simply despotism. In this respect Sir Winston Churchill was right in viewing the Russians (as Sir Isaiah Berlin reports) as a "formless, quasi-Asiatic mass beyond the walls of European civilization"; for these walls, that contain the Western realization of civility, were erected by men who understood the Western heritage of law—Roman, Greek, Germanic, Christian. The Soviet Union has no such understanding of law.

Moreover, through a novel set of institutions the Soviet Union has succeeded in centralizing all governmental power to a degree never before achieved. The ultimate organ of control is the Communist party, a small group of men who think and act under an all-embracing discipline that has like-

wise never before been achieved. Under its historically new system—a totally socialized economy—the Soviet Union has become an industrial and technological power whose single rival is the United States; in rising to this status of power it has chosen to emphasize industries and technologies that are related to war. This state is consequently a military power of the first order. It has no rival in ground forces; its air power is adequate to all the new exigencies of war; and for the first time in history the state that controls the Heartland of the World Island has become a sea power of a special kind, an underwater power. Finally, its nuclear capabilities, achieved in large measure independently of outside sources of information (as Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles has recently admitted), are equal to those of the United States, for all practical purposes and many impractical ones.

Two: Russia is unique as an empire, as a manner and method of rule, as an *imperium*. It is organized and guided in accordance with a revolutionary doctrine. For the first time in history this doctrine has consciously erected an atheistic materialism into a political and legal principle that furnishes the substance of the state and determines its procedures. Soviet doctrine is exclusive and universal in its claim to furnish, not only an account of nature and history, but also a technique of historical change. It is therefore inherently aggressive in its intent; and it considers itself destined to sole survival as an organizing force in the world of politics. The Communist doctrine of the World Revolution has indeed undergone a century of change, since the days of Marx and Engels. Substantially, however, the change has been simply development. The basic inspiration has been steady and the continuity has been organic. As Prof. Albert G. Meyer has recently pointed out: "Stalinism can and must be defined as a pattern of thought and action that flows directly from

Leninism" (*Leninism*, p. 282). Prof. Bertram D. Wolfe has documented the same thesis (*Khrushchev and Stalin's Ghost*). This thesis is in possession. And there is no convincing evidence that Mr. Khrushchev represents apostasy or even heresy.

Three: Russia is unique as an imperialism. The Soviet Union is essentially an empire, not a country. Nearly half her subjects should be considered "colonial peoples." Many of the "sister republics" are no more part of Russia than India was of Great Britain. As Mr. Edward Crankshaw has reminded us, "Even if Moscow retreated to the frontiers of the Soviet Union tomorrow, Russia would still be the greatest imperial power in the world." But Mr. Crankshaw's other proposition, that "Russian imperialism is at a dead end," is by no means true. It may indeed be difficult to describe the Soviet imperial design, but this is only because it is difficult to define Soviet imperialism. It is a new historical force, not to be likened to prior mysticisms of power. It is not at all based on the concept of a master-race, or on the aggrandizement of the sacred "nation," or on the fulfillment of a noble idea, such as the rule of law to be brought to the "lesser breeds." The newness of the imperialism has almost masked the fact that it is an imperialism.

It has exhibited a new mastery of older imperialistic techniques—military conquest, the enduring threat of force, political puppetry, centralized administration of minorities, economic exploitation of "colonial" regions. It has expanded the old concept of the "ally" into the new concept of the "satellite." But perhaps its newness is chiefly revealed in the creation of the historically unique imperialistic device known as "Soviet patriotism." This is not a thing of blood and soil but of mind and spirit. It is not born of the past, its deeds and sufferings, borne in common; it looks more to the future,

to the deeds yet to be done and to the sufferings still to be borne. It is a "patriotism of a higher order," and of a more universal bearing, than any of the classic feelings toward *Vaterland, la patrie*, my country. It is a loyalty to the Socialist Revolution; it is also a loyalty to the homeland of the Revolution, Russia. Its roots are many—in ideology, in economic facts, and in the love of power; in a whole cluster of human resentments and idealisms; and in the endless capacities of the human spirit for ignorance, illusion, and self-deception. This higher patriotism claims priority over all mere national loyalties. It assures to the Soviet Union a form of imperialistic penetration into other states, namely, the Fifth Column, that no government in history has hitherto commanded. Soviet imperialism, unlike former imperialisms, can be content with the creation of chaos and disorder; within any given segment of time it need not seek to impose a dominion, an order. The Soviet Union may indeed lack a finished imperial design; in any case, the concept of design is too rational for a force that owes little to reason. But it has something better for its purposes, which are inherently dark. It has a revolutionary vision.

If there must be a single phrase to sum up the intentions of Soviet imperialism, it would be far better to speak of "world revolution" than of "world domination." The word "revolution" has a definite meaning that signifies a definite possibility. The world as we know it can be radically changed; it is, in fact, changing daily before our eyes. Moreover, it is possible to know the directions of change that are implicit in the Communist world revolution, as it is guided by Communist doctrine. On the other hand, "world domination" defines not a process but a term. The term may be a Communist dream. It may even be admitted that this term is an historical possibility, if one admits that anything is possible in history. However, what we are called upon to

cope with is an actuality, a process that is really going on, an intention that is presently operative—the imperialism of the World Revolution.

Four: The Soviet Union is unique as the legatee of a longer history. It is the inheritor both of Tsarist imperialism and of mystical panslavist messianism. It carries on, at the same time that it fundamentally transforms, the myth of Holy Russia, the "spiritual people," the "godbearing children of the East," whose messianic destiny is to rescue humanity from the "Promethean West." Communism, whether in theory or in practice, is not a legacy of Western history, nor is it a "Christian heresy" (the pernicious fallacy popularized by Prof. Toynbee). Essentially, it came out of the East, as a conscious apostasy from the West. It may indeed be said that Jacobinism was its forerunner; but Jacobinism was itself an apostasy from the liberal tradition of the West, as well as from Christianity, by its cardinal tenet (roundly condemned by Pope Leo XIII) that there are no bounds to the juridical omnipotence of government, since the power of the state is not under the law, much less under God. In any case, communism has assumed the task at which Jacobinism failed—that of putting an end to the history of the West. Communism has undertaken to inaugurate a new history, the so-called Third Epoch, that will abolish and supplant what we called the two Western epochs, feudalism and capitalism.

My proposition is that each of these four unique aspects of the Soviet Empire has consequences for American policy. No structure of policy will be intelligent or successful that does not reckon with all of them. Indeed, all our past mistakes of policy have resulted from the American disposition

to ignore, or to misunderstand; one or the other of these four unique aspects of Russia.

It would be a lengthy task, although not a difficult one, to demonstrate this proposition with a fair measure of certitude. However, I shall make only two major points.

First, if the Soviet Union be regarded simply in the first of its unique aspects, as a state or power, under precision from its other aspects, there need be no serious conflict between it and the United States. By itself, the fact that a single government rules the Euro-Asiatic plain and possesses the technical competence to exploit its natural and human resources poses no serious threat to American interests. There is no reason why the Soviet Union, regarded simply as a state or power-complex, could not live in decently cooperative harmony with the other world-power, the United States. The American locus of power lies in another hemisphere. Our geopolitical position is secure; so too is theirs. Conflicts of interests and clashes of power would arise, but they could be composed peacefully.

This point needs making in order to disallow the conception that the American-Soviet confrontation is purely a power-struggle between two colossi of power, whose sheer power is reciprocally a threat, one to the other. To see the problem thus, and to base American policy on anxious conjectures as to which power is "ahead" or "behind" in the accumulation of power, is to mistake the problem completely.

The many-sided conflict known, not inappropriately, as the cold war is unintelligible (and therefore must seem unreal) except in the light of the second unique aspect of the Soviet state. It is an *imperium*, a mode of rule, guided in its internal and external policy by a comprehensive systematic doctrine that contradicts at every important point the tradition of the West. Soviet theory and practice stand in organic independence. Only Soviet doctrine makes Soviet power a

threat to the United States. Only Soviet doctrine explains the peculiar nature of Soviet imperialism and shows it to be unappeasable in its dynamism. Only Soviet doctrine illuminates the intentions of the new messianism that has come out of the East, fitted with an armature of power, and organized implacably against the West.

Here, of course, in the concept of an empire controlled by a dogma, is the sticking-point for the pragmatic American mind. Two questions arise. First, is this concept of the Soviet Empire true? Second, if it is, can the pragmatic mind take in its truth and be guided accordingly in the fashioning of policy? For my part, the answer to the first question is unhesitatingly yes. I am less sure about the answer to the second question. The American mind is consciously pragmatist. When questions can no longer be postponed, they are approached with an empirical, experimentalist attitude that focuses on contingencies of fact. The search is for compromise, for the "deal" that will be acceptable to both parties in the dispute. The notion of action being controlled by theory is alien to this mentality. The further notion of a great state submitting its purposes and action to the control of a dogmatic philosophy seems absurd. The pragmatist mind instinctively refuses to take in this notion or to study its implications.

When, therefore, this pragmatist mind reads Stalin's statement about Soviet doctrine that "there can be no doubt that as long as we are faithful to this doctrine, as long as we possess this compass, we shall be successful in our work," it can only conclude that Stalin must have been somehow "insincere." There is the further consideration that Soviet doctrine is couched in a technical jargon that is not only alien but very boring. The practical man puts it all aside. His distrust of ideas has itself become an idea. What he wants is "the facts." And he rapidly overlooks the essential fact

that the purposes and actions of the Soviet Empire are unintelligible without reference to the ideas on which its leaders act.

In his recent book, *The Illusion of an Epoch: Marxism-Leninism as a Philosophical Creed*, Prof. H. B. Acton makes this concluding statement: "Marxism is a philosophical far-rago." Other scholars, within the Academy and within the Church, after even more extensive studies have likewise stigmatized the Soviet dogma as scientific, historical, philosophical, and theological nonsense. But what matters for the statesman is not that the dogma is nonsense but that the Soviet leaders act on the dogma, nonsense though it be. The evidence for this fact may not be unambiguously demonstrative; no historical evidence ever is. But it amply suffices for a firm case that may be made the premise of sound policy. This is not the place to present all of the evidence. The record runs back to Lenin's signing of the Peace of Brest-Litovsk. But the segment of history immediately succeeding World War II deserves a brief mention.

In 1945, despite her war losses, Russia was on the crest of the wave. She had territorial defense in sufficient depth on all fronts. Fellow-traveling governments controlled the new states, including the crucial salient, Czechoslovakia. In the United States, Britain, and France a mood of general, if not unbroken, goodwill towards Russia prevailed to a degree that was almost pathological. Germany, the old enemy of Czarist regimes, was in ruins, impotent, under a military government imposed by the Allies. The Western nations were disarming at breakneck speed. If Russia's own security were the goal, it had been achieved. If the goal were the fulfillment of an old-fashioned Czarist imperial design, looking to the consolidation of power, it too was substantially complete. Or, if the goal was simply the extension of the new imperialism through international enlistments under the device

of the "higher patriotism," looking to what Crankshaw calls the "inconsequent mischief-making of the Comintern," the way to it lay open, and eager wishful thinkers in all lands were busily engaged in enlarging the possibilities of mischief, under hardly any opposition or even serious suspicion.

In any case, one would have expected subtle tactics of restraint. Instead the "tough line" suddenly appeared—ruthless pressure for direct control of the satellites, intervention in Greece (and Persia), obstructive opposition to the Marshall Plan and the Austrian Treaty, the Berlin blockade, and the creation of the Cominform. In consequence, within three years the Kremlin had dissipated its major asset of international goodwill. It created for itself a peril that had not previously existed. A divided and disarmed West had begun to unite and arm itself against the menace now visible, though not yet understood.

Why did all this happen? The only satisfactory answer is that the Kremlin was guided by Communist doctrine. The capitalist powers were well disposed? They could not be; the doctrine holds that the capitalist "camp" is irreconcilably hostile. Constitutional socialist governments would protect the socialist homeland against capitalist aggression? No; the doctrine holds that Social Democracy is inherently untrustworthy and ought to be destroyed, because it only deceives the worker and confuses the issue by its pretension to be a Third Force. World peace is the common goal, through negotiations within the framework of the United Nations? Nonsense; the doctrine holds that the conflict between the two homeland "camps" and the two colonial "fronts" is unappeasable. It is the necessary means to the World Revolution. It will be resolved only by the World Revolution. And in its resolution

the methods of force cannot be dispensed with. Finally, the doctrine held that at the end of the War the capitalist "camp" simply had to be in a state of "weakness"; its "internal contradictions" were actively at work, presaging its downfall. By the doctrine, therefore, it was the moment for the strategy of the Revolution, the strategy of forceful aggression.

All this may sound rather silly to the pragmatist. In a sense it all was rather silly. The point is that it all happened. And it only happened because Soviet doctrine decreed its happening.

Moreover, it will not do to say that this dictation of policy and events by doctrine will not happen again; that Stalin is dead; that Russia is "different"; that new men are in charge; that they are realists and opportunists, men rather like ourselves who take the pragmatic view. Russia is indeed somewhat different, but only within the limits of the doctrine. The men in charge are new, but only within the limits imposed by their thorough conditioning by the doctrine. The Soviet leadership is not subject to changes of heart. What is more important (and to the pragmatist, unintelligible), it does not even learn by experience. The doctrine is forever at hand to discount Soviet experience of how the capitalist world acts.

The doctrine casts up an image of the capitalist world that does not derive from experience and is not to be altered by experience. It is a "scientific" image, the product of a science, dialectical materialism, whose basic postulate is that determinism rules the world of human history as well as the world of nature. It is through the distorting one-way glass, as it were, of this deterministic theory of capitalism that the Soviet leaders view what we consider to be the contingencies of the historical world—only they are not seen as contingencies but as determined. So far from altering the scientific image, they are interpreted in such a way as either to confirm

it or at least leave it intact. When, for instance, the capitalist world professes its desire to be friendly, just, peaceful, cooperative, etc., such professions cannot but be bogus. Historical determinism will not permit the capitalist world to be other than hostile, unjust, aggressive, and war-mongering. Mr. George F. Kennan has commented, in rather baffled, but still superior, fashion, on "the systematic Soviet distortion of the realities of our world and of the purposes to which we are dedicated" (*Russia, the Atom and the West*, p. 29). Mr. Kennan too views reality through his special glass. Apparently it does not occur to him that Soviet analysts of "fact" really believe in the categories of Marxist-Leninist ideology as instruments of interpretation. Like a good American, he believes that if only the Soviet leaders could be brought to see "the facts," with complete "freedom of mind," all would be well.

It is, of course, not impossible that some basic change may take place in Soviet doctrine. But if it did its repercussions would be felt all through the edifice of power erected on the doctrine; and if they were not checked, the edifice could not long survive. The basic Soviet structure is an indivisible and interlocking whole. It cannot permit itself to be tampered with at any point, save on peril of destruction. Still less can it contemplate changes in the dogmas that sustain the edifice of imperialistic power.

The official atheism is necessary in order that the individual may claim no moral rights against the state and no freedom except within the "collective" freedom of the state. This exploitation of the individual in the service of the state is necessary as the premise of forcing further the gigantic technological development. The cult of Soviet patriotism is necessary to preserve the solidarity of the colonial empire over the more than thirty-five national minorities within the Soviet Union, and over the ring of satellite states, as well as to retain that in-

dispensable adjunct of Soviet imperialism, the motley Fifth Column. The maintenance of the police state makes it necessary there should be "danger from without," from irreconcilable, hostile, aggressive capitalist imperialism. This danger is also necessary to explain to the puzzled inquirer why the state is not withering away. The rejection of the possibility of entirely peaceful evolution to world socialism and the belief in force as the indispensable agent of the Revolution are necessary to sustain the burden of militarization and armament. And the whole edifice rests squarely in the basic Marxist dogma—the conflict of two opposed worlds leading dialectically and deterministically to the World Revolution. Finally, the personal security of the Soviet rulers and the continuing privileges of the "new class" are dependent on the maintenance both of the empire and of the revolutionary doctrine that sustains it. Thus self-interest buttresses belief in the doctrine.

The conclusion is that the Soviet Empire not only has been, and is, an empire controlled by doctrine, but must continue to be such, on peril of ceasing to be itself. Even to speculate about making a basic change in the established doctrine of the World Revolution would be to raise the spectre of the disintegration of the empire. This spectre, we may be sure, will be forbidden to rise.

This fourfold view of the unique reality of the Soviet Empire is the only solid first premise of American foreign policy in foreign affairs and military defense. It is a more intelligent premise than the concept of "world domination" in any of the current understandings or misunderstandings of that phrase. It is also a more comprehensive premise than any analysis of the relatively superficial "facts of power."

The major value of a full view of the unique character of the Soviet Union is that it creates a limited but useful set of expectations on which to base American policy. We need not be left to the resources of improvisation or even to the instinctive reactions of purely practical wisdom—the kind of wisdom that made us enter the Korean War but was never able to explain why we did enter it. The Soviet Empire is governed by the inner laws of its own nature; like any laws they create expectabilities. We may, for instance, expect Communist leadership to yield only to calculations of power and success; force and the prospect of success by its use are the determinants of Soviet action. This expectation would clarify the problem of negotiations. It would suggest that we put an end, as quietly as possible, to the Wilsonian era of diplomacy with its exaggerated trust in world assemblies and in spectacular international conferences. It would further suggest the advisability of direct negotiations with Russia. For instance, if and when any agreement on disarmament is reached it will be reached directly between the Kremlin and the White House, without the confusing assistance of twenty-five additional nations.

Again, a true view of the Soviet Union, as a unique imperialism, would suggest that we cease to confuse foreign policy with diplomatic negotiations. To paraphrase a famous remark, foreign policy is when you know what you want. It supposes that you know the possibility of getting what you want, before you decide that you want it. Negotiation is simply the means of getting what you want. The Soviet Union understands this. For instance, it is a fixed Soviet foreign policy to gain public international recognition of the successes of the Communist revolution as they are racked up. This policy is pursued through "negotiations" at international conferences. These conferences negotiate nothing. Either they simply register the political and military results to date and

thus fulfill Soviet policy (e.g., the 1954 Geneva "settlement" on Korea and Indo-China) or they run out in sheer futility after two million words (e. g., the prior Berlin Conference). It is time we, too, learned not to fix our policy by negotiations but to conduct negotiations in order to fulfill our policies. It is time, too, that we laid aside completely the concept of "sincerity" as a moral category, even though it is so dear to a type of Eastern-seaboard liberal mind that believes in nothing else. To inquire into Soviet "sincerity" or to require "sincerity" of the Soviet Union is a complete waste of time.

The chiefly important expectability or "sincerity" is that the Soviet Union will always act on its own doctrine. As the situation dictates, it will employ the strategy of the Revolution or the tactics of the protection of the homeland of the Revolution and of the Revolution's imperialist advances. In either case, since the doctrine is inherently aggressive, it permits no "disengagement." It continually probes for every vacuum of power and for every soft spot of purpose. This is why "disengagement" as an American policy could not be other than disastrous. It would surely heighten the danger of war, most probably by permitting the creation of situations that we could not possibly accept. Only the very opposite policy is safe—a policy of continuous engagement at every point, on all levels of action, by both tactical and strategic moves. At times this policy of continuous engagement might well be enforced simply by variants of the highly effective argumentative technique of the blank and silent stare. The Russians employed it well in the tent at Panmunjom. Turkey has always used it successfully; and West Berlin has learned its value. We still talk too much.

A policy of continuous engagement with the World Revolution does not mean solely a policy of hostility, contradiction, and opposition. Nor is it to be translated primarily into military terms. The engagement can be cooperative,

positive, constructive in a number of ways. Here I shall mention only one, because it is so neglected.

Perhaps the most alarming pages in Wolfgang Leonhard's book, *Child of the Revolution*, are those in which he reports the effect had on him by Western newspapers, broadcasts, etc. The effect was nil. In fact, practically everything he heard or read about the West only delayed his break with Stalinism. On the intellectual or doctrinal level the disengagement between West and East seems to be almost complete. Torrents of words are poured out Eastward, of course. But they do not even engage the attention of the East. "Why do they always go on about freedom?" asked one of Leonhard's companions, as he got up, bored to death, to turn off a Western broadcast. "In the first place there is no freedom in the West, and in the second place people in the West do not even know what freedom is."

The young Communist's disgusted comment makes the necessary point. Do people of the West understand what freedom is? Can they intelligently dispute the Communist thesis, that freedom means insight into historical necessity—an insight that is based on scientific theory? (One recalls General Eisenhower and Marshal Zhukov baffling one another in Berlin over the notion of freedom.) Or is it rather the American disposition to dismiss the whole dispute as "im-practical," and irrelevant to politics? Or do we think that this basic issue of theory would be settled by distributing (as has been seriously suggested) an avalanche of Sears-Roebuck catalogues in the Soviet Union?

It may be that the Illusion of our Epoch will not be overcome by argument. Certainly it cannot be overcome by force. Perhaps it will succumb only to the enemy of all illusions—time. The fact remains that Communist doctrine is an affront to the Western tradition of reason; and the manner of empire that it sustains is a further affront

to the liberal tradition of politics and law that was born of the Western tradition of reason. The further fact is that the West was so late in feeling the affront and still seems largely impotent to deliver against it an effective doctrinal answer, in a moment when a doctrinal answer is of the highest practical importance, not only to the East that will hear it, but to the West that will utter it—immediately, to itself. It may, of course, be that the West has ceased to understand itself. Prof. Toynbee may, in fact, be right in saying that the West now identifies itself with technology, as its cult and its sole export. If this be true, this failure of understanding, leading to a denial, more or less explicit, of the Western tradition by the West itself, would be the fateful “internal contradiction” that might lead to downfall. Ironically, Marx never saw this form of “internal contradiction,” though it is the greatest weakness in the “camp” that he opposed.

This may be the place to comment on the basic fiasco of our engagement with communism on the domestic scene. The subject is a bit complicated. It is, of course, not necessary to invoke Communist influence to explain the various stupidities of American wartime and postwar policies. Stupidity itself is sufficient explanation. The pattern of it was set by the American President who was “certain,” he said in all good faith, “that Stalin is not an imperialist.” The anti-Communist movement, centering on the issue of internal subversion, probably compounded the confusion by transforming issues of stupidity into issues of “disloyalty.” The muzzy sentimentalism of the 1945 climate has indeed been altered. Reckon this, if you like, to the credit of those who raised the cry of subversion. Public opinion, in the

sense of public passion (which it very largely is), has been transformed. Everybody now mortally hates and fears what is known, rather vaguely, as "the Communist menace." It was "brought home" to them amid great tumult and shouting (only in this way, it seems, can things be brought home to the American people). This was a good thing. At that, by a strange irony, those who were the loudest in bringing the menace home were or are the last ones on American earth whom one would want to see in charge of combating the menace abroad, in the field of foreign policy, where the massive menace lies. By a contrasting irony, many of those who took the sound view in matters of foreign policy were fuzzy on the issue of internal subversion.

In any case, whatever its effect on public emotion, the anti-Communist movement has been fairly spectacular in its failure to contribute to public understanding. The problem of understanding centers on three large issues: What *is* this "thing from the East," what *is* the Western "thing" in the name of which we oppose it, and what were the corrosive forces that were able to create a yawning spiritual and intellectual vacuum within the West, but were not able to fill it, with the result that the "thing from the East" found some lodgment there? Thousands of questions and answers before Congressional committees and bushels of propaganda sheets from patriotic societies have contributed almost nothing to an answer to these questions. In their turn, the forces that opposed the anti-Communist movement have rivaled it in their failure to contribute to public understanding. In considerable part they failed even to speak to the real issues, being content to retire, embattled, behind a rather porous barricade—a concept of democracy as an ensemble of procedures, a legal system of civil rights. It was not strange that in the end the public, with some instinctive feeling that the quarrel wasn't getting anywhere, and had become trivial any-

way, should have grown bored with it. Imposed on a prior fiasco of understanding, this was a most lamentable result. The three basic questions still stand.

Even yet the response to Communist imperialism is largely in emotional terms—fear and hatred (or, conversely, pathetic appeals to “understand the Russians”) and bursts of brief excitement over every new Communist success, and, for the rest, a last-minute rush to the resources of pragmatism in all its forms (notably including military technology) to meet particular issues as they arise.

This brings up the question that looms so large—the question of armaments and war. The underlying issue is whether a full view of the unique reality of the Soviet empire furnishes any reliable expectations in this critical area. There are several.

Soviet doctrine as a whole dictates a policy of maximum security and minimum risk. Risks can and must be minimum because the dialectic of history decrees that the capitalist world, though still powerful, is decaying and must inevitably disintegrate from within, whereas the forces of socialism are in constant ascendancy and must inevitably triumph. Security must be maximal because at every point the gains made by political or military means must be consolidated as the base for further revolutionary advance. The Soviet Union cannot be provoked into taking risks that exceed the minimum; for it does not act under external provocation but under an internal dynamism. These conclusions, already implicit in the doctrine, are confirmed by all the evidence in the historical record.

We may expect that Soviet doctrine will continue to dictate the same policy of maximal security and minimal

risk. This expectation furnishes a measure by which to decide the gravest and most pervasive problem of foreign and military policy, namely, how to balance the elements of security and of risk. We may safely invert the Soviet proportions. Our policy should envisage a minimum of security and a maximum of risk. Only by such a policy can we seize and retain the initiative in world affairs. And it is highly dangerous not to have the initiative. On the premise of this balance we did, in fact, enter the Korean war, which was right. But then we retreated from the premise to a policy of minimal risk, which was a mistake.

Moreover, it would be prudent even to create situations of risk for the Soviet Union—situations in which the risk would be too great for it to take. We may be sure that the Soviet leadership will not risk the debacle of the World Revolution through a major war for the sake of anything less than the soil of the homeland of the Revolution. We may expect that it will yield tactical ground, or refrain from going after tactical ground, if the risk of holding it or going after it becomes serious. But if there is no risk, or only a minimal risk, aggressive policies will be carried through, as they were in Hungary, where nothing was done to create a risk.

At the same time, Soviet doctrine serves to warn us to be wary of the facile persuasion now being spread about that "Russia doesn't want war." There is no reason to believe that communism has been converted to the faith of Social Democracy, which holds that the evolution to world socialism can be wholly peaceful. Any notion that the Soviet Union has tacitly entered some sort of Kellogg Pact is absurd. The use of force, as an instrument of national policy, is still an essential tenet in the Communist creed. By the whole force of Communist "insight into historical necessity" Russia still wants war—the kind of war, in the time and place, that

would be necessary or useful to further the multiple ends of the World Revolution, not least perhaps by extending the colonial "liberation front."

Moreover, this same insight convinces the Soviet leadership that the capitalist world wants war. War, like imperialism and aggression in general, is inherent in capitalism. This is a matter of scientific doctrine; the Communist understands it to be so, and he cannot be persuaded otherwise. To admit that the capitalist world does not want war would be to go against the doctrine. It would also be to cancel the "danger from without" that helps to justify the police state and to explain why it cannot yet wither away. In the face of the standing Soviet conviction about the war-mongering capitalist world, it would be doubly absurd to believe that the Soviet Union does not want war.

It is all a matter of the measure of risk that war would entail and of the measure of its usefulness for the World Revolution.

Precisely here, however, the present Communist insight into historical necessity—in the case, the necessity of the use of force to further the Revolution—must be less naive than once it was. It was Lenin's emphatic doctrine that "frightful collisions" must take place between East and West before capitalism is overthrown and socialism installed. Lenin was thinking not only of major wars but of other revolutionary violences. But he did believe in the inevitability of major wars. Stalin too believed that war was inevitable and that it would inevitably advance the fortunes of the Revolution. But this simple faith can no longer stand. One cannot doubt that the Leninist-Stalinist doctrine has been subjected to revision in Communist high councils in the light of the realities of nuclear war. What usefulness would attach to this manner of "frightful collision"? What risks of it should be run?

The results of this revision of doctrine may have been hinted at by Khrushchev at the 20th Party Congress in 1956. He did not refer to the new instrument of frightfulness, the H-bomb. His utterance was cautious. The Communist will not renounce his essential weapon, the threat of force. Nor will he renounce force itself. But he will carefully calculate its uses and its usefulness for his own purposes and on his own premise of policy—maximum security and minimal risk. This manner of calculation is his specialty. Moreover, he will make the conclusions of this calculation serve as the premise of his armament policies. His industry and technology are, after all, largely geared to war—not to war in general but to war as a possibly useful instrument of the World Revolution. To the Communist war is not a game, or a galvanic reaction, or an exercise in righteous anger, or a romantic adventure, or a way to develop the national character, or a sin. It is strictly and coldly a means to an end. And the end is clearly defined.

What conclusions has the Communist come to, what policies has he consequently defined for himself (he always defines his own policies, in what concerns both ends and means), in this historical moment so different from Lenin's—in this our nuclear age? The answer to this question would presumably be an important premise of American policies with regard to war and the weapons of war. The answer should be obvious.

First: All-out nuclear war is not a means of furthering the World Revolution; its only outcome would be the end of the Revolution, in the end of the world; the risk of it therefore must be avoided in the conduct of political affairs.

Second: An all-out surprise attack on the capitalist world, with nuclear weapons, would run a maximum risk of the retaliatory destruction of the Homeland and of the Revolution itself; it is therefore excluded as a strategy of conquest.

Third: On the other hand, the capitalist world is intrinsically imperialistic, aggressive, and bent on military conquest, as its hostile "encirclement" of the Soviet Union shows. It is ready for all-out nuclear war; and, despite its professions, it might launch a surprise attack. Therefore the Soviet Union must be ready for both contingencies. Maximum security requires maximum armament, conventional and nuclear.

Fourth: Military force is still a factor in political affairs, through its use, and especially through the sheer threat of its use. The doctrine of the Revolution—the doctrine of "collisions"—still holds. It will come into play whenever the risks are sufficiently minimal, and the chances of success sufficiently solid. These conditions will be more readily verified when the use of force, including nuclear force, is on a small scale for settling (or aggravating) local disturbances. Therefore small-scale nuclear force must be available in quantity, together with conventional arms. But if the risk appears that the tactical action will be enlarged to the dimensions of strategic action, through the employment of strategic nuclear weapons, it must be broken off, lest the Homeland or the Revolution itself be endangered.

In sum: Major nuclear "collisions" with the capitalist world are not inevitable; on the contrary, they must be avoided, since they cannot advance the Communist cause. World socialism can and must be achieved without major war, by peaceful means—political, diplomatic, economic,

propagandistic (this, in effect, is what Khrushchev said in 1956). Adventurism is to be rejected, since it violates the policy of minimal risk. On the other hand, the threat of force is still a valid revolutionary weapon; so too is the use of force itself in determined circumstances. Finally, the Homeland is in "danger from without." Therefore the armament program must be pushed through the whole spectrum of nuclear weapons—large weapons as a deterrent for maximum security; small weapons for use with a minimum of risk.

If this diagnosis of Communist thinking is generally correct, it suggests several conclusions with regard to American thought.

First: The danger of an all-out sneak nuclear attack on the United States has been vastly exaggerated. We have maximal security against it in the Soviet policy of minimal risk as long as the massive deterrent is sustained.

Second: The correlative danger of an all-out nuclear war has likewise been vastly exaggerated. It could only happen as the result of enormous stupidity, basically attributable to a complete miscalculation of Soviet intentions, itself based on a misunderstanding of Soviet doctrine. This stupidity is no more inevitable than war itself.

Third: The danger of limited wars has been underestimated. It seems to be the historical American delusion that no war is worth while unless it is unlimited, waged for "ultimate" causes. There is also the special delusion proper to the nuclear age, that any use of nuclear weapons, however low in the kiloton range, must inevitably lead to world

catastrophe. Hence the false dilemma: either to begin with catastrophe or to renounce all use of nuclear force.

Fourth: More generally, the whole concept of the cold war, so called, has been overmilitarized and therefore superficialized. This overmilitarization, combined with the exaggerations noted above, has affected national policy adversely in many respects. Moreover, it has tended to obscure or even discredit the validity of the very concept of the cold war. This too is lamentable, because the concept is fully valid, if it is interpreted in the light of the full reality of the Soviet empire in its fourfold uniqueness. Unfortunately, it has become too easy to say that, since the Communist threat is not primarily military (which is true), it is no threat at all and we should make disengagement our policy (which is completely false). Unfortunately too, it has become too easy to say that, since the United States is sufficiently safe from foreign military aggression (which is true), the real threat is internal Communist subversion (which is false).

Finally: All the confusions in American thinking come to a focus in the opinion that the issue of American "survival" is squarely put to the Department of Defense, supported by the Atomic Energy Commission. This opinion is entirely disastrous. We may be quite sure that the Communist mind, with its realistic and strategic habits of thought, has carefully separated the problem of the "survival" of the Communist Revolution from the problem of war. The Communist leadership has no slightest intention of making "survival" the issue to be settled by force of arms. In fact, it is prepared to abandon resort to arms, as soon as the issue of "survival" is raised. Survival is the one thing it is not willing to risk. In contrast, America is not prepared to resort to arms until the issue of "survival" is raised. Survival is the only thing

it is willing to risk. Not the least irony in the current situation is the fact that the West has surrendered to the East its own traditional doctrine, that "survival" is not, and should never be allowed to become, the issue at stake in war.

The major problem put to American policy at the moment is the problem that the Soviet Union has already solved in terms of policy, namely, how to be prepared to use force on all necessary or useful occasions, and at the same time to withdraw "survival" from the issues at stake in the use of force. "The children of this world are shrewder than the children of light in their dealings with their own kind" (Luke 16:9). The children of this world understand better the uses, and the uselessnesses, of this world's darkest thing, force. They are shrewd enough to know that the institutions of this world can be advanced by force, but that their survival should not be put to the test of force.

The irony in the Gospel saying seems to be magnificently fulfilled in the American nuclear armament program. It seems to have been conceived to insure "survival" but not to fight a legitimate war for limited and justifiable ends. Perhaps one should not blame the Department of Defense or the Atomic Energy Commission. They could not get their budgets through the Congress unless they "proved" that "survival" is the issue at stake. And the Congress could not levy taxes on the people unless it "proved" that the "survival" of the people is at stake. But this is moral absurdity, not least because it is military absurdity. We have got the problem of "survival" and the problem of war so mixed up that we may finally be incapable of solving either.

Nor will it do to say that we have been forced into this position by the Communist menace. It would be almost impossible to set limits to the danger of communism as a spiritual menace. It has induced not simply a crisis in a history but perhaps the crisis of history. Its dream of the

Third Epoch that will cancel Western and Christian history and the major institutions of that history (notably the rule of law and the spiritual supremacy of the Church) has gone too far toward realization over too wide a sweep of earth to be lightly dismissed as a mere dream. On the other hand, as a sheerly military menace communism is strictly limited. It is limited in the first instance by its own doctrine. This doctrine has always assigned to military force a real role in the advancement of the World Revolution. Nevertheless, the role of force has always been ancillary, subordinate, supportive of political, economic, and ideological initiatives. Force is to be employed only when the historical moment is right and the military or political risk is minimal. Moreover, there is every reason to believe that in the nuclear age, in which all risks are enhanced most horribly, Communist doctrine has set a still more diminished value on the use of force. By a sort of perverse genius, proper to the children of darkness, it has at the same time set a higher value on the sheer threat of force.

The Soviet Union as a power-imperialism must be confronted by power, steadily and at every point. But when the question is military engagement it is quite false to say that the issue is "survival." And American persistence in thinking this could easily reduce American power to impotence. The real issue is to know how and why "survival" got to be thought of as the military issue, and then to withdraw it from the limited political and moral issues at stake in our military engagement wtih the Soviet Union. It is impossible to think of any other way in which our nuclear armament program can be reduced to rationality—to some sensible conformity to the canons of moral reason (which look to justice in war), and to a hardly less desirable conformity to the rules of military reason (which look to success in war).

The clue to the distortions in the present structure of American policy is deposited in a remark made by the Military Operations Subcommittee in its nineteenth report, submitted on February 20, 1958. It said: "Under present methods of operation we do not know what we are trying to accomplish through military aid." Military aid programs, it added, "are not clearly related to a strategy of defense . . . Logistical plans have not been revised to keep step with strategic concepts and strategic concepts lag behind war technology." The general sense of this judgment, made directly with regard to military aid programs, holds with greater force of our nuclear armament program and its newer adjuncts, rockets and missiles.

The general uneasiness among the public—here at home and abroad—derives from an instinctive sense that America does not know what it is trying to do. And the uneasiness is sharpened by the general knowledge of what we are in fact doing, and have in fact been doing since the Manhattan Project. We are engaged in the exploitation of technological possibilities simply because they are possibilities, in the absence of any clearly defined strategic purposes that would be consonant with the institution of war as a valid instrument for altering the political will of an enemy—in the case, the Communist enemy, whose political will, and whose doctrine on the limited use of force in support of his will, are by no means mysterious or unknowable. The general public senses that this situation is irrational and therefore immoral. And it focuses its deeper fear and its more diffused disapproval on the relatively minor question of nuclear tests.

It is doubtless true that military concepts have always lagged behind weapons technology. The lag was tolerable

MILLIS: The probabilities are that if we maintain a large strategic Air Force there will be no great war of mass destruction. There will probably not be any important small-scale war. The experience the British and French underwent in Suez is probably the pattern of the future. It would be very difficult today to repeat a Korea. The probability is that war has been eliminated from the relations of states. The thought has been in my mind that America has been operating under a false assumption. Since 1945, the whole of our policy has been conducted on the assumption that we are fighting a war with the Soviet Union. I don't believe this fits the facts of this period. Rather than fighting a war, I believe we are working out a relationship of some other character than can be expressed in strictly military terms. The concept of a cold war with Russia is not a meaningful concept, nor is it a valid concept in dealing with the problems which now actually confront us.

GOLDMAN: We are engaged in building a set of relationships with respect to a world-wide revolution, which is social and economic in character and of which Russia is just a kind of state spearhead. The answer to the question of whether the concept of the cold war is meaningful is therefore no, and our policy has been seriously limited because we have been answering yes.

NIEBUHR: There is a cold war insofar as we have a military contest. We have the proof of its existence in the nuclear stalemate, etc. But this has obscured the second dimension of the problem, which one might call competitive co-existence. The two systems are competitive throughout the world and we have not given this fact sufficient emphasis. Our concept of the cold war makes us emphasize military alliances—which does nothing but alienate other countries—and it is this cold war psychology which has interfered with our political strategy of competitive co-existence. There is a military threat, so you can't say that we can do less militarily; but we should not be so obsessed with it as to ignore the other.

MILLIS: It seems obvious to me that we have applied to our situation vis-a-vis Russia a whole series of concepts that are meaningless, in that they do not fit any external reality. Our problem in the largest possible terms is to establish a viable relationship with Russia—that is, between the two great power centers. We approach the problem with concepts that are contrary to fact, the simplest illustration of this being our conviction that as a free society we could necessarily attain a higher degree of technological development than the Communist dictatorial society. This concept has certainly underlain the policies of the past twelve years and we now know, in the face of Sputnik, that it is completely erroneous.

NIEBUHR: There are frightening similarities between what Khrushchev says and what Robespierre said. The Russians may be modern in a technological sense but they are still ruled by dogmas that are not true to the facts. So far as the concept of the cold war is concerned, there is a companion problem—the concept that Dulles takes continually, that communism is an ephemeral condition that will pass

away. This is a dangerous illusion, and it is only obliquely related to the cold war and to competitive co-existence.

BUCHANAN: There are two or three questions here. I take it we agree that the cold war concept has made history—the Marshall Plan, the recent conviction that we must have more education in this country, and so on. Actually the concept goes back to the first World War. There has been a kind of cold war ever since, and it has affected foreign policy. This is one question. The other is whether it originally was a valid concept; that is, that communism was threatening regimes all over the world and still is. If you argue both questions at once, you get into terrible confusion.

BURDICK: I think we would have to answer the question of whether the cold war is a meaningful concept with a yes, in the sense that if the two powers believe they are in a cold war the belief begins to make a substantial part of history. Then we might answer, it is meaningful but not sufficient.

NIEBUHR: Couldn't you say it was insufficient and that all the attitudes it engenders tend to isolate the military factors unduly from the over-all factors of competitive co-existence?

BURDICK: This is the chief deficiency of the cold war concept. One of the groups that has recognized this most quickly is the military itself. They want the concept broadened to involve education, aesthetic choice, religious choice, etc.

NIEBUHR: The original conception of containment, as George Kennan described it, was that if you prevented the expansion of Soviet power by whittling away at it, the

despotism would become less onerous and there would be a difference between the original revolutionaries and the second and third generations. Kennan has changed his mind about that. Now, as he explained to the Council on Foreign Relations, the real problem—the political choice we have to face—is whether we are going to sit tight until it might blow up and the Soviets become confronted with a desperate choice which might be dangerous to us, or whether our policy would be of such a kind that there would be inadvertently a loosening not of the Soviet system but of its empire and the Soviets would find themselves by the slow process of history with a disintegrated empire.

BUCHANAN: If you take the interpretation of the cold war in any literal sense, it means in effect that we are at war with Russia. This becomes the premise for almost all of our foreign policy and to a great extent our domestic policy.

NIEBUHR: We are at war with Russia in that sense.

BUCHANAN: This means that we have militarized our society to a certain extent. The recoil effect of the containment policy is that we have become a more military society. We understand ourselves that way. We are at war. Therefore, we do certain things.

NIEBUHR: Containment or no containment, we have militarized ourselves more than we were when we were in security. The containment policy did not do this. The historic situation did it. You can't change the fact that America and Russia have become the great power centers beyond the calculation of any historian.

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CHAIRMAN*: Let us take the next step. Since there are two great power centers, which everybody admits, must their policy inevitably be a policy that can be accurately described as a cold war?

NIEBUHR: Yes and no. All of history proves that in a contest between two powers, whether on the national or the super-national level, unless they come to an agreement the military power is always the *ultima ratio*.

CHAIRMAN: Isn't the clause; "unless they come to an agreement," the real question?

NIEBUHR: They will come to an agreement, let us say, because the balance of forces is perfectly constructed and in addition, today, because they might annihilate each other and thus prefer peace to superiority. But even that peace is determined by the *ultima ratio*. In other words, if we did not have a comparative parity of military power, we would not have the security we have today. This is our dilemma. You can't get out of it by adopting some other policy, because a part of the cold war situation is that we have all kinds of power and prestige in contest with it, including nuclear weapons.

CHAIRMAN: What in your opinion would be the difference between competitive co-existence and cold war?

NIEBUHR: Competitive co-existence is a wider term but it does not exclude the military factor. We cannot exclude it. We simply say that it is there. But we must not take sole cognizance of it because we must take cognizance of all the power and prestige factors involved all over the world.

* Robert M. Hutchins

MILLIS: The actual relationship with Russia today is not a relationship of two powers at war, cold or hot. It is the relationship of two powers engaged in competitive co-existence. But we refuse to admit this. If we are going to make a success of a policy of competitive co-existence, we must face it ourselves and realize that it is our policy.

CHAIRMAN: It changes the base of your operations. Your object then is to try to make your own existence a model for the world and not so much to hold in check the developments in another country or to threaten another country. I don't feel any obligation to change my educational ideas, for example, as a result of the Sputnik, because I've always thought American education ought to be serious education. The notion that the Russians have made a great discovery in finding that intellectual power is a national asset is absurd; every serious educator in the United States has thought that for centuries.

NIEBUHR: That's right but it is too isolationist an interpretation, because we cannot make our national existence the model for all nations.

CHAIRMAN: Granted. Molotov, I think, first used the phrase competitive co-existence about 1945. He called it the peaceful competition of different social and political systems. If you take this seriously, it would mean that we would try to develop for this country and for the world the full potentialities of the American system. The net result of this would be that there would be a better chance of beating Russia if she had to be beaten in a military way. If you drop the phrase cold war and change it to peaceful co-existence, which I prefer to competitive co-existence, you alter the tone and the direction of your policy.

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BUCHANAN: Can't the question be put another way: Do we understand ourselves properly by understanding our relations with Russia as a war?

NIEBUHR: What we are saying is that it is too narrow to term it a war. It is certainly competitive.

BURDICK: Is it possible to have competitive and peaceful co-existence? Isn't this what happened between the Protestants and the Catholics?

NIEBUHR: The analogy is good. Millis says we won't have war in the present situation because we would destroy each other. In the religious wars it was found that neither could win and so they established a competitive co-existence. They decided to get along with one another. So did Islam and Christianity.

CHAIRMAN: Aren't we agreed that the term cold war is insufficient? Aren't we agreed that it is misleading? If the term is insufficient and misleading, then we come to the question of how we want to describe the situation as we think it (a) does exist and (b) ought to exist.

NIEBUHR: If I understand Henry Kissinger's thesis in his book, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, the administration has concluded that war has ceased in any respect to be an instrument of policy. His point is that if you take this absolutely as a sort of pacifist dogma and the Soviets recognize this to be our policy, they will push us around all over the world. They will not be afraid of the ultimate war, because we have committed ourselves to the fact that there cannot be *any* war. The question is not adequate instrumentalities but the relationship of foreign policy to a de-

mocracy. The greater question is that as the hazards increase and the technical details become more complex, can foreign policy be grasped in terms of the whole democratic structure? George Kennan may not be right, but he seems to say that in this era foreign policy cannot be as democratic as we would like.

GOLDMAN: As I understand Millis' position, he is saying that war has become so mutually annihilating that there is not going to be a big war, and therefore we should take things in that context.

MILLIS: I think we have already passed the point where a big war is probable. I can't say it is not possible. There is always the business of the sergeant at a radarscope with his finger on the button. I could not make a hard and fast prediction that there is no possibility of a war. I am saying that the two arsenals have grown so huge and destructive as apparently to rule out a war, at least in the near future, and have deprived us of the function which military force previously fulfilled in international affairs. Therefore, we are faced with a situation where force is a vacuum. That situation is not to my mind accurately described by the term "war". I don't know whether it is possible to see this international situation in terms other than those of a cold war, but I think it is. The profound paradox is that we are manufacturing nuclear weapons so that they shall not be used. That is the standard official argument. Yet you cannot manufacture weapons that will not be used. You have to manufacture them as if they would be used, and you have to train your people as if they are going to be used.

MURRAY: Have we ever been really publicly clear about all of this?

MILLIS: No, we have not, because of the paradox we have never resolved. The suggestion has frequently been made in the past that the only way we can deal with these megaton weapons is to announce to the world that we will never use them unless they are used against us.. That seems a logical thing to say. The answer has always been made that we could not dare to do that because that would announce to the Russians that we would not intend to use them. The Russians, satisfied that they were never going to be used on them, would then go off and do anything they please. As long as you regard our relations with Russia as primarily those of a war, that sort of decision is almost inevitable. If, however, you can find some other frame in which to place our relationship with Russia—I don't know how to do it—it is conceivable that you might have a foundation on which both of us could talk, and a decision about the use of megaton weapons could be made in some self-enforcing form.

GOLDMAN: I can easily see the American public saying that the dumping of these weapons on Russia is a moral thing to do because communism is so immoral. Its destruction justifies the action. Part of the difficulty, it seems to me, is that we have assumed officially and unofficially in this country that the American purpose should be to destroy or diminish communism.

MILLIS: That is almost the problem—communism is immoral, there is a real responsibility on our side to see that it is destroyed. When you take that position you have declared war on communism. Then you cannot conduct relations with Communists in any other except a war context. I am asking if that context is the only one we can apply. If we can apply a non-war context with our relations with the Soviet Union, we will have to drop the idea that we are

under a moral obligation to exterminate communism. We really have a choice here between either competitive co-existence or cold war as the foundation of our policy. Through considering and deciding definitely for either one or the other policy, we might be able to control the development of the world better than we are controlling it now. The overwhelming outside fact, as I see it, is that under the policies we have followed we are not controlling events in any way that leads anywhere except a total military disaster or a total disaster through Soviet Russian conquest of the rest of the world against our wishes. If present trends appear to end in an inescapable disaster on one side or the other, then we must at least address ourselves to the possibility that these trends can be reversed or can be altered or modified to lead to something else. The only place in which I can see that we can begin to attempt to modify them is by re-examining our own assumptions about the nature of the problem with which we are dealing.

GOLDMAN: We are really dealing with a deep-seated judgment on the part of the American people. I think there are two parts to the judgment and I think we have been operating under them for a long time before the cold war. First, there is a conspiracy abroad in the world called socialism, Bolshevism, etc. This conspiracy is in and of itself immoral. Secondly, it is inherently expansive and is constantly threatening us. By threatening us, it is threatening all of our moral judgments and values. I think we have constantly done things as a result of these feelings which we would consider immoral if viewed in the light of our other standards. We can reverse these feelings in two ways. We can say communism is immoral, but we are going to act as if it is not, or we can say that communism is not immoral, under many circumstances, and in many parts of the world.

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CHAIRMAN: What about something in between, that communism is immoral but you are not going to shoot all the Communists?

GOLDMAN: If you take my second point, if I am right in what the American people have been saying, that communism is not only immoral but is a constant threat, don't you therefore have a right to try to destroy it with weapons which you would call immoral under other circumstances?

MURRAY: That raises what is to me the most basic power issue; that is, the failure of understanding. I think it is fairly demonstrable that in this country we have never understood the uses of force or the meaning of power. We have gravitated between the two extremes of absolute pacifism and the use of force as in Hiroshima. One extreme is just as dangerous a guide to policy as the other. If we had a thoroughly conceived doctrine with regard to the uses of force, we would never have built the hydrogen bomb in the first instance because it is not a weapon of war, unless you are going to give to the word "war" a content that is inherently absurd. War has been historically a means of improving a power position. That is all. That is all it can ever be.

MILLIS: You can still build it as a weapon of defense.

MURRAY: Not in the absence of any offensive weapon that would call for such a defense.

MILLIS: What instigated the decision to go ahead with the crash program in the hydrogen bomb was the discovery that we no longer had a monopoly of the weapon.

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CHAIRMAN: War is now defined as a kind of death of civilization. War in the past has never meant that. Therefore, it seems that we have generally decided that we would prefer to live. It seems we have generally decided that if this means we have to let the Russians live, we are willing to let them live, too. Since we want to live ourselves, and hence to let the Russians live, we have got to start to talk about the ways in which we live together and whether it is possible to live together. This would seem to require us to drop as an official objective the annihilation of communism or the destruction of governments that profess to be communistic. You have to let them live or else you will get exploded yourself.

MURRAY: We have been permitting them to live, and they us. It is not a question of whether they live or not. It is the measure of power that they are going to be allowed to have or not to have and how they can be blocked from having it or not having it. It is a problem of power, not life. It can be extended into an issue of life or death of the civilization, if you will, but the problem is not the continued existence of civilization, it is the problem of power.

CHAIRMAN: I was extrapolating the present situation to one of life or death. I view the present situation as that.

MILLIS: How would you state the problem of power?

MURRAY: I would have to start, I suppose, with my understanding of communism and its history and dynamisms as they have become evident. I would have to have some understanding of their power program as well as some understanding of the ideology out of which it was projected. Then I would have to decide just how far the success of this program was compatible with a power program of my own. I

suppose we as a nation have to have a power program. I would have to see how likely it is for this power struggle to erupt into violence and where and in what measure. Then, having done that as best I could, I still would not have anything more than a basis of, say, high probability from which to launch national policies of various kinds, one of them being development of military power, another being development of other types of power, and so on. Policy is designed—not entirely but to some extent—in terms of the policy it is trying to counteract.

MILLIS: Your description of the analysis of the power problem is a description of what is going on every day. You can read almost anywhere very carefully detailed analyses on points at which the American foreign policy rubs against the Soviet power policy. This is still no solution to the problem before us. Exactly this type of analysis applied to our affairs has brought us to a dead end or a blank wall in which no course we can now advocate appears to offer us the safety, survival, and security of a free society.

BUCHANAN: It is very important to get at the rationale of this whole thing. There is an inference to be made about the use of force. Force can be used under law, and is used that way. It seems to me that we should be talking about making a major treaty with Russia. This is the nearest thing you come to law in international relationships. It has been said here that we are not interested in destroying communism and we are not going to distrust the Russians as a national policy. If that is true, we can make a treaty and the treaty would be the way to hold the rationale that is left.

NIEBUHR: A treaty with Russia is both impossible and unnecessary. Politically it is impossible from our side, strategi-

cally it is impossible from their side. What we need is a tacit understanding or agreement rather than a treaty.

MURRAY: There is a problem which has preoccupied this country for thirty years in different forms and focused on different things, namely, can our American republican form of government cope with the situation as it exists. It was raised first of all with reference to the economy. We got over that one. Then it was raised with reference to the conduct of war in the face of dictatorship. We got over that one. Now it is back with us again, quite rightly. I think this is a basic problem.

MILLIS: I started from the rather simple proposition that we are not coping with the situation that now confronts us. As far as anybody can project the tendencies now at work, they cross at a point spelling catastrophic disaster. If that is a fair analysis of the present tendencies, it means that our government for whatever reasons, or our people for whatever reasons, are not coping with them. How should they begin to cope, or how can a group such as this make it more easy for them to cope?

GOLDMAN: What have American leaders been saying about the nature of this danger for the last forty years? It seems to me that they have been saying two things: One is that the danger that is Bolshevism is an immoral danger, and, to quote Mr. Truman, America has no meaning unless it opposes it now and forever. The other thing they have been saying is that this danger is inherently and permanently predatory and expansionist, and if you do not check it, undermine it, and attempt to destroy it, it will destroy you. We here cannot say anything significant about the problem unless we also say something about these two propositions.

NIEBUHR: Felix Morley said in one of his books that empire and democracy are incompatible, and we must do away with empire to preserve democracy. In order to preserve our virtue, we must renounce our responsibilities. That is a very ultimate question, which Christian civilization has always faced and which sectarian Christianity and orthodox liberalism have answered wrongly. That is to say, since responsibility involves guilt and danger, we will be pure rather than be responsible. On the other hand, it is argued rightly that if we use these instruments we will annihilate ourselves not only physically but morally. If the bomb were ever used, I would hope it would kill me, because the moral situation would be something that I could not contemplate. At the same time you cannot disavow its use absolutely prematurely without bowing yourself out of responsibility for the whole generation. That is the character of our moral dilemma.

GOLDMAN: If my understanding is correct of what American policy and American public opinion have been, this would be the answer: The destruction or undermining of Bolshevism is so important that no matter what it cost, you must do it. There is a higher morality. The moral meaning of America is to prevent the spread and power of communism. Therefore the moral question of using these weapons is subordinate to the larger morality. This, I think, would be the public answer.

NIEBUHR: Suppose you eliminate the idea that we were called by God to eliminate Bolshevism from the world. Suppose you assume that we did not have an ephemeral configuration here but something we have to live with for who knows how long. You will still have two problems. You still have the problem of whether we could carry imperial

responsibility without losing our democracy and the problem of the moral substance of our civilization with regard to the use of atomic warheads in limited wars.

GOLDMAN: I think we can agree among ourselves that the statement that Bolshevism is ephemeral is false. A third point, it seems, we will have to discuss, namely, that Bolshevism is inherently predatory and expansionist. If this is true, the relentless, remorseless pressure to undermine it, to get it, or otherwise it will get you, must be maintained.

NIEBUHR: Any dynamic historical movement is to some degree expansionist. We were expansionist when we found this continent and brushed everything out of our way.

GOLDMAN: I think what is meant by the word "expansionist" is that communism represents a permanent conspiracy which has as its major objective, by any means whatsoever, the undermining of the governments of the rest of the world. This in definition raises serious questions about what it would mean to make a treaty with them, to negotiate with them, and so forth.

MURRAY: Would it be implicit in what you said that we have got to the point now where we have exaggerated the threat or we ought to re-examine it to see whether we have not exaggerated the threat?

GOLDMAN: My own feeling would be that we have exaggerated. We must face the question whether this popular point of view toward communism is the correct one.

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CHAIRMAN: Suppose we assume that the Russian threat is precisely what the worst threateners or threat-fearers think it is. Have the methods we have been employing to meet this threat been rational? That is, have they been effective, and have they been in their application in this country and elsewhere just?

MILLIS: There has never been a careful examination and re-examination of the nature of the threat. We have never stopped to say, what is the threat? Is it the threat of a sudden sneak attack with atomic weapons to be delivered on this country at any moment without any warning? I think it is quite possible to say that is a remote element of the threat. It is almost unimaginable that it will ever actually happen. A State Department official has made the flat statement that the Department had decided that the policy of the Soviet Union was not to start a war but to avoid a war. Meanwhile, however, building up of armaments would permit them to continue their other policies without inciting war. Their whole effort was to prevent these other policies from resulting in a war, either a big war or a little war. That is a very logical analysis, it seems to me, of the fundamental nature of the Soviet policy. Now, if that is the nature of the threat, it makes it all the more plain that many of the things we have been doing have not in fact been rational means to meet the Soviet threat.

NIEBUHR: The question would be whether it is a threat of world domination or whether it is calculated expansion wherever there is a weakness militarily or economically for them to fill the vacuum. That is the nature of the threat.

BUCHANAN: Any live element of history is expansionist. If it falls into a certain pattern, it is conspiratorial. That is

where we are. It seems to me we ought to be able to get above that. Accept the conspiratorial thing as we accept the cold war. This is relatively true at present. We made it true. By acting against a conspiracy, we have become a conspiracy and this has become a vicious pattern. Can't we get above that somehow? Isn't the reciprocal position here something very familiar in history; that is, any two powers in history have always been enemies in some sense, they have been expansionist, they have been subversive to each other? There is nothing new about this.

CHAIRMAN: Where do you come out?

BUCHANAN: With a treaty. If you drop these assumptions which are obviously only half-true and perhaps terribly false because they are half-true, you get to that. Niebuhr says it is politically impossible. It is politically impossible because no group like this has ever said to the contrary.

NIEBUHR: The analogy between Hitler and the Russians is the most false analogy we have to deal with because Hitler had to have military expansion in order to exist at all. The Soviets are expansionists in a quite different sense. They are politically, morally, and ideologically expansionist. You cannot get rid of this by simply destroying them. Here is where Kennan's point comes in. The ultimate choice is whether we want to drive them into a corner where they will become desperate or whether we will create a situation where the empire will disintegrate, and disintegrate so inadvertently that the Communist oligarchs themselves can't deal with it.

GOLDMAN: My understanding is that the consensus of this group is this: There is a popular view that communism is inherently expansionist to the point where you cannot deal

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with it. You cannot do business with it. We agree that this view is not necessarily correct.

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MURRAY: It seems to me we are piling assumptions on assumptions. We are assuming that it is the assumption of American foreign policy that a political objective of the United States is the utter destruction of the Soviet empire. Is our assumption that this is the assumption correct? I am inclined to say it is not.

GOLDMAN: I would state that this has been a major assumption.

MURRAY: Maybe you have to distinguish. There are two things constantly going on in American life which necessarily must go on because of the nature of the threat. We cannot view with complacency a reign of tyranny all over the earth. What we do about it is something else again. My judgment on the damnation that I invoke on the tyranny is one thing. The action I propose to take against the tyranny is quite something else again. It is on this second level that I would conceive foreign policy to rest. You have the two levels very clearly demonstrated—and also the impasse which the failure to join them leads to—in the Hungarian situation. The air was filled with moral denunciations. Apparently nobody ever thought antecedently what we possibly could do as, if, and when such a situation arose. We had no policy.

GOLDMAN: I wonder whether a detailed history of U.S. policy from 1947 on would bear out the sharp distinction you make between the power level and the prophetic level. It seems that the two things were constantly confused in the minds of

those who were making policy. I should say that if we had not been operating upon the prophetic assumption as well as the power assumption our foreign policy would have been very different.

MURRAY: You are probably right. The confusion of these two things has been at the root of a lot of our confusion in foreign policy. The notion of confusion, the level of moral judgment, the level of policy formation are all related to the basic failure of both moral and political intelligence in the national relationship, which is force.

BUCHANAN: You are separating these too sharply. Do you mean to be going as far as you are?

MURRAY: Separating what?

BUCHANAN: The moral and the power judgments.

MURRAY: I don't want to separate them. I say we in our day-to-day national fumbling-around have separated them. I don't want them separated.

BURDICK: I would like to see them separated. I think this is what Goldman suggested. He made two statements; one is a moral statement, the other is a statement about reality. The moral statement is that communism is evil. The reality statement is that it is expansionist and impracticably so. I think these two should be kept separate.

MURRAY: One of the moral factors to be considered in the use of force is the pragmatic factor of success. There must be a reasonable chance of success in the power arena, otherwise the action is not fully moral.

BURDICK: The distinction between morality and morals can be reduced to more manageable questions: Is extinction of communism as an ideology desirable? I think the answer in America would be yes. Is the extinction of Communists as persons desirable? Here you would get some ambiguity. Under some circumstances, for example, as a defensive move we might be prepared to drop bombs to exterminate Communists as persons. The third question would be, is the extermination possible? Clearly here, the answer is yes. Fourth is the extermination possible without ourselves being exterminated? Apparently the answer is no. The fifth question would be, does the fourth question affect the morality or the expediency of the previous questions? After we had answered these, then we might be able to find practical working alternatives. These questions deal with both the morality and the reality of the situation, and keep them distinct.

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CHAIRMAN: It has been suggested that we might be at the point where a treaty with Russia covering all outstanding issues might be seriously considered. I would like to ask Mr. Berle his view of the relative value of one procedure or another.

BERLE: I do not see how any treaty or agreement with Russia could be effective if you assume that Russia is going to continue her general desire to conquer the world. I am afraid that any American-Russian agreement now, in the present state of affairs, would be certainly broken and the next step is war, as happened after the Munich Pact and the Hitler-Stalin Pact. There is only one question that is basically unsettled. That is whether the Soviet Union is going to try to use its combined political and military techniques to

establish something narrowly approaching the word "empire." They accuse us of the same thing. I think we would agree that is not true of us. I think it *is* true of the Soviet Union. We are not going to settle that by sitting down together and talking it over.

NIEBUHR: We are in a very great dilemma. We cannot overcome it simply by saying that if we abandon the false psychology of a cold war we can negotiate on all things and get into a scheme of competitive co-existence. Khrushchev has spelled it out the way Eisenhower spells it out. He has said, of course, we don't want war, but the imperialists do want war and we have to have a deterrent power against imperialists. This is exactly what Eisenhower also says. We both have the same policy. That is the pathos of the dilemma.

BERLE: I can't see the cold war as a fantasy. The bullets that were coming across the fields in 1948 and 1950 and 1956 looked to me like perfectly real bullets. In the first place, instead of saying there is not a war, I would like to say quite frankly there is one. It may be the word is inept. Second, I would like to say we may have reached the point at which there is a possibility of an armistice or of a policy looking towards an armistice. We have certain limitations. We cannot bargain with the rights of other people. When Kennan and Millis say let Middle Europe go, I find myself interested in liberation as a moral dilemma which I am totally unable to solve; that is, our inability to bargain with the lives of many tens of millions of people. However, let us leave that alone. There may be a possibility of working towards an armistice.

Third, there are a group of fundamental considerations on which I think we and the Soviet Union agree. What are

they? One is that there is a common desire in both populations not to have this thing go to ultimates. That I think is as true in the Soviet Union as it is here. Another is that the economic burden of the modern armament race is going eventually to break either system if carried to ultimates. We match the Soviets and can match them, and in any such matching operations their system becomes increasingly impossible and possibly ours, too. So there is a common motive to bring this situation under some control. Fourth, I think we have inadequately communicated the degree of common ground we have with the Russians or with the Soviet statesmen. I think we could make it perfectly clear that no American would spend a dollar, let alone a life, to try to change the system in the Soviet Union by force. The idea that they are constantly under attack, which they have sedulously fomented, is a myth, and we ought to be able to communicate that. If we start there, then we have to add a limitation where we do not agree. The first is that we cannot bargain away the rights of any other people. We can concede, if we like, that our own system is not the only system by which other peoples can organize their affairs. In other words, we do not consider this a competition between different forms of industrial organization. Actually, our systems are so alike when you bring them together—I mean mechanically and organizationally—that you discover the competition is not between two social systems, it is between the content of either system. At this point we then get down to cases. An exploration of those cases conceivably might lead to a basis for armistice. I mean just that, a temporary cease-fire.

Finally, I would like to see if we could not throw on the screen the fact that we are not trying to recreate the nineteenth century with the United States playing the part of Britain. It cannot be done any longer. To say you can

"accommodate" doesn't take you anywhere. If accommodation means anything, it can only mean some kind of work-out in a few specific situations which you hope would enlarge themselves by the painful process of beginning with limited common ground and finding out where it can be expanded. The philosophy or at least the publicly stated philosophy by which all these matters have been tackled has been absurd. It seems to me any time Khrushchev says something that is decent and human we ought to recognize it. Every step he takes that looks toward a decent recognition of what we call human rights we ought to accept and welcome. We don't need to add that we think he is a liar. He may be, but the essential question is the political effect of what he says or does. In any case, instead of having rebuffed every apparent movement towards our point of view, we should have welcomed it. For example, we could have recognized the one thing that I think ought to have been recognized—that Khrushchev (who is not any great favorite of mine certainly) did move towards liberating a great many of the political prisoners. To say that every decent thing the Soviets do is just propaganda is merely silly.

CHAIRMAN: Our purpose, as I understand it, is to produce a state of mind in which instead of saying, let us get bigger bombs so we will be able to blow up more people even though this means we will get blown up ourselves, we say let us figure out whether we can do something about this Polish loan, for example.

BERLE: Stopping the arms race is contingent on beginning to get gradual understanding on the other side. I am firmly of the opinion that you will never get any cessation in the armament race until you get some cessation of the opinion that each side is merely waiting for the moment to do the

other side in. We believe that is wrong when applied to us and right when applied to the Soviet Union. I may add that I think the evidence against the Soviet Union adds up to a pretty powerful bag of evidence, but they have to determine, I think, as we do, whether they want to keep up with this effort.

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NIEBUHR: Could I suggest that we would perform most effectively not by confessing absolute guilt on all levels of our policy but simply by analyzing the predicament in which we and the Russians are. How similar it is! What makes our policy so wrong is that we assume we are always right. We can offset our reputation not only with the Russians but with our allies of being inflexible, self-righteous, and so forth by calling attention to the fact that we are in a common predicament and we ought to recognize it. We are in a common predicament in regard to the burden of the arms race. We are in a common predicament in regard to preserving our strategic security. We are in a common predicament in relation to the political and economic realities of Asia and Africa today. That is where Dulles is so wrong in regarding communism as an ephemeral thing which will blow up if you keep the heat on. We should say that we are dealing with a viable social system which we think is dangerous to the world but which has certain powers of attraction in Asia and Africa. We are in the same predicament in regard to the fact that Russians believe they are the wave of the future and we believe we are the wave of the future. The technical collectivism of Soviet power is more attractive to Asia and Africa than our curious libertarian ideas which are not as libertarian as we say they are. We have not proved that this liberty is compatible with justice and stability.

MILLIS: The fact is that we have two super-states, neither of which can destroy the other and both of which are related to their surrounding people in various ways. The picture of a war between the angels of light and the angels of darkness, between light and freedom and darkness and enslavement doesn't fit the facts of international history.

NIEBUHR: It does not fit the facts to say that if we get rid of the war psychology, these things would be solved. We are in a war. It is not militarily dynamic in the way that Napoleon or Hitler was. That is a false analogy. But it is dynamic. It is dynamic primarily in a political sense and an economic sense. Khrushchev disassociates himself from all analogies with Hitler and says, "Why should we have war? We have this vast expanse of territory." That is indeed a fact. That is the difference between them and Hitler. They have what they want, in effect, and a war would annihilate everything. Khrushchev says, "We have the future on our side. Why should we bring the world to disaster by military action?" Granted we can't trust him altogether on this. Communism has a broad political base. It has an ideology that regards itself as the wave of the future, but it has not the historical military necessity of getting more territory in the way Hitler had to get territory in order to survive at all. The basic mistake in our policy is to regard Hitler and communism as identical forms of dictatorship. It is basically true that military weapons are ancillary to their purposes and not primary; with Hitler it was the other way around.

BERLE: The present state of American policy is that we have expressed our willingness, and are committed, to explore through diplomatic channels with the Soviet Union any matters which might conceivably be agreed upon at a possible conference, summit or otherwise. If you are perfectly cer-

tain that anything they achieve on their side is done primarily or solely for the purpose of abuse, you would enter negotiations in a rather different frame of mind than if you assumed that Poland is a problem to them as well as to us and perhaps there is some possible *modus vivendi*.

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BURDICK: I think there are three substantial errors in Father Murray's analysis. First, he assumes that communism has a character that is fairly stable, rigid, and unchangeable. Second and most important, that we can study this and come to know the essential character and personality of communism. Despite the fact that Dr. Niebuhr and other people tell us there is a great scholarly debate about this and it is almost inscrutable at this time, Father Murray makes it clear that he believes that when we know the character of communism we will discover it to be evil because it is antagonistic and destructive of the character of man; it is imperialistic. The third assumption is that having discovered that the personality is evil we can construct a foreign policy on this basis. I think that none of these three is relevant to our discussion. I agree that the character of communism has little bearing unless we can do something about it. I think it is clear that today, regardless of what the character of communism is, there is very little that we can do about it and that our present way of dealing with it has some consequences that we can calculate pretty accurately.

NIEBUHR: Whether communism is evil or not is ultimately irrelevant if we agree that something must be done. Take the religious wars after the Reformation. There is no question that the Protestants regarded the Catholics as evil and vice versa, because Protestantism represented an anarchy and

Catholicism represented tyranny. The point is that neither could overcome the other and so they finally reached a competitive co-existence and they have lived that way ever since. That is an historical analogy.

LUCE: I take as my text the sentence: "If we believe in ourselves we need only stand upon our own convictions, looking to our freedom, power, and creativeness to determine the course of history." And in that sentence I take the words: "stand upon our own convictions." What do we mean by "convictions"? I would suggest that convictions are compounded of three elements. One is vision, the second is principles, and the third is circumstances. Let us say, vision and principles confronted at any given moment, and always, with circumstances. Circumstances have to be observed and assessed and you agree or disagree with what they are when vision and principles confront them. By vision I mean Isaiah's use of the word: "Where there is no vision, the people perish." By principles, I mean political philosophy in general, in the sense in which we say the principles of the American form of government or something of that sort. I make a distinction between vision and principles. Principles are susceptible to a coherent statement and to agreement or disagreement. Vision, which is quite as important as principles, perhaps more so, is not as susceptible of semantic articulation. A man or a group of men or possibly in some sense a nation has a vision of how the world may be, a vision of what the ultimate meaning of man may be. The case of the United States is almost unique in its expression of political principles. I do not say it expresses them well, but they are susceptible of more exact analysis than a statement of what might be called vision. Now, let us look at the circumstances and see how circumstances alter the cases or how devotion to principles may alter circumstances.

BURDICK: Wouldn't you say that the American society is anti-visionary and pro-principle? One aspect of our constitution is that we do not want to provide ways in which visions can become official or single. You can search for the vision any way you want. This is the first of our principles.

LUCE: I think you are right that what Americans feel they should hold in common and fight about in common is the form of government and how you work this form of government out. Whereas, for example, something like a religious unity is not supposed to be the American task.

NIEBUHR: That is Burdick's point, that we assume a plurality of visions.

GOLDMAN: Mr. Luce, I am much attracted by your idea that we ought to try to figure out and then state what we stand for, but I am worried by what I take to be the implication in your remarks that if we did that we would achieve something good for the United States. What I have in mind is this: I will go out on a limb and venture what seems to me the basic American principle about the world, which is that there is a kind of law of history about the world. This is what I think Americans believe: That all peoples everywhere want peace and democracy and that the reason they don't have it is that evil men have come in and deprived them of it. This, I would say, is a basic American principle drawn in fact from our history. What bothers me is that if you and I could agree that this is a basic American idea the thing that is wrong with it is that it is wrong. History has not worked that way. What is going on in the world today is the proof that it has not worked out that way. This is the American delusion, if you will. Should we not state to the world that we have been operating under a delusion?

LUCE: You are jumping too fast. It is by no means to be presumed that most of the rest of mankind responds to this kind of statement of principle. They may not even be the right principles, ultimately, for the world, but they are our principles.

NIEBUHR: Isn't it important to make the distinction between vision and principles? The principles upon which we are founded are the principles of a pluralistic society that grants freedom and toleration within its pluralism. The vision that we have is this pluralistic society as an example for all the world to follow if they were not evil or ignorant.

GOLDMAN: The word "vision" is a laudatory word. Don't we have to raise the issue whether what we have is a vision or whether it is a kind of egocentric projection of our own ideas on other people?

LUCE: I think it is important to find out what a group of Americans believe about American principles.

CHAIRMAN: Will you extend this to apply to Millis' statement? This would mean, as I understand it, that in this statement you would try to indicate what the principles were for which Americans stand. You would then discuss our foreign policy in the circumstances in which we find ourselves possessing these convictions. Is that correct?

LUCE: That is just what I mean.

MILLIS: May I ask this question: Suppose we did establish an agreed statement of American principles and American vision. Do you conceive that the terms by which that statement was established would have a material effect on the

paper I have drafted; that the manner in which you state your principles and vision would affect the pragmatic steps you take?

LUCE: Yes.

NIEBUHR: If you state it purely in moral terms or political terms, something is left out. The idea of circumstances is integral to principles. How do you state principles in the context of circumstances? So you can't state principles clearly except where they are inconclusive and pragmatic. What does a free society mean in the light of the circumstances that we are in competition with the Soviets in areas of Africa and Asia where our kind of free society does not quite make sense and where the Soviets' kind of collectivism is dangerous? There the circumstances tell more than the principles. Isn't it futile to go into the historical analysis of what our vision is? Take Mr. Luce's statement of the two visions we had. One is that we were the idea of democracy and other people could take an example from us. Then, beginning with Woodrow Wilson, we say we must export this. Those are two visions of the relationship of America to the world. They were both illusory. They were the visions that an immature nation had both of its power and of its ideals in the vast context of world history.

LUCE: It was not simply a fantasy. The American experiment by accident or providence has made a kind of breakthrough. Other people do want it and will tend toward it.

BERLE: I agree that if you tried to make a statement of a vision you could not do it. We would like to have several visions going. But we do have a vision of a society, if not a government, which regards the holding of visions as sacred

and endeavors to give the widest base of political and economic materials so that they can be realized. That is one thing. The second is that we try to construct a government of our own responsive to people for that precise purpose. That is why we do it. We rather look forward to an international world system which does the same thing. When it comes to what you could give up out of this in the interest of accommodation, the only thing you could discuss is form. That is, free elections might be a good way or a bad way of achieving representative government; but you could not give up the hope that the government or governments with which you were dealing were essentially trying to allow visions to constitute themselves instead of crushing every other vision but their own.

GOLDMAN: Mr. Berle, would you accept the interpretation of what you are saying along these lines, that there is a kind of fallacy of Westernism in this thing? Through democracy one achieves a social and economic uplift of the masses. This is what Western society has assumed and, particularly, our society. We have projected a vision of the world in those terms and it has not worked out that way. Democracy does not seem to be the road to social and economic change. It does not seem to be the wanted road.

BERLE: I am prepared to say that at any given point or period on the map or in time democracy may not work. But I don't believe we need to abandon the hope that in the long period of time it will prove to be the most effective. Pragmatically we think it is pretty effective for us.

GOLDMAN: When we are stating principles to the world, do we not have to decide whether we believe that you can get desirable social and economic change only through democratic

methods? One of the great confusions in our policy lies exactly in that area, I would say.

NIEBUHR: I don't see how you could clarify that confusion absolutely. On the one hand, democracy is an absolute necessity of justice and on the other hand democracy is a luxury which is attainable only by a highly technical and very balanced society. These two things do not quite fit. You have to spell them out if you are talking about them.

BERLE: An elected democracy in a state in the middle of Africa may be of blazing irrelevance. I should imagine it would be. This is not to say that you do not still anticipate as a part of your vision that that state in due time will be the kind of society which can handle democracy or something like it.

GOLDMAN: Suppose you get a circumstance abroad where through totalitarian methods the general population is being socially and economically benefited. Do you not have to decide whether you consider the vision of democracy more important than you do the vision of social and economic change?

BERLE: Yes.

GOLDMAN: That is all I am asking.

BERLE: But I think there you are picking a different range of time. The totalitarian society may be able to bring a society from "X" to "Y" very rapidly and then leave it in a mess. Let me add that one synthesis ought to be made and has not been made. The fact is that there is no demonstration yet that a totalitarian society can do it more rapidly.

MILLIS: I don't see how restating our principles in any terms is going to contribute anything to the process which I think most of us agree must somehow be brought about; that is, a relaxation of the military struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States. While we hope that the world will ultimately conform to democratic principles, the most we can see as of now, probably, of attainment is a solution similar to that arrived at between the two great religions in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

LUCE: An attitude which the United States might want to take, which might be good for fifty years, would be that we insist that no power control the earth. Never mind whether there is ambition or not. We will take steps and measures to be sure that no power of any sort, whether it is the aviator kings or the Kremlin, should control the earth. I would like that much better than to say we will settle for half the earth or a quarter of the earth and you have the rest.

BUCHANAN: I am sorry if I misunderstand Mr. Luce, but it seems to me he is talking about ideology and not political principles.

LUCE: Ideology is propaganda.

BUCHANAN: It is propaganda to yourself, too. You are trying to make yourself believe it. This has been going on for twenty years. All of us are aware of this. Sometimes there is a very explicit American appeal to the public: let us have an ideology so we can meet the other ideologies in the world. It seems to me too bad. We should be able to do something else. Our fundamental rules come from the common man. Every human being is born free and equal. That is where we derive our just principles of government.

In foreign relations and in military affairs we have to find some channel by which these fundamental rules can become operative again. At present we are all sickened and confused and feel helpless about the whole situation. Although you may have simple-minded convictions, there is no way they can get processed through the government and the appointed officers and all the rest. We in this group ought to be concerned about this. We ought to be concerned about processing the ordinary man's principles of conviction that arise from his own soul and formulating and communicating them to the public; in other words, setting up a process by which the common convictions of the ordinary man can be put into international relations.

LUCE: The American common man seems to be voting more than he used to. You think that the election process is failing very seriously to work?

BUCHANAN: I think voting is a very important function, but the ordinary processes of persuasion are much more important. That is the only thing that makes voting mean anything. Our persuasion has been cut short. This has to do with civil liberties and things like that that have failed in the last ten years. The military thing has destroyed a lot of our persuasive process. This is true on all levels—public meetings, free association, and everything else. We have destroyed our fundamental persuasive processes and therefore cut off our government from our own convictions and, vice versa, almost allowed them to overwhelm us.

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CHAIRMAN: As I understand it, you are proposing that we make a moral judgment ourselves which may articulate the

moral judgment of the people. How would you make the argument?

BUCHANAN: It would be a statement of some things that Mr. Luce refers to when he says our convictions.

CHAIRMAN: Such as?

BUCHANAN: Our general behavior in international relations. The idea that we are out to destroy foreign governments is not part of our deep conviction at all. On the contrary, there is a very deep conviction that we should not do that. Take also the idea that we should think that Russians are liars, in terms of either the diabolic notion or Kennan's notion that they have forgotten how to tell the truth. Although there is a great deal of evidence toward it, this seems to me fatal to all our negotiations with them. There is no chance of getting along with them at all. It is an incitement to them to do more of what we object to. I am afraid we catch the same thing. We begin lying, too. This seems to be going on on a grand scale. The main aim is to get the Russians into the world community. If you consider them outlaws and all the other things we call them, there is not any hope for peace at all. This is absolute barbarism on our part.

NIEBUHR: I would agree with the end, but the worst possible way of reaching it is to trust them, because trust is developed by all kinds of communal processes which have to be established first. You do not establish the process of truce in a community by trusting first. You live together on various levels. The main thing is that we have our principles. We state our principles or ideologies or visions or what have you. It must also be recognized that an atomic war is possible, and that the Russians and we both know this to be a fact. There-

fore, we must adjust ourselves to both a nuclear stalemate and an ideological stalemate. This ideological stalemate might not be trust or mistrust. It was not between Catholics and Protestants. It was simply a gradual living together. There grew out of this living together a certain trust that you don't establish by challenging people to trust each other.

BUCHANAN: I have some difficulty in seeing the difference between living together and trusting each other.

CHAIRMAN: Let me ask you, Dr. Buchanan, whether this is equivalent to what you were saying: That we should deal with the Russians and we should not on all occasions proclaim that we don't trust them.

NIEBUHR: That I will accept.

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MILLIS: I sense the existence of an issue which seems to be very fundamental in the discussion which has been going on here. One group here feels that the Communist world is a fact and our primary problem is to work out a system of negotiation with this world. In order to do so, we have in a large measure to accept it in the same degree, let us say, that Christianity finally accepted Islam. The other group here says that we can never accept the Soviet Communist world as it is now, that it is fundamentally aggressive, it is fundamentally evil, it is fundamentally contrary to our principles and philosophy of life.

CHAIRMAN: It seems to me that those who take one view of communism and those who take another, and there are shades of these views, agree that the ultimate holocaust has got to

be avoided. It can be avoided only by dealing with the Russians, and this has to be done without constant proclamations of our distrust of them. If this is a general agreement it is most important, because it means that a national policy which falls into two parts—(a) every opening that is offered is slammed shut from our side, and (b) we talk almost entirely in terms of bigger and bigger armaments in order to blow up these people—these policies are in the opinion of this group unsound.

LUCE: I would like to suggest the case of Poland today. I am speaking of the Catholics, and the position of Cardinal Wyszynski. There you have a very good case of living together. There is no acceptance on the part of Wyszynski or the Vatican of any Communist ideology. There is an acceptance of Poland by Gomulka and Wyszynski. They are both for Poland.

NIEBUHR: I think that example is splendid. They have one thing in common: Poland. We have one thing in common: the saving of the world. We try to get along with each other because we want to save the world, as they want to save Poland. Take the orthodox and secular Jews in Israel. They don't trust each other at all. They have a common interest in Israel which holds them together. They have so little trust of each other—an archaic orthodoxy and complete secularism—that they could not write a constitution. That is why a covenant between Russia and ourselves is impossible because you have to spell out in what way you will protect yourself against the other guy. The Israelites could not establish a constitution. Why? Because some wise people said this thing has to settle down. If we try to write a constitution now, we will try to protect ourselves against you in such a way that we will just get into a fight with one

another. But we have to live together. They have accommodated themselves to each other.

BUCHANAN: I am not talking about a constitution. I am talking about agreements. I am saying we should be willing to enter agreements properly formulated and processed. I am talking about a certain attitude that we have, that it is dangerous to come to any agreement with the Russians.

NIEBUHR: It is more important to have understandings than agreements. What we have to do is to reach understandings on all levels without explicit covenants because we haven't got enough trust.

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LUCE: It is an obligation of the United States, which has been unfulfilled so far, to develop and project certain ideas, proposals, and suggestions as to how the world community should be. If we are able to say what America stands for and what our convictions are and then examine the question of America's relation to the world, it becomes not only our duty but our nature to develop a type of world community in consonance with these principles, making compromises or whatever in accordance with our ethos, in accordance with our understanding of other people. I would say, let us have a little less emphasis on the Russians. I am not forgetting the gun they have in their hand or the size of it. We had better proceed with our guard up, as the saying is, as an aim to make a mutually good agreement here and there, but we should be trying at the same time to develop a reasonable and in some sense a radically new world system. As we develop our own ideas and get agreement or partial agreement with other countries, always implicitly there will be the invitation

to the Russians to join that developing world community in such a way as suits them. We should not make our idea of how to settle the world depend on what the Russians say.

BERLE: The crushing thing that we have to meet is really what was called old-fashioned imperialism. That is the real reason why you have distrust, and the fantasy, which is unhappily not a fantasy, of the cold war. It is that we are trying to allay by trying to find some method of getting inside the Soviet complex to convince them of two things: First, we don't intend to change their social organization. That is their business. We do regard as hostile anything that undertakes to be hostile to us. Next, our vision of the world is totally upset when the Soviet Union imposes its vision of the world in the singular ungentle way it has done on others by force. This is really about where we start and stop.

MILLIS: I think a very strong argument can be brought out that an alteration in our present foreign policy will make the total destruction less and less likely and will bring us nearer and nearer to a time when we can escape the overwhelming threat. I see an extraordinary and unique opportunity, one that has never occurred in the past history of international relations. Because the destruction is bound to be so total, because everybody knows it—the Russians as well as ourselves—we have an opportunity for normalizing international relations in a way they have never been normalized in the past.

BERLE: I wonder if there is not agreement on this: The present situation is unsatisfactory, and unless some way is found to change the pattern we don't see it getting any more satisfactory. We are, therefore, looking for some way of shifting the pattern of affairs. The only way we see is to

take advantage of the present apparent stand-off, if stand-off there is, to try to see what measures of accord can be found, if any, from which an abatement of the arms race can proceed. Summed up, isn't that about what it comes to?

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BUCHANAN: I would like to ask Father Murray a question. It seems to me that when you accept dialectical materialism and the messianic theory that goes with it, and assuming that it is really effective in Russia, you are caught in a kind of paradox. That is, you are in a sense admitting the truth of the doctrine.

MURRAY: The question of the objective truth of the doctrine is, of course, the central issue.

BUCHANAN: Do they act in accordance with it?

MURRAY: That is my thesis, that they do, substantially.

BUCHANAN: Then you are admitting a peculiar kind of truth. I wonder if you want to accept it.

MURRAY: In the first instance, I am admitting simply a fact; the fact that this particular instrument is in control of both their purposes and their actions.

BUCHANAN: Suppose you run across a man in a hospital who believes he is Napoleon. Do you assume he is Napoleon and will act that way?

MURRAY: If I were his keeper, I think I would assume that he would act in accordance with his own inner view.

BUCHANAN: Suppose you believe that the Soviet doctrine is false. Then they will be behaving in a peculiar way which will not follow from your assumptions if you assume that they will follow their own doctrine.

MURRAY: That I don't see. Whether the doctrine be false or not, it tells them to do this or that. Therefore, when I put myself in their context, I may expect them to do this or that, and what I want to know on the level of statesmanship is what they are going to do, not whether or not their theory is capable of substantiation.

BUCHANAN: It does not seem to me that the Russian doctrine is failing.

MURRAY: Whether or not they are following the doctrine, there is the further argument whether or not the doctrine is true.

BUCHANAN: I think they are connected. They can't follow it if it is not true.

MURRAY: They can't follow it? All I say is that I think they have.

BUCHANAN: It seems to me your judgment that they have followed it involves the funny paradox that their doctrine is true.

MURRAY: I, if I am a good statesman, would try to lay down some basis for further expectations. I can find no other basis, in the first place. Secondly, I just think we have done ourselves in by meeting every concrete situation only when it arose in terms of a purely pragmatic response.

NIEBUHR: I would define pragmatism as a concession to historical contingency. I would say that we have not been pragmatic enough. We have not been pragmatic because from Roosevelt to Eisenhower we had a fixed doctrine of anti-imperialism. According to this, the Russians and we were anti-imperialist. This is really a fantastic bit of our doctrine. As a matter of fact, we are dealing not only with Soviet imperialism but with American imperialism. Ours is a very reluctant imperialism because we have the power to influence the destinies of many nations.

MURRAY: I agree that we have not been sufficiently pragmatic. Probably it shows itself in the instance that you noted—our anti-imperialism. We somehow feel that it is morally wrong for anybody to have political power over anybody else. It is as simple as that. Our anti-imperialism, so called, is based upon this completely irrational dogmatic feeling.

REDFIELD: I think that the validity of your analysis as to the Russian purpose—inflexible dynamism against the West—might be open to some criticism on the ground that you seem to be accepting that inevitable opposition between communism and the West which they also accept. If I may put it harshly, you sound just as Hegelian as they do.

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KERR: I would agree with Father Murray's point that an understanding of the Communist ideology is absolutely basic to an understanding of Russian policy. One can't really understand what has happened within Russia without an understanding of this ideology, because if you look upon it just as leaders subject to political pressures they certainly

would not have done what they have done. You cannot otherwise understand the tremendous emphasis on investment, the massive exploitation of the workers which has taken place—the greatest exploitation in the world today. If ideology is absolutely basic and if they do not respond to political pressures and ethical motives as we tend to in the West, then it is important to know where this ideology would lead them in the world scene. I would agree that logically it leads them to world domination, if (a) they continue their ideology, and (b) if it is possible for them to dominate the world physically.

But how do you oppose, if you wish to oppose, a nation with such an ideology so that it will not conquer the world and destroy what we consider to be basic values in human life? There are two ways of doing this. One would be to help them, to the extent we can, in the change of their ideology so that over time they do not remain what they now are; or, second, through direct opposition—just standing in front of them and saying you can go no further. Our dilemma is that these two methods work in opposite directions. If you want to change their ideology, you would say let us be nice to them, let us persuade them that they can live with capitalism, let us have a lot of exchange back and forth. Direct opposition means maintaining the solid front, building up armaments as they build up armaments, and so forth; to some extent reinforcing their current ideology that there has to be a war between the two worlds. What do you do when you are faced with this dilemma? My answer would be that the only thing you can do is to work for time. Two things are necessary to make the time constructive. You have to balance their power with your power. This means particularly at the scientific and military levels, but hopefully to balance their military power through disarmament agreements at the lowest possible level. At the same

time, try to work to restructure the situation so that over time their ideology might be changed or the situation might be changed so you did not have to rely forever on this balance of power. So, then, how would you restructure the situation?

One, the reason you get peace in industrial relations despite all the strikes is that you very seldom see the destruction of one party by the other as you do in international relations. In industrial relations you have a situation really of mutual survival. If the union destroys the plant, it has destroyed the employment of its members. This is not quite as true on the other side. If the employer destroys the union, he has not destroyed to the same extent his work force. But he has destroyed, in the bitter battle which will take place, a good deal of the morale and the support he otherwise would have. How do you achieve this kind of mutual survival in international relations? I would say that the only answer to that, and it is not a full answer, is to trade. The more trade you can have back and forth, the greater dependence you have economically, as, for example, between Canada and the United States.

Second, in industrial relations you have two power organizations with the same citizenry; that is, the workers are the citizens of the plant. They are also the citizens of the trade union. As such they have a good deal of knowledge about both sides, and can exercise some influence. In international relations the closest you can get to that is by having the fullest possible cultural exchange, particularly at the intellectual level, appealing to the new intellectual elite in Russia. Any advance in industrial society becomes very dependent upon its intellectuals. Really the future, I am sure, belongs to the intellectually trained. You can get a little closer if people in both countries have about the same information and trade knowledge back and forth.

Three, in industrial relations the reason you get peace is that you have a superior external power which is the state, the community, with its rule of law. This would suggest working in the direction of a more powerful world rule of Law all the time. I would say at the same time that none of these things is anywhere near as easy to do in the international scene as it is in the domestic scene of industrial relations.

MURRAY: How do you sustain the necessary measure of implacability against a force that I would myself judge to be implacable without going over into a political policy of unconditional surrender, which I would consider to be just as disastrous as our military policy of unconditional surrender was? How do you do this balancing in the middle?

BURDICK: There is one point where the analogy falls down between the plant and the planet. On the planet level you each have as the hole card the potential to destroy the other. We can't do any of the things that you have indicated until we assure the first thing, which is time. This is why survival has become so important.

MURRAY: I don't have too much trouble with the notion of survival. The famous Russian sneak attack I think is nonsense. They are interested in the survival of the world revolution, and they will not do anything to imperil its course. The only purpose of my paper was to fill out the idea—yes, of course, co-existence but let us be quite clear in our own minds what we are called upon to co-exist with, or, if you want to speak of accommodation, let us be very clear what we are accommodating.

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CHAIRMAN: Would Dr. Buchanan care to elaborate his proposition that because the Russian theory is false, therefore they cannot act in accordance with it?

BUCHANAN: There is very little of the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist dogma being followed in any literal way at all. The thing has not panned out. It seems to me that externally there is a certain kind of childishness and irresponsibility about Russian foreign policy. It does not show the kind of solidity or substantiality that Father Murray is imputing to them. It does not seem to me they are being doctrinaire and wise in terms of their own ideology about their moves at all.

KERR: In what sense is it false? It is obviously an ideology which can be used to organize a modern industrial state and attain a great deal of economic progress within that state, as well as ability for the ideology and its proponents to survive over a period of time. In terms of survival value it certainly is not false. As I see it, the essence of the ideology is this: The technology must be absolutely supreme. That is the one real consideration. You must wipe away all aspects of the pre-existing culture which stand in the way of fulfilling the technological possibilities of the modern world. This technology can best be advanced through the mechanism of the state, through the power of the state, relying on a unified party, relying on a police force. Only through the power of the state can you wipe out the centers of opposition which might arise to the fulfillment of the technology—the church, independent trade unions, humanitarian considerations. Only through the power of the state can you exploit the people sufficiently to get the maximum amount of investment which allows the growth of scientific investigation and of capital goods to release the modern technology. The so-called withering away of the state I think you can put aside as a

lot of chaff which was talked about to appeal to some intellectuals and draw them into the fold. It is an ideology which is trying to give modern technology its fullest scope, regardless of the cost, regardless of any other considerations.

NIEBUHR: It seems to me you left out one thing. The original Marxist theory was that property was the source of all injustice. You wipe out property and then you have by definition a just society and a non-imperialistic state. That is obviously false.

KERR: Sure it is false in that sense. I don't think myself that justice or injustice really has much to do with it. I would argue, and I think the facts prove it, that there is the most massive exploitation of the workers in Russia of any place in the world. In Western society about two-thirds of the national product goes to wage- and salary-earners. In Russia it is only about one-third.

CHAIRMAN: What is the appeal?

KERR: It is the ideology of forced draft industrialization. While we were getting industrialized a little over a century ago, and in England a century and a half ago, industry was something to be hated. Now today the revolution and the protest are not against industrialization in the capitalist form but in favor of industrialization in any form provided it is successful. That is what the Communists offer.

BUCHANAN: What relation does this have to the original Marxist-Leninist doctrine?

KERR: Not very much. This goes back in history before Marx, the idea that technology has to be freed.

CHAIRMAN: The only way you can sell this is on the theory, as Marx sold it, that nineteenth century capitalism is cruel and unjust. We want the benefits of industrialization; we do not want the cruelty and the injustice. The way we get this industrialization without cruelty and injustice is to have the state take it over.

KERR: I say that is just the sales talk.

CHAIRMAN: What we are trying to find out is what the ideology is.

KERR: I don't believe that has anything to do with it. I say you find a person's or system's ideology in what they do. The one thing they have always done is to free technology and the science which stands behind the technology. That is the one thing which goes the whole way through. I think that is the essential ideology. I would agree with Dr. Niebuhr's point that we need to have world areas under our influence through ideas and aid, and we better get the ideas and aid to them. I am all for that. Take a situation like that in Ghana where they want to make progress. They got their independence. They want to move ahead. How are they going to do it? They look to the United States and they see that we have an independent labor movement which fights the employers. But their trade union movement asks: Can we really fight the employers and hold up progress? Don't we have to ally ourselves with the state and push for economic progress instead of exercising a protest function? They are now looking very strongly to Israel and a movement which is not really like an American trade union movement at all, but a mechanism for the economic development of Israel. Ghana looks at the West and sees conflict. They say a rich society can afford conflict. We can't. We have to

unify to move ahead. We can only unify along with the state. We don't want to go as far as Russia has gone, because that is too much exploitation and too little freedom and the trade union is merely an agent of the state. We have to find some place in between.

I think that was your point, Dr. Niebuhr, that we have to be more sympathetic to these alternatives and not condemn them because they are different from our pluralistic system with its regulated conflict. We have to find some ideas and start selling them to keep control over sufficient world areas, as well as enough military and scientific strength, to balance Russia during this interim period while we are trying to re-structure the total situation.

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BUCHANAN: I would like to ask Father Murray: Do you think Russia is working it out? Do you think that dialectical materialism is covering all of these phenomena?

MURRAY: The success in the long run is not the point. It may be the ethic of failure in the long run. That I have no trouble in accepting at all. You just can't do this kind of thing. The truth is on the reverse side of pragmatism—that whatever is not true will somewhere fail to work. This whole thing is going to fail to work.

NIEBUHR: You might say if we were lucky and were not going to be annihilated in this whole struggle, this might be subject to the same developments that came about in Anglo-Saxon history under the theory of royalism.

MURRAY: The only trouble I have with that is this: The thing we confront at the moment is unique. The impe-

rialism here cannot survive except on the basis of the ideology and vice versa. The whole process of historical analogy, which is the only way we have of understanding what goes on, is something that I would be a little bit careful about. The old thing always was that the initial fanaticism was dulled either by success or by failure; it wouldn't matter which. This particular thing seems to be able to survive both so far and therefore has no historical parallel.

GOLDMAN: Father Murray, from this conception of yours relating to the uniqueness of the situation, it seems to me that a kind of grim determinism gets into your analysis. I wonder if it is not overly pessimistic and in some sense inaccurate. The question always is: What are we trying to co-exist with? Either your answer or Kerr's answer is overly simple and rather unhistorical. You say, as I understand it, that we are trying to deal with an inflexible dogma. Kerr says we are dealing with a doctrine of technological change. Could we not recognize that their stage at the present time is in part both of these, in part national interest, which Russia has been pursuing since long before communism, in part a kind of race war, in part a humanitarian drive? This situation is not unique in the world. It is confused, it is complex, it is like the French revolution. What is unique, it seems to me, is not the situation, but our reaction to it. In the past, when we have met such confused and complex world revolutionary situations; we have tended to be more adaptable. We have tended to be accommodatable. We are not now. The obvious reason we are not is that we have talked ourselves into believing that the things that are going on represent an attack on values we cannot change or adapt. There are certain bedrock values involved in this. This leads to the question whether this definition of the world situation necessarily forces us back on bedrock values and whether it is accurate.

KERR: May I follow up my view of the Russian scheme as being forced draft industrialization? I think, incidentally, that this forces some changes on them. I would feel that we ought to play for time until their internal contradictions catch up with them. The single-minded emphasis upon technology eventually is going to bring very great changes within Russia, and that is why we are fighting for time, until some of the changes take place. First, technology is basically dependent upon science. So you have to put a tremendous amount of money into education. Then you get the phenomenon of the intellectual elite being the most important group in your society. For the sake of advancing technology you have to have an advance in science, and that means these intellectuals have to keep up with the world and are developing more and more power all the time. You can't handle them as easily as you handle the managers. You cannot handle them as easily as the peasants and the military.

Additionally, I would like to point out that in the occupational hierarchy, as technology goes on, there arises a more and more diverse structure. Under this educated layer skilled groups will also get power and professional status. They will move around; you can't keep your hands on them. Second, the level of living over time also is bound to rise. As it rises, you get more people into the service trades, which do not lend themselves to as much central control. You get into more variation in food production, and can't run it like the production of wheat or the production of military equipment. As you get into diversification of products, you have to break down your industrial system into smaller units, and you have to give more authority to those units to adjust to all the little markets which spring up. All this will also bring greater leisure, and with greater leisure there will come more travel, more reading, a more educated mass generally. As a result of these factors the contradictions between the mass

and the ruling class will build up and inevitably force changes within the system if we give it time and help it along.

MURRAY: So these changes take place. Could you make some educated conjecture as to the effect of this on foreign policy? These are domestic changes within the Russian complex as such. How will these changes, operating inside, affect foreign policy?

KERR: My guess is that they will soften the whole system - both internally and externally over time.

MURRAY: Would you hold with those who say that the danger in foreign policy comes the moment the system is softened internally?

KERR: Yes. During the current period they are going through the softening-up process, while the ruling class is trying to hold on as the mass changes, and they may want to use external threats for the sake of maintaining ruling-class power. That is why you have to maintain your balance of power in the meantime so that they can't go wild with it for internal purposes.

NIEBUHR: About this danger point, wouldn't it be right to say that the danger point is when the ruling oligarchy gets desperate? Therefore, the policy must be not to confront them with an absolute fact.

KERR: Not make them desperate, but hope that it will change slowly enough so that they can adjust.

MURRAY: Somehow or other, I don't know how this is done, removing survival as a political or even military issue.

GOLDMAN: I am led to the question: Are we engaged in a life-and-death struggle involving fundamental values? It seems to me that Kerr's analysis still assumes this in the sense that we have the good values and what we should do is maneuver and wait and so forth and let them hang themselves. Is that correct?

KERR: Yes, I assume that we have the good values.

GOLDMAN: And that there are things in all of this which we cannot reconcile ourselves to without giving up our fundamental values?

KERR: Yes.

GOLDMAN: I would take the position that there is not anything very much that we cannot adjust to within the American tradition.

BUCHANAN: What we are looking for here is some way of co-existing with or tolerating socialist revolutions all over the world. They are of many forms, they are very inventive, and so on. They are not in themselves the new world. Socialism, it seems to me, as you look at it now, including the Russian form, is a receivership for bankrupt societies. It also is a step towards a kind of freedom and justice which these societies have not had. Our problem is to exist as a capitalist society in, possibly, a completely socialist revolutionary world. The purpose of socialism is to sort out the possible institutions in a kind of melting pot and to rearrange them into a form that we have not yet imagined; technology, of course, is the great power under this. The dynamism of it is fundamentally technological and scientific. I agree with Kerr on all that he was saying on that.

MURRAY: Do you think that communism is striving to do this thing, sorting out viable institutions?

BUCHANAN: Yes. I don't think they imagine their intention to be this except on occasion, but they show signs of doing it like mad. In very early stages they did.

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BURDICK: I think you join the issue in a very direct way. What Goldman suggests is that Soviet communism is pluralistic. Kerr suggested that it will change. Father Murray says flatly that if it changes, the whole thing will collapse. Here I think is the central issue. They are committed to a material metaphysics. There is no question of that. There has been a high degree of consistency about it. But it seems to me that there is a considerable amount of evidence that they have changed the ideology a great deal. Can you give an example of what you think a failure to change in a basic issue has been?

MURRAY: If you ask the question with respect to decades or generations, I would maintain that the basic ideology, the atheism and materialism, would be entirely controlling. I would never undertake to explain any individual maneuver or tactic in terms of the ultimate atheism or materialism. I would take no such simple view as that. But in the long run this is the central thing. If they allowed free discussion among variants of the Communist line as it may have changed over the decades and generations of its existence, if some such basic change as this were to take place, then I would say that the structure is turning into something else. It may turn into something we can live with. That I don't deny. Therefore, I would welcome all such changes just as I would

welcome the changes that Kerr has projected. But then that has nothing to do with policies that I have to adopt at the moment. When these changes have occurred, then I will begin my process of accommodation. Just at the moment I do not see that this is anything we can accommodate to.

CHAIRMAN: Couldn't we make the same mistake Marx made? Marx looked at nineteenth century capitalism and said this is the way it is always going to go.

KERR: Also there is in their basic theory the idea of thesis and antithesis. There must be some antithesis going on within the Russian system itself.

MURRAY: I agree. To that extent I am an Hegelian, too. What I am afraid of here is that we interpose between ourselves and the Russian reality a theory of freedom and contingency which underlies part of what I call the West. They don't. Their basic belief is deterministic.

MILLIS: You said, Father Murray, that after 1945 fellow-traveling governments controlled the new states, which they did not. The Russians were engaged in a battle as to whether Poland would be controlled essentially by the West or by the Communists. The origin of the cold war grew up not in a situation in which Russia was completely in control of things but when she was facing what seemed to her an attempt of the West to suppress her again, and brought back the memories she had of the post-1918 period and the Western intervention at that time. To say her actions were wholly stupid except as you explain them on the grounds of an ideology of world conquest is a misreading of history. To say that in the United States, Great Britain, and France a mood of good will prevailed that was pathological is an extraordinarily strong statement. While you might say that the general

tone, especially of the more liberal American voices of opinion, was favorable to Russia, on the other hand there was very violent opposition to Russia within the United States. We had just fired the atomic bomb and showed ourselves in possession of a weapon which was regarded at that time as absolute. A lot of voices in the country were saying we have got the absolute weapon, let us put it up to the Russians and tell them to put up or shut up. That attitude was there. We got the Truman-Atlee statement, which implied an offer, in 1945. It was not until 1946, after Stalin's famous statement of February 15, which was widely regarded as the declaration of the cold war, that the Baruch Plan was put out. I have never regarded the Baruch Plan as something that could have looked to the people in the Kremlin as a genuine offer.

For some of the reasons I have just indicated, it does not seem to me that your analysis is an accurate depiction of what it is we are trying to co-exist with. When you put together Kerr's remarks and Goldman's and add them together, then perhaps you get a fairer picture of what we are trying to co-exist with, in which doctrine has some importance but is not controlling, and in which the necessity for industrialization has very great importance, but again is not wholly controlling, and so on. Regardless of when we have decided what it is we are co-existing with, I am puzzled as to what practical use we can make of this knowledge. You offer your analysis of what we are co-existing with but are unable to offer any suggestion or prediction, nor are you offering any suggestion as to how the action not predicted could be met.

MURRAY: There has been something new let loose. That is my basic intuition. I can only give it as an intuition. The basic thing I am trying to protest against is trying to understand this thing in the light of certain categories that we find

familiar, that are congenial to our mentality and are based on our own experience and European experience in general. These I distrust. Why I wanted to emphasize the uniqueness of this thing is that if you overlook it, I think you are in bad trouble.

GOLDMAN: Do I understand that you would rule out any interpretation of what is going on in the world as simply a continuation in somewhat new forms of the ancient problem of tyranny?

MURRAY: Here I would have to reach for a fairly ultimate position. This, I think, is the first time you have had in history a tyranny—a political tyranny—formally and deliberately organized on the basis of atheism.

BUCHANAN: The ordinary voting machinery we are living with at present is not working very well anywhere. There is a kind of groping for a new kind of politics. We have to invent some new political forms to deal with these monster states, and the strange things that have happened to citizenship all over the world. Seventeenth century England was also threshing through a period in which some great inventions were made; at least we still think so. Couldn't this be happening right now?

MURRAY: I don't think so because all I can see is a variant of the manipulation of the masses by an elite. What is the relation between technology and politics? The Soviet Union has established one very definite, clearly defined relationship. We also have established a particular relationship. The other nations may be seeking one or another variant of either the American or the Soviet concept of the relationship. What they have in common in the world revolution is the simple

thing of escape from misery. There is no reason under science and technology why people should be so miserable as they hitherto have been, why there should not be enough to eat, adequate shelter, reasonable comfort in life, and so on and so on. According to what political formula are the resources of science and technology to be utilized in order to effect this highly desirable result? That seems to me to be in a very broad statement pretty much the issue in conflict, or in doubt, at the moment.

NIEBUHR: There is another thing in the world revolution. It is not merely technology. It is national freedom against the infringement of European imperialism of the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries. That is a great part of the revolution.

MURRAY: Yes, but the question is whether they want national freedom as a means toward economic advancement or as an end in itself.

NIEBUHR: They might want both. The Indonesians are probably willing to sacrifice a good deal of economic efficiency for the sake of absolute freedom.

MURRAY: They are exploring, I suppose, the theoretical implications as well as the institutional implications of what is one of the phenomena of the world revolution, namely, that the old, eighteenth century, clear-cut distinction between politics and economics has completely disappeared. This we know better now. The era of laissez-faire liberalism and capitalism is simply outworn. You cannot separate and compartmentalize politics and economics. We worked it out over history in terms of various oscillations. They in turn are beginning to try to work it out. I don't know what

the end result will be. I think I would still stick with my admittedly moral and intuitive judgment of condemnation of the Soviet system both in terms of its theory and also in terms of the casualties that have come forward in the course of its practice. Whatever else, not this, I would say.

BUCHANAN: You could do that with the stages of any revolution. The British Revolution in the seventeenth century or the French Revolution—you would want to condemn some of those steps, too. They were pretty awful, pretty immoral, pretty evil.

NIEBUHR: Could I suggest a possible consensus between you and the rest of us about the uniqueness of the Russian system? I at least would accept the fact that the consistency of the dogmatism and the pretension of the redemptive quality of the revolution are almost unique. Nevertheless, there is nothing unique in history that does not have some kind of a pattern. We find all kinds of patterns. The French Revolution we have obviously stated. If one can analyze what is unique and what is general in the patterns of history, I think we could reach some agreement and say there is a unique consistency in the Russians' dogmatism and there is a unique relationship of a power system to the dogmatism as there has never before been. It is also unique in the spread of its success. This does not change the fact that historical contingency can dilute any kind of dogma and may be diluting this dogma, or may be corrupting it or emptying it of dynamic meaning, without ever changing the symbols. History empties symbols of meaning, changes the dynamism. It seems to me that your excellent statement of uniqueness errs on the side of leaving out the pragmatism of history, the adjustment to the contingencies of history.

MURRAY: It has changed within itself—changed both in theory and also in practice. All I have been saying is that as of the moment no basic change has occurred, and, secondly, that when the basic change does occur it will be something quite other than it is now, and then we will be confronted with a situation quite other than what we are now confronted with. Our problem at the moment is not, however, to confront the thing that will be after the changes have occurred, but the thing that is now, which I believe is still acting according to its nature, a nature still essentially unaltered.

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CHAIRMAN: Do we agree with the Kerr formula about the way in which this should be confronted, which I take to be a maintenance of what he called the balance of power?

KERR: What I say is that if during this stage in which they do confront us with an ideology which works towards world revolution we can hold them off through some balance of power, then the long-run trends of the world are working in such a direction that we don't have to keep the balance of power forever. We could have peace on some other basis. Father Murray's argument, as I understand it, would really mean that we had to have a balance of power forever because neither they nor we are going to change, or that if it was not possible to have a balance of power forever, then one side or the other would find it advantageous at some moment to break the peace and conquer the other side. We might choose our moment.

GOLDMAN: The success of your hypothesis depends on the prediction that by and large the forces which are at work will take the world toward certain values that we hold good.

KERR: I would say that eventually industrialization is going to bring a world-wide system. That is in its very nature. This world-wide system will be a pluralistic one, more nearly like our own than the monolithic system of Russia. This does not mean that every country is going to end up being exactly like every other country, but more like us than them. I think that is inherent in industrialization. I would argue—and I really do believe—that the industrial society is different in many ways from any type of society we have ever had in history. We cannot just generalize from the past. We have to take a new look at this new form of society. It will be more pervasive around the world than anything before. It will be more dynamic than anything we have ever had before. It will diversify people much more in their productive tasks than any society we have ever had before. It will bring a good many other differences. There is a logic in it which works in the direction of pluralism. Eventually, providing we can avoid catastrophe in the meantime, it will come out to be a pretty good society. I would say that men by and large in the long run adapt themselves pretty well.

MURRAY: But you would not exclude the possibility that it may also turn out the most destructive thing we ever had.

KERR: It could. I just don't think it is going to happen.

CHAIRMAN: Let us ask what the bearing of these remarks is on Father Murray's proposition which, I think, could stand some further explication in relation to the question of maximum risk and minimum security. We have just touched on that and I think it is a very important point to understand. As I understand your proposition, Kerr, you are not going to take any very great risks militarily, and that is not the way I understand Father Murray.

MURRAY: In the Hungarian affair, for example, I would rather have hoped that there would have been some people sitting in the State Department with nothing else to do except figure out what would be likely to happen in a place like Hungary or in the whole belt, if you will, of satellite states. I should have thought that somebody would have thought of the possibilities of an armed or semi-armed or almost unarmed revolt of the Hungarian type, and what we would do in such a case, and what the risks might be in doing them. What could we afford to do—ranging from nothing at all, which is what we did, through moral indignation, through what I call nicely calculated military intervention? I do not necessarily mean dropping paratroopers into Austria. We might have parachuted arms. It might have been simply a token intervention with arms as its symbol in some fashion, not necessarily troops stepping over the border. I don't know what it might have been. I am not a military expert.

MILLIS: To the extent that we could get a clearer idea of what the real restraints on the Russians are, that we could make a clearer evaluation of the risks involved in military or similar policy—no one could oppose that. I do have the idea that this is awfully difficult to do. Military factors are just not susceptible to that kind of reasonable rational analysis. Most people are apt to think they are. But you never know what you are going to get when you resort to force. You never can firmly decide how the results are going to fall out.

NIEBUHR: We have left out of our recent conversations what was very much on our minds months ago. That was the new dimension arising out of the common predicament between us and the Russians, which does not cancel out any of the differences we have but makes all the analogies of history

faulty, because no competing empires have ever had the situation before that they would destroy themselves as they destroyed each other.

MURRAY: I am substantially attacking the problem on the level of understanding, which indeed was the level that I think Millis was operating on. How do you understand the situation that confronts us? Millis understood it in one way. I tried to understand it in other terms and on a different level. This is all right. This is a contribution to public understanding.

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